Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law by Law Review, North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 35 | Number 2 Article 1
2-1-1957
Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law
North Carolina Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 35 N.C. L. Rev. 177 (1957).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol35/iss2/1
FOURTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Fourth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is designed
to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court during
the past two terms of court and to supplement past and future Surveys
in presenting developments in North Carolina case law over a period
of time.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that were
decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to discuss only
those decisions which are of particular importance-cases regarded as
being of significance and interest to those concerned with the work of the
Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes and matters of first
impression in the law of North Carolina.
Most of the research for and writing of this article was accomplished
by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the Law Review,
working under the supervision of the Faculty of the Law School of the
University of North Carolina. Some sections, however, represent the
individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review and the sections for which they
are responsible are:
James A. Alspaugh (Future Interests, Real Property, and Wills and
Administration); Frederick A. Babson, Jr. (Agency and Workmen's
Compensation, Contracts, and Insurance); James P. Crews (Criminal
Law and Procedure); Robin L. Hinson (Civil Procedure (Pleadings
and Parties)); Harriet D. Holt (Administrative Law, Business As-
sociations, Credit Transactions, and Sales) ; Billy F. Maready (Torts) ;
Lewis H. Parham, Jr. (Domestic Relations, Equity, Municipal Corpora-
tions, and Trusts) ; Thomas P. Walker (Constitutional Law, Damages,
and Evidence).
Throughout this article the North Carolina Supreme Court will be
referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The United
States Supreme Court will be designated only by, its full name. North
Carolina General Statutes will be signified by "G. S."
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWt
JURISDICTION
It is fundamental that an administrative tribunal must act within its
jurisdiction.
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court reported in 242 N. C. 533 through 244 N. C. 398.
t For other cases involving administrative law, see AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In North Carolina ex rel. Util. Comm'n. v. Youngblood Truck
Lines, Inc.' irregular route trucking company A had petitioned for
authority to interchange freight with trucking company B. The Utilities
Commission dismissed the petition because it had no jurisdiction since
.B was not a party to the petition and there was no allegation that B
desired to enter or had entered into any agreement with the petitioner.
The Court affirmed the dismissal pursuant to G. S. § 62-121.28 (2)2 and
further held that neither the Commission nor the court below should
have considered and dealt with matters relating to the merits of the
proceeding.
In another case,3 the Industrial Commission had granted an award
for payment of compensation in accordance with an agreement between
an employer and an injured "employee." Over a year later the "em-
ployee" moved to have the agreement set aside because the requisite
employer-employee relationship was lacking. The Commission granted
the motion and dismissed the case on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction.
The Court ordered the proceeding remanded to the Industrial Commis-
sion with instructions that an order be entered setting aside its former
approval of the agreement and dismissing the proceeding for lack of
jurisdiction. This last was necessary because the Commission had set
aside the agreement, not merely its approval, and had ordered a refund.
RATE FIXING AND VALUATION
A case, not squarely bearing on the question of jurisdiction, but
somewhat related thereto, is North Carolina ex rel. Util. Conin'n v.
North Carolina.4 In that case the Commission based a fifteen per cent
increase for basic freight rates and charges of intrastate railway carriers
upon the findings made in an Interstate Commerce Commission hearing,
in which the Utilities Commission had "participated," and on the fact
that discrimination would result if the intrastate rates were not raised
since the ICC had granted a fifteen per cent increase. The lower court
reversed the Utilities Commission's order because it failed to comply with
G. S. § 62-124, 5 which prescribes the conditions for the determination of
increased rates. The Court further made it clear that the commission is
2243 N. C. 442, 91 S. E. 2d 212 (1956).
'The statute provides that "common carrier[s] by motor vehicle .. . shall
establish reasonable through routes and joint rates, charges, and classifications
with other such common carriers by motor vehicle, and with the approval of the
Commission, may do so with irregular route common carriers by motor vehicle...
[Emphasis added.]
Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N. C. 84, 92 S. E. 2d 673 (1956).
'243 N. C. 12, 89 S. E. 2d 727 (1956).
The statute provides: "In fixing any maximum rate or charge, or tariff of
rates or charges for any common carrier ... the Commission shall take into
consideration ... the value of the property of such carrier ... used for the public
... or the fair value of the service rendered in determining the value of the
property. .. .
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not a policy making body for the state; therefore, a long line of its de-
cisions could establish its policy, but not the policy of the state.
The problem of the proper valuation of public utility properties used
to serve the public arose in another connection. In North Carolina ex
rel. Util. Coinm'n v. Greensboro6 the city appealed from an order of the
Commission raising the bus fare five cents, on the ground that the Com-
mission considered only the transportation service properties of the
utility company and the return thereon. This was claimed to be contrary
to the city's franchise to the company, which provided that the franchise
for electric and bus services was granted as a unit. Nevertheless, the
Court found that the valuation had been made in accordance with G. S.
§ 62-124. The service charge for transportation is correlative to the
value of the properties used to furnish that service.
In North Carolina ex rel. Util. Comm'n. v. Municipal Corp.7 the
Court sustained an order of the Commission for the increase of rates for
electric current. The protesting municipalities appealed on several
grounds, which amounted to allegations of discrimination in the rates
charged the municipalities for electricity for resale. The Court held
that there were factors justifying making this rate different from certain
other rates, and that there was no discrimination. Accordingly, the
Court sustained the new rate pursuant to G. S. §§ 62-26.10 and 62-123.8
During the period when the increases were being considered the Com-
mission had held a conference with the officials of the electric company
without notifying counsel for protestants. The Court said that this was
"unfortunate," but held that there had been no prejudice.9
AUTHORIZATION FOR SALE OF SECURITIES
In North Carolina ex rel. Util. Comn'n v. North Carolina Tel. and
Tel. Co.'0 the Court found that the Commission had in accordance with
G. S. §§ 62-82 and 62-8311 correctly required that the petitioner tele-
phone company offer its unissued common stock for sale at $125.00 per
share instead of the originally proposed price of $100.00.
8244 N. C. 247, 93 S. E. 2d 151 (1956).
7243 N. C. 193, 90 S. E. 2d 519 (1955).8 G. S. § 62-26.10 provides for the review of Commission action by the court;
it states the scope of the review and specifically sets out six grounds for reversal
or modification of the Commission's order if there has been prejudice. The statute
further states that "the rates fixed ...shall be prima facie just and reasonable."
G. S. § 62-123 provides likewise that "rates ... established by the Commission shall
be deemed just and reasonable. . ."
' In the conference a rider was approved which was found to be beneficial to the
protestants, and, additionally, the electric company offered to withdraw it.10 243 N. C. 46, 89 S. E. 2d 802 (1955).
" G. S. § 62-82 provides that there shall be no issue of securities of a utility
company until and after investigation and approval by the Commission. G. S. §
62-83 provides that the Commission may grant or deny an application for approval,
or may, if necessary, modify the conditions under which securities may be sold.
1957]
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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
In Burton v. Reidsville 2 the Court commented that although it can-
not interfere arbitrarily with the authority of administrative officers, it
may review the officers' acts to "determine in a proper proceeding
whether a public official has acted capriciously or arbitrarily or in bad
faith or in disregard of the law."'13
In Burlington City Bd. of Educ. v. Allen14 the Court held under
G. S. § 115-125 that an individual whose land is to be appropriated by
a board of education cannot appeal to the Superior Court until the final
report of the appraisers, assigned by the Clerk of the Court to appraise
property, has been returned.
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
Several cases concerned the proper use of the writs of certiorari and
mandamui. In City of Sanford v. Southern Oil Co.15 defendant sought
certiorari to review a special assessment of his property made to pay for
improvements to adjacent streets. At the time, his appeal from the final
assessment of the Board of Aldermen had not been perfected in ac-
cordance with G. S. § 168-89. The lower court dismissed the petition,
and the Court affirmed because a writ of certiorari cannot ordinarily be
granted where procedure for appeal has been provided by statute.
Certiorari may be used to correct errors of law where no statutory
means for appeal exists to review the proceedings and determinations of
lower tribunals.16 It may also be used where a statutory means for ap-
peal does exist, provided (1) the party seeking review was unable to
perfect it within the statutory period, (2) this fact was due to no fault
of his own, and (3) the grounds for review are meritorious. 17 In ad-
dition, the writ of certiorari may be used as an ancillary writ in a
mandamus action where the petitioner seeks to have the records of an
inferior court brought up for use in the trial before the higher court.' 8
In Wilson Realty Co. v. City and County Planning Bd.19 the Court
held that the lower court had proceeded incorrectly in considering an
application for a writ of mandamus. The lower court had reviewed a de-
cision of the Planning Board of the City of Winston-Salem under the
assumption that an application for mandamus invokes the court's ap-
pellate capacity to review errors of the Board. The Court pointed out
12243 N. C. 405, 90 S. E. 2d 700 (1956).
13Id. at 407, 90 S. E. 2d at 702.1"243 N. C. 520, 91 S. E. 2d 180 (1956).
1 244 N. C. 388, 93 S. E. 2d 560 (1956).
"
8 Wilson Realty Co. v. City and County Planning Bd., 243 N. C. 648, 92 S. E.
2d 82 (1956).lCity of Sanford v. Southern Oil Co., 244 N. C. 388, 93 S. E. 2d 560 (1956).18Ibid.; Wilson Realty Co. v. City and County Planning Bd., 243 N. C. 648, 92
S. E. 2d 82 (1956).
'9243 N. C. 648, 92 S. E. 2d 82 (1956).
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that a writ of certiorari is designed to review the proceedings of the
lower tribunals and to correct errors therein, whereas mandamus com-
pels performance of a clear legal duty, and is an exercise of original,
not appellate, jurisdiction.
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY
Bank as Agent for Collection
In First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Raynor,1 defendant Raynor
and his wife had a joint checking account with plantiff bank pursuant to
an agreement that the bank was "only ... depositor's collecting agent"
for all items deposited. The Credit Union, a co-defendant, mailed to
Raynor its check, drawn on another bank, for $800.00, payable to the
order of Raynor. His wife received the check and, without his knowl-
edge or consent, wrote "for deposit to the account of the within named
payee" on the back, and deposited it with plaintiff without signing his or
her name.2 The deposit slip also contained a statement to the effect that
the bank was only the "depositor's collecting agent." The joint account
showed a balance of $17.35, when the check was deposited, but the wife
at that time drew a check for $800.00, which the bank paid. Learning of
this, Raynor notified the Credit Union to stop payment, which it did, and
the check was dishonored on presentment.
In affirming judgment of nonsuit in plaintiff's action to recover the
$800.00, the Court pointed out that, by statute,3 in order to constitute
the transferee of a negotiable instrument, made payable to order, a holder
in due course, there must be an indorsement by the payee; and that the
drawer of a check may stop payment at any time before it is transferred
to a holder in due course. Plaintiff was held not to be a purchaser, but
merely an agent for collection,4 and, at that, an agent for Raynor's wife,
not Raynor, since he had not authorized his wife to deposit the check.
The Court added: ". . . she is the one who is alone responsible to plaintiff
for its money paid to her." 5
1243 N. C. 417, 90 S. E. 2d 894 (1956).
2 Although the report of the case stated that Raynor's wife wrote the words
on the back of the check, it is possible that they were stamped on the back by a
bank teller, since stamps containing an identical statement are commonly used by
banks. Moreover, if the teller had directed her to write anything on the back of
the check, it seems likely that he would have directed her to sign her husband's
name "by" her, or at least to sign her own name.
'G. S. § 25-35 (1953).
Of course, an agent for collection, if properly such, may obtain a lien on the
paper by issuing cash therefor.
S243 N. C. 417, 421, 90 S. E. 2d 894, 897 (1956).
1957]
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Effect on Master of Judgment Against Servant
In Bullock v. Crouch, plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to
judgment against defendant for the amount of damages determined by
a Virginia court in a previous action by plaintiff against defendant's
servant, the unsatisfied Virginia judgment having been transferred of
record to the North Carolina court. The Court held that for the prior
judgment to have binding effect upon defendant, he must have been a
party to the action or in privity with the defendant therein. The Court
cited an earlier decision7 where it was held that the master, when sued
by a plaintiff who has obtained an unpaid judgment against the servant,
is free to prove less damages if he can, while the plaintiff cannot obtain a
larger recovery than that awarded in the action against the servant.
McFarlane v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n.,s was an
action under the Tort Claims Act9 for damages for injuries resulting
from negligence of defendant's employee acting within the scope of his
employment. Plaintiff had, however, already collected $9,715.00 in
settlement of an action against the employee. The Tort Claims Act
limited recovery against the State thereunder to $8,000.00.10 Noting
that plaintiff had already recovered more than the maximum for which
defendant-employer could be liable, the Court affirmed dismissal,1 stat-
ing, ".... when the injured person sues the servant and recovers, he may
not thereafter recover against the master a sum greater than the verdict
against the employee.'
1 2
Dual Capacity of Servant: Imputability of Negligence
Dosher v. Hunt 3 presented the interesting situation of a defendant-
servant having two masters14 at once, with his negligence being imputable
to one but not to the other. Plaintiff was passenger in her own car,
being driven by defendant Hunt with plaintiff's consent or at her direc-
tion, thereby creating one master-servant relationship. There was also
evidence that the defendant Hunt was in the general employment of the
8243 N. C. 40, 89 S. E. 2d 749 (1955).
SPinnix v. Griffin, 221 N. C. 348, 20 S. E. 2d 366 (1942).
"244 N. C. 385, 93 S. E. 2d 557 (1956).
9 G. S. § 143-291 (1951).
10 A 1955 amendment increased the amount of damages that can be awarded to
$10,000.00.
'The action had been "dismissed" by the Industrial Commission, which hears
claims under the Tort Claims Act.
" 244 N. C. 385, 387, 93 S. E. 2d 557, 560 (1956). The Court obviously had in
mind an unsatisfied judgment against the employee, because "if the servant satisfies
the judgment against him[self], or obtains a verdict in his favor, no action will
lie against the master." Bullock v. Crouch, supra, note 6, at p. 42, which the
Court in the instant case cited to support its statement.
2. 243 N. C. 247, 90 S. E. 2d 374 (1955).
"' Strictly speaking, there was one master-servant relationship and one principal-
agent relationship, the relation between defendant corporation and defendant Hunt
being of a principal-agent nature.
[Vol. 35
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defendant corporation at the time of the collision with another car, al-
legedly due to Hunt's negligence, which had resulted in injuries to plain-
tiff.
In reversing a judgment of nonsuit as to the individual defendant,
the Court held that the doctrine of imputed negligence has no application
in an action by the master against his servant to recover for injuries
suffered by the master as a result of the servant's actionable negligence.
But in affirming judgment of nonsuit as to the corporate defendant, the
Court held that, since plaintiff had the right to control and direct the
operation of her car, in her suit against a third party, the driver's
negligence was imputable to her.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Conclusiveness of Commission's Fact-Finding
In Moore v. Superior Stone Co.,' 5 plaintiff was injured when 300
dynamite caps exploded. The Industrial Commission found that at the
time of the explosion, plaintiff was alone in the "doghouse" for the pur-
pose of eating his lunch, and "out of curiosity or for reasons unknown,
wired the blasting machine . . . and in his attempt to set off a single
dynamite cap ignorantly and accidentally detonated the 300 dynamite
caps beside the doghouse resulting in a terrific explosion and in the
injuries which he sustained. . . ."16 The Commission concluded that
plaintiff's injury did not "arise out of the employment," and compensa-
tion was denied.' 7 This conclusion was rejected by the Superior Court.
In reversing the lower court, the Court stated that there was "sufficient
circumstantial evidence" to sustain the Commission's conclusion, and,
therefore, "the court below was without authority to reverse."' 8 It was
further noted that the burden rests upon the claimant to show that his
injuries arose out of his employment, and that implicit in the Commis-
sion's conclusion was a finding that plaintiff had failed to carry the
burden.' 9
2'242 N. C. 647, 89 S. E. 2d 253 (1955).
Meld. at 648, 89 S. E. 2d at 254.
, The condition antecedent to compensation is the occurrence of any injury (1)
by accident (2) arising out of, and (3) in the course of employment. Wilson v.
Mooresville, 222 N. C. 283, 22 S. E. 2d 907 (1942). Whether an accident arose
out of the employment is not exclusively a question of fact. It is a mixed question
of law and fact, but there must be some causal relation between the employment
and the injury. Matthews v. Carolina Standard Corp., 232 N. C. 229, 60 S. E.
2d 93 (1950).
" In another recent case, Watson v. Harris Clay Co., 242 N. C. 763, 89 S. E. 2d
465 (1955), the Court stated: "When there is any competent evidence to support a
finding of fact by the Industrial Commission, such finding is conclusive on appeal,
even though there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the contrary."
" See Henry v. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N. C. 477, 57 S. E. 2d 760 (1950),
for well-established rules of procedure regarding workmen's compensation cases.
1957]
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Insurance Solicitor Not Employee
In Hawes v. Accident Ass'n,20 plaintiff's intestate had been district
manager, paid solely on commission basis, of the Durham agencies of the
two defendant insurance companies. He was killed, July 11, 1952, en-
route to Winston-Salem in his own auto to confer with defendants' state
manager. However, eight days earlier, as a result of alleged shortages
in his accounts, he had delivered to defendants a signed statement that,
"I ... agree not to solicit any business for Mutual or United Benefit
[defendants] .. .after July 6, 1952 .... at which time my licenses are
cancelled." 21 Despite this, he had continued to solicit and sell insurance
for defendants throughout the ensuing week prior to his death and had
obtained fifteen solicitations, which were found in a brief case in his car
following the accident. Defendants later issued policies on these fifteen
solicitations. The Court affirmed the Industrial Commission's denial of
compensation based upon the non-existence of the relationship of
employee and employer, adding: "It would seem that when the deceased
-signed the statement that he agreed not to solicit ... after 6 July... he
had severed all relations with the companies. '22
There was no mention of ratification in connection with defendants'
issuance of the fifteen policies.2 3 Indeed, had there been held to be
ratification of a sort restoring the status quo ante July 6, 1952, the Court
would doubtlessly have reached the same conclusion. For in affirming
the Commission's conclusion, the Court, without mentioning the term
"independent contractor," cited seven cases,24 in each of which there had
been a finding of that relationship.25 Of these cases, only one (a North
20243 N. C. 62, 89 S. E. 2d 739 (1955). f
21 Id. at 63, 89 S. E. 2d at 740. Id. at 64, 89 S. E. 2d at 741.
" In Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N. E. 279 (1891), plaintiff ordered
coal from defendant. One McCullock, who was not at the time in the employ of
defendant, delivered the coal without defendant's knowledge, and while making
delivery broke plaintiff's plate glass window. With full knowledge of the accident
and of the delivery by McCullock, defendant billed plaintiff for the coal. This
was held to be ratification of McCullock's delivery, making defendant liable for the
broken glass. Holmes, J., stated: "The ratification goes to the relation, and
establishes it ab initio."
"The ratification of an unauthorized act is equivalent to a prior authority to
perform it." Wittlin v. Giacalone, 171 F. 2d 147 (1949). But for cases contra,
see Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 81 Utah 223, 17 P. 2d 256, 85 A. L. R. 908(1932) ; J. C. Penney Co. v. Gravelle, 62 Nev. 439, 155 P. 2d 477 (1945).
"Cited by the Court were: McGraw v. Mills, Inc., 233 N. C. 524, 64 S. E. 2d
658 (1951) (building painter) ; Perley v. Paving Co., 228 N. C. 479, 46 S. E. 2d
298 (1948) (licensed contract hauler) ; Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N. C. 11, 29
S. E. 2d 137 (1944) (electricians) ; Beach v. McLean, 219 N. C. 521, 14 S. E. 2d
515 (1941) (contractor to dismantle and move machinery) ; Bryson v. Lumber Co.,
204 N. C. 664, 169 S. E. 276 (1933) (same); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, 71
N. D. 78, 298 N. W. 773 (1941) (to recover money paid under protest to Work-
men's Compensation Bureau as assessments upon commissions paid by plaintiff to
agents) ; Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Tenn. 471, 79 S. W. 2d 572 (1935)(insurance premium collector killed by an irate customer).
25 The Workmen's. Compensation Act covers only employees according to
the common law concept; thus it does not apply to independent contractors. See
Hayes v. Elon College, 224 N. C. 11, 29 S. E. 2d 137 (1944).
[Vol. 35
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Dakota case) 26 involved insurance solicitors; although another (a Ten-
nessee case) 27 dealt with an insurance premium collector. Research
discloses no prior North Carolina decisions involving insurance solici-
tors ;28 therefore, the instant case apparently stands, albeit subtly, for
the proposition that an insurance solicitor is without the coverage of the
Act in North Carolina.
29
Occupational Disease
The Court divided three ways in interpreting G. S. § 97-57,30 in May-
berry v. Oakboro Granite and Marble Co.3s The employee had been
disabled by the occupational disease, silicosis. His last injurious ex-
posure to silica dust had been on February 19, and defendant employer's
insurance by defendant carrier expired on the preceding January 31,
leaving the employer with no insurance. The Commission ordered the
carrier to pay the entire compensation. In splitting three ways, 32 the
only proposition on which four members of the Court agreed was that
the carrier should pay at least a pro rata part of the award.
"'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, 71 N. D. 78, 298 N. W. 773 (1941).
27 Income Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Tenn. 471, 79 S. W. 2d 572 (1935).
2" Rogers v. Imperial Life Ins. Co., 2 I. C. 335 (1931), involved an insurance
collector, but there was no independent contractor question raised, since the collector
worked out of defendant's office, reporting to work each work-morning just as an
ordinary office employee would do.
"8 For strong argument that insurance solicitors should be regarded as employees,
see Buscheck, Life Insurance Solicitor--Employee or Independent Contractor, 25
Geo. L. J. 894 (1937). Also see MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY §§ 357, 358, 446-
452 (4th ed. 1952).
The contract in the instant case between the solicitor and defendant companies
expressly negated an employer-employee relationship, but that, of itself, is not
controlling. "The rights of the parties under the contract are not to be determined
solely by the names they call each other, but rather by intent and meaning of the
terms of the instrument." Kesler Construction Co. v. Dixson Holding Co., 207
N. C. 1, 5, 175 S. E. 843, 845 (1934).
For treatment of traveling employees under workmen's compensation acts, see
Note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 159 (1945).
20 G. S. § 97-57 (1950) states: "In any case where compensation is payable for
an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last
injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and the insurance carrier, if
any, which was on the risk when the employee was so last exposed under such
employer, shall be liable.
"For the purpose of this section when an employee has been exposed to the
hazards of asbestosis or silicosis for as much as thirty working days, or parts
thereof, within seven consecutive calendar months, such exposure shall be deemed
injurious but any less exposure shall not be deemed injurious."
8 243 N. C. 281, 90 S. E. 2d 511 (1955).
"The three interpretations were: (1) The Chief Justice and two justices were
of the opinion that since the carrier was not on the risk on the date when disable-
ment occurred, the employer should pay the full award; (2) two Justices thought
that the exposure in Febrary, being less than thirty working days and less than
a calendar month, should be disregarded as non-injurious, and that, since the carrier
was on the risk during the period of injurious exposure prior to February, the
award should be paid in full by the carrier; (3) the remaining two Justices decided
that the last thirty working days when the employee was exposed constituted the
period of last injurious exposure and the basis of the employer's liability, and
that, since the carrier was on the risk during part but not all of this period, the
carrier should be liable pro rata according to the number of working days in this
period it was on the risk. %
19571
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Request for Review of Award
G. S. § 9747 requires that a request for review of an award for
changed conditions must be made within twelve months of the claimant's
last payment of compensation. In Paris v. Carolina Builders Corp.,88
plaintiff had on November 1, 1952, received a draft payable to him as
lump sum payment for permanent partial loss of use of his right hand.
He cashed it at a local bank and it was paid by the drawee bank on
November 7, 1952. Plaintiff's letter requesting a rehearing was re-
ceived by the Industrial Commission on November 4, 1953. Plaintiff
contended that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the de-
livery and acceptance of a check is not payment until the check is paid;
but the Court held that when a draft or check is accepted in payment of
an obligation and is paid on presentation, payment ordinarily relates
back to the time of delivery to the payee.
Unemployment Compensation: "Available for Work"
The Court held3 4 a claimant for unemployment compensation "avail-
able for work" within the meaning of G. S. § 96-13,31 where the claimant,
a 56-year-old female textile worker with training in no other type of
work, became a Seventh.Day Adventist,8 6 lost (because of absence) her
third-shift job37 in a textile mill which she had held for thirteen years,
and sought only first-shift38 work in the mills in her area, which, since
they operated only five days a week (Monday through Friday), would
have left her free on her Sabbath. The Employment Security Commis-
sion found that, by eliminating herself from job opportunities on her
Sabbath, she voluntarily became not "available for work," mainly on the
strength of the fact that ninety-five per cent of all job openings in textile
mills in the area were for third-shift workers. In reversing, the Court
held that G. S. § 96-13 must be construed with G. S. § 96-14, which
provides that a person only has to apply for "suitable work"; and that
work which requires one to violate his moral standards is not ordinarily
suitable work within the meaning of the statute.
"Widow" and "Dependents" within Meaning of Act
In Wilson v. Utah Construction Co.,39 liability of the employer being
admitted, the problem was determining who were the proper dependents.
Claiming were: (1) deceased's widow and their three children, and a
33244 N, C. 35, 92 S. E. 2d 405 (1956).
In the Matter of Miller, 243 N. C. 509, 91 S. E. 2d 241 (1956).
omThe statute, which sets forth the conditions to eligibility for unemployment
compensation, makes availability for work one such condition.
36A religious denomination which observes the period from sundown Friday to
sundown Saturday as Sabbath.
37 From 11 p.m. till 7 a.m.
- From 7 a.m. till 3 p.m.
39 243 N. C. 96, 89 S. E. 2d 864 (1955).
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child of the widow born out of wedlock, of which the deceased was not
the father; and (2) three children of deceased's common law wife, of
whom he was not the father, but who were living with and being sup-
ported by him at the time of his death, plus a child of the common law
wife born after his death. The Industrial Commission allowed com-
pensation to the three children of the common law wife and the widow
and three children of deceased, one-seventh each. The Superior Court
confined the award to the widow and decedent's three children by her.
The Court (1) affirmed the elimination of the after-born child of the
common law wife, because ". . . there is no sufficient evidence in the
record tending to show that this child was an acknowledged illegitimate
child of the deceased so as to entitle it to compensation" ;40 and (2)
affirmed exclusion of the other children of the common law wife on the
ground that, by statute, "the widow and children 'shall be conclusively
presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon the deceased em-
ployee.' 41 And they 'shall be entitled to receive the entire compensation
payable share and share alike to the exclusion of all other persons.' "42
The Court added that the children of the common law wife were
further barred by an earlier decision, Fields v. Hollowell, 238 N. C. 614,
78 S. E. 2d 740 (1953), which denied compensation to a deceased em-
ployee's common law wife, granting it instead to his mother, because
"Grave considerations of public policy forbid it. . . . such a claim is
conceived in sin, and shapened in iniquity."
This "public policy" test apparently overrides the "actual dependency"
test promulgated in G. S. § 97-39, which, after stating that a widow, a
widower, "and/or" a child shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly
dependent, declares: "In all other cases questions of dependency, in
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts as the
facts may be at the time of the accident. .. ."
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
THE CORPORATE ENTITY
A recent holding concerning the legal existence of the one-man cor-
poration has evoked critical comment.' The Court held in a rehearing of
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co.2 that because the statutes
of North Carolina require three or more persons to obtain a certificate of
40 Id. at 98, 89 S. E. 2d at 867.
I- G. S. § 97-39 (1950).
"2 243 N. C. 96, 99, 89 S. E. 2d 864, 867, citing G. S. § 97-38 (1) (1955).
'See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N. C. L. REv. 432, 441-44 (1956) ; Latty, A Conceptualistic
Tangle and the One- or Two-Man Corporation, 34 N. C. L. REv. 471 (1956);
Note, 34 N. C. L. Rnv. 531 (1956).
243 N. C. 595, 91 S. E. 2d 584 (1956).
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incorporations and to manage the affairs of the corporation, 4 and re-
quire that at least more than one perform other corporate functions,8 a
corporation with a single stockholder is a "dormant corporation." Ac-
cordingly, where any one individual performs all of the corporate func-
tions, he is the real party in interest, and "will not be permitted to use
the corporation of which he is the sole beneficial owner, to cloak his
actions as an individual."6  Therefore, the corporate entity can be
disregarded, and any one seeking legal redress against the corporation
may look immediately to the "one man."
Elsewhere discussed 7 is Lexington Insulation Co. v. Davidson Coun-
'ty,s in which a corporate plaintiff was refused quantum meruit recovery
for work performed under a contract concededly illegal because entered
into by a public official who was also an officer of the plaintiff and owner
of one-third of its stock.
RESIDENCE OF A DOMESTICATED FOREIGN CORPORATION
For discussion of a case dealing with the subject of residence of a
domesticated foreign corporation, see Venue under TRIAL AND APPEL-
LATE PRACTICE.
PARTNERSHIPS
In Ewing v. Caldwell9 a demurrer to the complaint was sustained by
the Court because the plaintiffs, devisees of the deceased partner of the
defendant, failed to join the personal representative of the deceased
partner as a party plaintiff in accordance with G. S. §§ 59-76 and -77.
These statutes, as construed by the Court, give the personal representa-
tive the exclusive right to require an accounting of partnership assets.
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADINGS AND
PARTIES)
PARTIES
Real Party in Interest
In Rand v. Wilson County,1 plaintiffs were commissioners appointed
by a consent judgment to sell, pay taxes on, and distribute the proceeds
of real property. It was held that the commissioners were trustees of an
3 G. S. § 55-2 (1953).4 G. S. § 55-48 (1953) (at last three directors required).3 See G. S. §§ 55-5 and -6 (1953).
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 243 N. C. 595, 597-98, 91 S. E.
2d 584, 587 (1956).
'See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, p. 239 infra.
8243 N. C. 252, 90 S. E. 2d 496 (1956).
9243 N. C. 18, 88 S. E. 2d 774 (1955).
' 243 N. C. 43, 89 S. E. 2d 779 (1955).
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express trust within the meaning of G. S. § 1-63 and were authorized,
without joining the beneficial owners, to bring the action to recover taxes
paid on the property under protest.
Intervention
In an action2 to recover for work done and to establish and enforce
a lien on realty, defendant did not answer, but three other persons, as-
serting a prior lien, asked for leave to intervene. The Court reversed an
order permitting such intervention. It held that the intervenors were
proper, but not necessary parties, and that ordinarily permitting their
intervention would be discretionary under G. S. § 1-73. s However, in
this case, thanks to the absence of an answer, the Court found that there
was no controversy in which to intervene.4  Plaintiff was entitled to his
default judgment against defendant without delay.
In such a situation there would seem to be no compelling reason why
plaintiff could not be given his separate judgment against the defendant,
with the action continuing for the purpose of litigating priorities between
plaintiff and the intervenors. That question must eventually be settled;
and, with the parties already before the court, why require an independent
action? However, in the principal case, there had been a foreclosure by
the holder of a lien superior to any asserted in this action, and surplus
sale proceeds had been deposited with the clerk. The Court observed
that, therefore, the appropriate remedy for the intervenors would seem
to be under G. S. § 45-21.32.5
Capacity to Sue and Be Sued
At common law an unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued
as a legal entity, because it has no existence separate and distinct from
Childers v. Powell, 243 N. C. 711, 92 S. E. 2d 65 (1956).
The statute provides that ". . . when a complete determination of the contro-
versy cannot be made without the presence of other parties, the court must cause
them to be brought in... ." Intervention is explicitly permitted when the action
is for the recovery of real or personal property and one not a party has an
interest in the subject matter. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (b), which permits
intervention when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common.
'If there is literally no controversy, then the part of G. S. § 1-73 quoted in
note 3 (and in the Court's opinion) would seem to be inapplicable, with the result
that there could be no intervention by a person who would be a necessary party if
an answer were filed. In fact, this seems logically to follow if the principal case is
sound. The difference between necessary and proper parties is that the former
may intervene as of right, the latter only in the court's discretion. There is no
difference between them bearing upon whether there is an existing controversy
between plaintiff and defendant.
Compare with the principal case: Sanders v. May, 173 N. C. 47, 91 S. E. 526
(1917) (intervention after judgment not permitted); Dawson v. Thigpen, 137
N. C. 462, 49 S. E. 959 (1905) (claim and delivery proceeding in which, after
others intervened, plaintiff took a nonsuit and the case was continued to determine
the claims of the intervenors).
' This statute authorizes a special proceeding to determine title to such surplus
funds paid to the clerk.
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that of its members.6 G. S. § 1-97 (6), as interpreted in Stafford v.
Wood,7 modifies the rule as to unincorporated labor unions only if the
union is doing business in North Carolina in the sense of performing in
this state the acts for which it was formed. One ground of defendant
union's demurrer in Youngblood v. Bright8 was that the court did not
have jurisdiction because the union was not subject to suit as a separate
entity. The lower court overruled the demurrer, because prior to demur-
ring the union had made an application for an extension of time. It thus
classified the objection raised by the demurrer as one involving lack of
jurisdiction over the person, which is waived by a prior general ap-
pearance.
The Supreme Court agreed that a prior general appearance had been
made and that, under G. S. § 1-134.1, this waived any defect in service
of process. But it held that no statute authorized suit against the union
unless it was doing business in North Carolina and further held that the
general appearance was no waiver of any objection grounded upon this.
Thus, in effect, it treated the question as one of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter. It remanded the case for a determination as to whether the
union was doing business in the state, with a direction that the demurrer
be treated as a motion to dismiss.9
.oinder of Parties and Causes'°
In two cases the Court held that there was a misjoinder of parties and
causes and dismissed the action.
Tart v. Byrne"1 involved a number of causes of action against three
defendants, though they were not separately stated as required by Rule
20 (2) of the Supreme Court. Against the two administrators of an
estate plaintiffs alleged causes of action for decedent's breach of contract,
negligence in breaching contract, defamation, fraud, and suppression of
bids at a judicial sale, and asked for an accounting. Against the adminis-
trators and the trustee of a deed of trust executed by plaintiffs in connec-
tion with business dealings between plaintiffs and decedent, plaintiffs
asked to have the deed of trust declared void for want of proper execution
and fraud and to have a foreclosure proceeding under the deed of trust
set aside.
Perhaps plaintiffs attempted to pack in a little too much; and it may
'Hallman v. Union, 219 N. C. 798, 15 S. E. 2d 361 (1941).
"234 N. C. 622, 68 S. E. 2d 268 (1951).8243 N. C. 599, 91 S. E. 2d 559 (1956).
8 It should be noted that since the suit was begun before July 1, 1955, G. S. §
1-69.1, providing in part that, "All unincorporated associations . . . may hereafter
sue or be sued ... to the same extent as any legal entity established by law...
had no application.
o See Brandis and Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive
Joider of Parties and Causes it; North Carolina, 34 N. C. L. REV. 405 (1956), for
other cases involving joinder which are within the volumes covered by this survey.
243 N. C. 409, 90 S. E. 2d 692 (1955).
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well be true that, technically, some of the causes against the adminis-
trators did not affect the trustee. However, as far as appears, the trustee
was acting for the benefit of the administrators and presumably any re-
covery by plaintiffs against the administrators could have been applied
to discharge or reduce the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust.
According to the complaint, the deed was given as part of the contract
which the decedent allegedly breached. Hence, the allegations regarding
the deed were not wholly unconnected with the basic claims against the
administrators, but were, in a practical sense, ancillary thereto.12
In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. O'Hanlon3 plaintiff brought an action
against three individual defendants and their corporate employer to en-
join violation of separate contracts not to compete, made at different
times by the individual defendants. It was held that all causes did not
affect all parties as required by G. S. 1-123.
The situation was complicated by the fact that one contract was not
made with the actual plaintiff, but was with a related corporation of
similar name. However, the opinion seems to mean that dismissal for
misjoinder would follow even if all three contracts had been with the
same plaintiff. This seems entirely too narrow, and presents one more
illustration that North Carolina has been all too little affected by modern
procedural trends. The three individual defendants, allegedly guilty of
breaching virtually identical covenants not to compete, were work-
ing for a common employer (the corporate defendant). The action
was for injunctive relief (no mention of any claim for damages being
found in the opinion), and common questions of law and fact were
clearly presented.
Since defendants were associated in a common enterprise (though
there was no allegation of conspiracy), in at least a broad sense each
defendant was affected by the causes against the others-if, indeed,
there were separate causes rather than a single equitable cause. To re-
quire three law suits in such a situation is to allow technicality to sup-
plant practicality.
In Veasey v. King,14 plaintiffs, after instituting action to recover
permanent damages to realty, sold the land. The clerk permitted the new
owners to be joined, and they adopted the material allegations of the
Compare the creditors' bill and similar cases discussed in Brandis, Permissive
Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N. C. L. Rxv. 1, 19-30 (1946).
13243 N. C. 457, 91 S. E. 2d 222 (1955).
111244 N. C. 216, 92 S. E. 2d 761 (1956). Misjoinder is the ground of demurrer
specified in the Supreme Court's statement of the history of the case. The record
indicates that the demurrer was on the ground (among others not here relevant)
that the purchasers were not real parties in interest. Technically, therefore, it may
be said that no joinder question was presented, though the Court proceeded on a
contrary assumption. However, the decision seems clearly correct even if it be
assumed that only a real party in interest question was presented. When the de-
fendant injected the title issue, the new owners certainly had an interest in that.
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complaint. Defendant then demurred for misjoinder of causes and
parties. The Court, per curiam, affirmed judgment overruling the de-
murrer, holding that the new owners were at least proper parties, en-
titled to defend their title against the assault made on it in defendant's
answer, even though they could not participate in any award of damages.
This result is both reasonable and commendable. Once the answer
put the title in issue, both the original plaintiffs' damages and the ad-
ditional plaintiffs' ownership depended upon resolution of that issue.
Though the Court cited no authority, there is at least a rough analogy
to the cases permitting joinder of plaintiffs who seek to recover for
damage to their respective separate interests in the same property.r'
In Hall v. DeWeld Mica Corp.,16 a husband and wife alleged that
clouds of dust given off by a mica mine and plant constituted a nuisance
and continuing trespass, damaged plaintiffs and their property in a
certain sum, caused fear and mental anguish because of the threat to the
health of plaintiffs and their children, and resulted in a greater amount
of labor in keeping the premises clean. Plaintiffs sought damages and
an injunction. In affirming an order overruling defendant's demurrer
for misjoinder of parties and causes and for "improper misjoinder" of
causes, the Court held that plaintiffs had stated but one cause of action11
(for trespass) in which they had a joint interest.' 8 In this decision,
practicality justifiably outweighed technicality.
In an action by a bank on a note secured by a chattel mortgage on
defendant's truck, defendant alleged that he paid the premium on an
insurance policy, payable to the bank and defendant; that the bank
wrote the policy as agent of the insurer; and that the bank wrongfully
failed to require payment under the policy when the truck was damaged.
The insurance company, brought in as a party on defendant's motion,
demurred on the ground of misjoinder of parties and causes. The
" See, for example, Peed v. Burleson's, Inc., 242 N. C. 628, 89 S. E. 2d 256
(1955) ; Wilson v. Motor Lines, 207 N. C. 263, 176 S. E. 750 (1934).10244 N. C. 182, 93 S. E. 2d 56 (1956).
" The other allegations were held to affect only the measure of damages. Cf.
Snotherly v. Jenrette, 232 N. C. 605, 61 S. E. 2d 708 (1950), where the Court
rejected the one-cause-of-action solution. The Court in the principal case pointed
out that it was not passing upon the admissibility of evidence to prove the elements
of damages alleged. This may cause trouble. Mental anguish is obviously indi-
vidual and not joint, as the defendant pointed out. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped
that plaintiffs will not be restricted in their proof, particularly since, for the whole
complex of annoyances, they claimed only a modest $1,200.
18 The precise nature of plaintiffs' ownership is not stated, though tenancy by
the entirety seems inferrable. However, whatever the tenancy, those who share title
may join to sue for damages to their respective interests. See note 15. Cf.
Chambers v. Dalton, 238 N. C. 142, 76 S. E. 2d 162 (1953), where owners of
separate properties, alleging damage by virtue of defendant's breaches of similar
covenants, were not permitted to join.
Though North Carolina seems not to have decided the question, many courts
vill permit owners of separate properties to join in seeking an injunction. Krocken
v. Westmoreland Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 A. 669 (1922); CLARK, CODE
PLEADING § 57 (2d Ed. 1947).
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Court held that there was no misjoinder. 19 The rationale was that the
allegations tied the bank and the insurer together in denying defendant
the benefit of the insurance, that they presented the insurance transac-
tion as a part of the loan transaction, and that since both the bank and
defendant were named insureds, the presence of all parties was neces-
sary2" to a final determination of the matters in controversy.
The holding represents a liberal, and desirable, approach to the
problem of joinder. If there is any technical violence done to the statutes,
which seems most doubtful,21 it seems justified by the eminently practi-
cal considerations of speedy disposition of cases and of the possibility,
as pointed out by the Court, of inconsistent verdicts in separate actions
depriving defendant of all relief. For another case involving joinder,
see Guarantor under CREDIT TRANSACTIONS.
COUNTERCLAIMS
It has been held in North Carolina that defendant's motion for non-
suit of plaintiff is equivalent to a voluntary nonsuit on his transaction
clause counterclaim.22 The Court, by way of dictum, has again paid
homage to the rule.23
It is difficult to find any rational basis for such a result. About the
only explanation ever given is that defendant "cannot put its adversary
out of court and at the same time retain the cause in. court."24 This is
nothing more than a restatement of the rule itself.
There are sound reasons for abolishing the rule. While all transac-
tion clause counterclaims are not compulsory in North Carolina, some of
them are.s 5 The policy behind this is, of course, to dispose of the entire
'
9 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Currin, 244 N. C. 102, 92 S. E. 2d 658 (1956).2 0There may well be some doubt as to whether the insurer was a necessary, as
distinguished from a proper party. However, the appeal was not from the refusal
of the lower court, in its discretion, to make the insurer a party. The appeal was
from a judgment sustaining a demurrer for misjoinder, filed by the insurer after
being made a party.
2'A dissenting judge took the position that the insurer's only liability was on
the policy; that it was a matter of indifference to the insurer whether it owed
plaintiff or defendant; and that its liability was not affected by the question as to
whether defendant was indebted to the plaintiff. As a practical matter this thesis
is highly questionable. Since the policy was apparently payable to plaintiff and
defendant, as their interests might appear, the insurer's liability, if any, to de-
fendant, might well depend upon the extent of its liability to plaintiff. That, in
turn, would depend upon the existence of the indebtedness. If either plaintiff or
defendant had sued the insurer on the policy, the other would certainly have been
a proper, and perhaps a necessary party.
IBourne v. Southern Ry., 224 N. C. 444, 31 S. E. 2d 382 (1944). The case is
not one in which a trial judge was reversed for allowing a counterclaim to go to
the jury after nonsuiting plaintiff. The judge nonsuited plaintiff, but did not
continue with the trial. The counterclaim was left ostensibly pending. Subse-
quently the question arose as to whether the action was still pending and the court
held that it was not.23Bradham v. McLean Trucking Co., 243 N. C. 708, 91 S. E. 2d 891 (1956).
aBourne v. Southern Ry., 224 N. C. 444, 446, 31 S. E. 2d 382, 383 (1944).
See, for example, Johnson v. Smith, 215 N. C. 322, 1 S. E. 2d 834 (1939). It
may also be pointed out that after a transaction clause counterclaim is interposed,
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controversy in a single action. A typical case is that involving an auto-
mobile accident, in which, if defendant wishes to claim damages, he can
do so only by way of counterclaim. It seems never to have been ques-
tioned that plaintiff, without waiving his right to go to the jury, may
prevent the counterclaim from going to the jury if defendant's evidence
is insufficient. When the evidence of defendant is sufficient and that of
plaintiff is insufficient, it seems perfectly clear that, by moving for an
involuntary nonsuit, the defendant should be able to keep plaintiff's
claim from the jury without waiving his right to have his own claim con-
sidered. Even though the motion precedes the introduction of defendant's
evidence, he should be entitled to present his evidence in an attempt to
demonstrate that he can make out a case. It seems utterly foolish
to require a new action when a partially educated jury is already in the
box and the parties, attorneys and witnesses are in court.
It has been said by the Court that a counterclaim is designed to
secure to a defendant the full relief which a separate action would have
provided on the same set of facts.26 If this is true, then why should
defendant be put out of court when he successfully moves to nonsuit
plaintiff?
In a recent case, 27 where the question of forcing defendant to take
a nonsuit on his counterclaim was not raised, the Court held that de-
fendant's motion for nonsuit should have been allowed. Treating matter
in the answer as sufficient to allege a cross action not decided by the
trial court, the cause was remanded for trial of the cross action. 28  The
decision would seem to make it clear that there is no compelling reason
for requiring defendant to bring a separate action to adjudicate his
claim.29
Following an early federal decision, 0 North Carolina has held that,
as applied to national banks, the statutory penalty for usurious interest
plaintiff may not discontinue the action by taking a voluntary nonsuit. Shearer v.
Herring, 189 N. C. 460, 127 S. E. 519 (1925); MCINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1645 (2d Ed. 1956).
" Bourne v. Board of Financial Control, 207 N. C. 170, 176 S. E. 306 (1934).
'7 Andrews v. Burton, 242 N. C. 93, 86 S. E. 2d 786 (1955), discussed in Case
Survey, 34 N. C. L. REV. 1, 16 (1955).
" In view of the fact that the Court has on occasion defined counterclaim as a
cross-action by defendant against plaintiff, Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Wise, 200
N. C. 409, 157 S. E. 20 (1931), the Andrews case, supra note 27, seems to be a
clear-cut departure from the rule. Cf. G. S. § 1-222, which explicitly authorizes
the granting of affirmative relief to a defendant.j0 One state has expressly abolished the rule by statute, Mo. R. S. A. § 847.103
(1949) ; New York has adopted the modern rule by decision, Lincoln Nat'l
Bank v. John Pierce Co., 228 N. Y. 356, 127 N. E. 253 (1920) ; and the federal
courts allow the counterclaim to persist where it is supported on independentjurisdictional grounds, Pioche Mines Consol. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co.,
206 F. 2d 336 (9th Cir. 1953).
" Barnet v. National Bank, 98 U. S. 555 (1878). The Federal Rules have
been construed as permitting a counterclaim for usurious interest arising out of
the same transaction alleged in the complaint. John R. Alley & Co. v. Fed. Nat'l
Bank, 124 F. 2d 995 (10th Cir. 1942).
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could be recovered only by separate suit and not by counterclaim. 1 In
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Robeson Motors,32 a case of first impression,
a corporation was suing on a debt. The Court held that the debtor could
by counterclaim recover the statutory penalty for usurious interest paid to
the lender in connection with separate and independent transactions.
An action to recover a statutory penalty is deemed an action in con-
tract.33 Since the contract counterclaim was in existence at the com-
mencement of the action, it is not required by G. S. § 1-137 (2) that the
counterclaim relate to the contract set forth in the complaint.3 4  The
Court was careful to point out that plaintiff's action must be in contract
in order to allow such a counterclaim under the statute3 5 The decision
is in accord with the modem trend of settling all disputes between the
parties in one action.
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
In Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co., 36 plaintiffs were suing to recover
compensation for the wrongful taking of and damage to land caused by
mining operations. The original defendant answered and filed a cross
complaint for contribution against two other companies engaged in
similar operations. These companies were made parties and answered.
Plaintiffs replied, asserting that if the additional defendants were made
parties, the complaint would be amended to allege the same cause of
action against them. One of the additional defendants demurred to the
cross action and the other moved for judgment on the pleadings3 7 dis-
" Bank v. Wysong & Miles Co., 177 N. C. 380, 99 S. E. 199 (1919), overruling
Bank v. Ireland, 122 N. C. 571, 29 S. E. 835 (1898).
32 243 N. C. 326, 90 S. E. 2d 886 (1955). A rather curious adjunct to the
principal case is Commercial Credit Corp. v. Barnes, 243 N. C. 335, 90 S. E. 2d 893(1955), in which the facts were the same, but in addition to his counterclaim de-
fendant alleged that his claim for relief was the same as that set forth in a pending
action (the principal case). The order sustaining plaintiff's demurrer on the ground,
among others, that defendant's pleading showed the pendency of another action be-
tween the same parties was not challenged on appeal. Under Rule 28, Rules of
Practice of the Supreme Court, the exception to the order was taken as abandoned
and the order sustaining the demurrer was affirmed.
"Commercial Finance Co. v. Holder, 235 N. C. 96, 68 S. E. 2d 794 (1951).
"The party against whom an action to recover on a note or other evidence ofdebt is brought may plead the penalty for usurious interest paid as a counterclaim
under G. S. § 24-2, but that statute restricts the counterclaim to interest paid on
the obligation on which plaintiff is suing. It is inapplicable to counterclaims with
reference to independent transactions. Commercial Finance Co. v. Holder, mipra
note 33.
" Counterclaims for usurious interest were held to be improper in Commercial
Finance Co. v. Holder, supra note 33, where plaintiff was suing in tort for con-
version, and in North Carolina Mortgage Corp. v. Wilson, 205 N. C. 493, 171 S. E.
783 (1933), an action to recover possession of land. In some instances plaintiff may
sue either in contract or tort. Query: Is it wise to adopt a rule which allows
plaintiff to control the propriety of a counterclaim by the selection of one of two
possible theories of action?
"244 N. C. 17, 92 S. E. 2d 429 (1956).
'* In a dictum the Court stated that though the motion for judgment on the
pleadings may sometimes be used by defendant, it ordinarily is in essence a demurrer
by plaintiff to the answer. (If a reply admits the allegations of an affirmative
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missing plaintiffs' action and the cross action. Both motions were granted.
The original defendant appealed38 and the rulings on both motions were
reversed.
In dealing with the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court
held that as the reply did not allege a cause of action against additional
defendants (merely stating an intention to do so), they were strangers
as to plaintiffs and the original action was not dismissible on any motion
made by them. The Court emphasized that the function of the reply is
to deny new matter and answer any counterclaim or cross action 9 and
that the cause of action is to be alleged in the complaint.40 The result
reached by the Court seems clearly correct because, considering all of
the pleadings, judgment thereon against the plaintiffs was not justified.
But the reply in effect alleged wrongful acts by the additional defendants.
As a practical matter (though the practice is certainly not to be com-
mended) it should make little difference that these allegations were con-
tained in a writing labeled "reply" instead of in a writing labeled
"complaint."
PLEADING
Amendment
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. O'Hanlon4l presents a most pecul-
iar procedural history. A corporation alleged three virtually identical con-
tracts with three different defendants. The contracts were attached to
the complaint as exhibits. A reading of the exhibits disclosed that one
of the contracts had not been made with plaintiff, but was made with a
related corporation of similar name. The lower court permitted amend-
ment of complaint and process to substitute the related corporation as
sole plaintiff. This happy solution resulted in having a plaintiff who was
a stranger to two of the contracts instead of one. This alone justified the
Supreme Court's conclusion that the amendment should not have been
permitted. It would have been better had that been the sole ground as-
signed for the conclusion; but, in fact, the opinion indicates that, even if
all the contracts had been with the substituted plaintiff, the substitution
defense, and its allegations in avoidance are insufficient, the motion should clearly
be available to defendant.)
"Apparently plaintiffs did not appeal. One assumes that plaintiffs interpreted
the judgment below as confined to a dismissal as against the additional defendants-
not as a dismissal of the cause against the original defendant.
"See Scott v. Bryan, 96 N. C. 289, 3 S. E. 235 (1887), where a cause of action
introduced in the reply without objection was treated as an amendment to the
complaint. See also MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACrICE AND PRCCDURF§§ 1263, 1265 (2d Ed. 1956).
40 Under FED. R. C. P. 13 (b) a reply may state a counterclaim. Downey v.
Palmer, 114 F. 2d 116 (2d Cir. 1940); Warren v. Indian Refining Co., 30 F.
Supp. 281 (D. C. N. D. Ind. 1939).
"243 N. C. 457, 91 S. E. 2d 222 (1955), discussed also under Joinder of
Parties and Causes.
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would have been improper. This represents a rather technical approach
to the problem of the scope of the amendment power.
In Wall v. England,42 the trial court, upon finding that an amended
answer contained matter which had been ordered stricken from the
original answer at a prior term, struck the entire amended further
answer. The Supreme Court affirmed. The privilege to plead further
given at the prior term did not entitle the amending pleader to reiterate
verbatim or in substance the matter ordered stricken. One wonders how
repleading counsel could conceivably have expected any other result.
Evidentiary and Ultimate Fact Allegations
The distinctions between evidentiary facts, ultimate facts and con-
clusions of law are often nebulous and the cases involving them often lack
value as precedents except in precisely identical contexts. It is possible
to do little more than lump them together as examples of what the court
has done.
In East Carolina Lumber Co. v. Pamlico Co.,4 3 the Court held that
an allegation that a deed is void for want of legal authority to convey
states ultimate facts. In Billings v. Taylor 4 4 plaintiff alleged that de-
fendant contractor caused great clouds of dust to settle on plaintiff's
crop, resulting in damage which defendant could have avoided by the use
of available water facilities. It was held that the allegations disclosed
ultimate facts sufficient to state a cause of action.45
Election of Remedies
The ancient doctrine of election of remedies still operates in North
Carolina to trap the unwary.
In Davis v. Hargett,46 plaintiff alleged that defendants, by fraud and
duress, had induced him to release a cause of action worth a substantial
sum. He asserted that he was electing to affirm the compromise settle-
ment and was bringing the present action to recover damages for the
difference between the true worth of the original cause and the considera-
tion received under the settlement. The Court held that when the duress
was removed plaintiff had the right either to affirm or to rescind the
compromise settlement, the remedies being inconsistent and requiring an
election, and that in the present action he had affirmed the settlement
and was bound by its terms. Since the agreement'had been carried out in
exact conformance with its terms, plaintiff could not recover damages.47.
4"243 N. C. 36, 89 S. E. 2d 785 (1955).
4,242 N. C. 728, 89 S. E. 2d 381 (1955).
"243 N. C. 57, 89 S. E. 2d 743 (1955).
See also Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N. C. 23, 92 S. E. 2d 393 (1956), discussed
under DAmAGES.
"244 N. C. 157, 92 S. E. 2d 782 (1956).
'7 Such cases as Hutchins v. Davis, 230 N. C. 67, 52 S. E. 2d 210 (1949), were
distinguished by the Court. There the defrauded purchaser affirmed the contract
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In Surratt v. Chas. E. Lambeth Ins. Agency, Inc., 48 plaintiff was
suing to recover damages for fraudulent representations. In a previous
action involving the same parties, plaintiff had moved to set aside a judg-
ment on substantially the same grounds as alleged in the present suit.
The Court held (1) that the principle of res judicata4 barred plaintiff's
right to maintain the action, and (2) that, as one complaining of fraud
has the right to rescind what has been done or affirm and sue for damages,
the motion to set aside the judgment was equivalent to an election to
rescind and plaintiff could not maintain an action for damages.
Another decision may imply that an election will be compelled be-
tween an action for rescission and an action for breach of warranty.50
The question was raised by defendant's motion to make more definite
and certain on the ground that he was unable to determine whether the
suit was for rescission or breach of warranty. The Court deemed it
unnecessary to determine the theory of the complaint because plaintiff's
counsel stated in the argu~ment on appeal that the action was for rescis-
sion.
Verification
In Bolin v. Bolin,51 a divorce action, the granting of defendant's mo-
tion to have the complaint verified as required by law was reversed on
appeal because the complaint had been verified in substantial compliance
with G. S. § 1-145. In granting the motion the trial court was evidently
thinking of the requirements of G. S. § 50-8 before it was amended.5 2
Rich v. Norfolk So. Ry.,53 aptly described by the Court as involving
much ado about very little, nevertheless involved a number of technical
questions. The complaint was verified. A corporate defendant and in-
dividual defendants filed a joint answer which was verified only on be-
half of the corporation. Seven months after this answer was filed,
plaintiff's attorney, without notice to defendants, moved before the clerk
for judgment by default and inquiry against the individuals. The motion
was granted, the order not mentioning the answer. Thereafter, upon
motion of defendants, the judge vacated the judgment of the clerk and
allowed the individuals thirty days within which to verify the answer
nunc pro tunc. On appeal, the order of the judge was affirmed.
of sale and sued for damages resulting from fraud. The basis of recovery was that
the execution of the contract was not in accordance with the real agreement.
4'244 N. C. 121, 93 S. E. 2d 72 (1956).
'9 The issue was raised by defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and
admissions made in a pre-trial hearing. See Leonard, Pleading and Proving the
Defense of Res Judicata in North Carolina, 34 N. C. L. REv. 458, 468-69 (1956),
where the methods of raising the defense are discussed.
9 Baker v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 242 N. C. 724, 89 S. E. 2d 388 (1955).
51242 N. C. 642, 89 S. E. 2d 303 (1955).,
See Statute Survey, 29 N. C. L. REv. 351, 375 (1951).
13 244 N. C. 175, 92 S. E. 2d 768 (1956).
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The Court first held that verification by the corporate defendant was
not verification for the individual defendants under G. S. § 1-145.
(It was indicated that verification by an individual could be sufficient for
all individuals joining in the answer. Whether verification by an in-
dividual could be sufficient verification on behalf of a corporate code-
fendant was not indicated.) Nevertheless, the answer could not be
ignored. A motion to strike the answer, made on notice, was a necessary
predicate to the motion for judgment by default and inquiry.54 Notice
of the motion for judgment by default should have been given, even if
not preceded or accompanied by a motion to strike the answer. For
several well founded reasons the Court found that the judge had jurisdic-
tion to entertain defendants' motion and enter his order.5 5 Finally, since
the clerk's judgment was irregular and that alone justified the judge's
action, it was not necessary to investigate the question of excusable
neglect.
Controversy Without Action
When a case is tried on an agreed statement of facts, the statement
is in the nature of a special verdict and is equivalent to a request for the
judgment which arises as a matter of law on the facts agreed; and the
court may not infer or deduce further facts from those stipulated.50 In
Blowing Rock v. Gregorie,57 the trial court heard the case upon admis-
sions in the pleadings and stipulations by the parties. On appeal de-
fendants contended that the trial court erred in failing to pass upon pleas
of estoppel and the statute of limitations and upon the failure of plaintiff
to make certain allegations. It was held that these questions were not
presented to the lower court for decision because they were not admitted
in the pleadings or included in the stipulations. The trial court had
visited the premises at the request of the parties and had made observa-
"' The Court has recently raised a question, without giving an answer, as to
whether a clerk has jurisdiction to rule on a motion to strike pleadings under G. S.
§ 1-153. Gallimore v. Highway Commission, 241 N. C. 350, 85 S. E. 2d 392
(1954), discussed in Case Survey, 34 N. C. L. Rav. 1, 19-20 (1955). in the Rich
case the Court, in outlining the procedure that should have been followed, merely
assumed that the motion to strike might have been made before the clerk, but
again failed to give a definitive answer.
'The clerk's statutory jurisdiction (G. S. §§ 1-211, 1-212) to enter judgment
by default is not exclusive, but concurrent with that of the judge. A motion to
vacate the clerk's judgment may be made before the clerk or judge and, when it is
made before the judge, his jurisdiction is both original and appellate. Further, the
judgment by default and inquiry transferred the cause to the Superior Court for
further hearing in term. (The Court also said that the clerk's jurisdiction to enter
the judgment exists only when there is no answer, as, upon filing of answer the
cause is transferred to the Superior Court for trial at term. G. S. § 1-171. How-
ever, the opinion subsequently labels the judgment as irregular, whereas if the
clerk was literally without jurisdiction it would, under normal terminology, be
labeled as void.)
' Hawes v. Accident Ass'n.. 243 N. C. 62, 89 S. E. 2d 800 (1955).
5?243 N. C. 364, 90 S. E. 2d 898 (1955).
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tions which were included in the judgment. This was error, said the
Supreme Court, because the court may not infer or deduce further facts
from those stipulated ;58 but the error was held to be harmless.
Effect of Denial of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Defendants presented a novel argument in Baldwin v. Hinton. 9 The
pleadings raised an issue of fact as to the ownership of a parcel of land.
Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied and at a
later term, without objection, amended pleadings were filed in which
plaintiffs alleged ownership of a different tract. Defendants contended
that since plaintiffs did not appeal from the order denying the motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the order was in effect a ruling, binding on
the second judge, that the description of the land in the instruments un-
der which defendants were claiming title was sufficient. The contention
was held to be without merit. It is settled that an appeal does not lie
from the denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings ;6 the plead-
ings had raised an issue of fact to be determined by jury trial or other
appropriate procedure; and the controversy under the amended pleadings
was a different case, involving a different tract of land.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Alternative Grounds For Decision
In State v. Ennis Jones1 there was a criminal prosecution in which
the bill of indictment contained two counts. The lower court granted the
defendant's motion to quash saying: "The defendant, in support of his
motion to quash, contended that the aforesaid ordinance was uncon-
stitutional and the enforcement void. In addition to the aforesaid ground
for quashing the Bill of Indictment, it is observed by the court that the
offense is alleged in the alternative .... ,,2 On appeal the Court was
unable to ascertain whether the indictment was quashed on the ground
that the ordinance was unconstitutional or because of the alternative
aspect of the indictment; therefore, the Court applied the well-established
a8 This, of course, is a non-sequitur. Independent observations of the judge can
hardly be classified as further facts deduced or inferred from those stipulated.
Since counsel for both parties requested the view, it seems clear that the parties con-
sented that the judge's observations should constitute evidence to be considered
along with the admissions and stipulations.
On the other hand, the Court concludes from the facts stipulated that the
municipality accepted dedication of the street. Is this an inference of fact rather
than a conclusion of law? If so. it violates the court's stated rule.
- 243 N. C. 113, 90 S. E. 2d 167 (1955).
10 Howland v. Stitzer, 240 N. C. 689, 84 S. E. 2d 167 (1954).
1 242 N. C. 563, 89 S. E. 2d 129 (1955).
2-Id. at 564, 89 S. E. 2d at 130.
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rule that it will not pass upon a constitutional question unless raised and
passed upon in the court below,3 nor will it pass on the constitutional
question, even when properly presented, if there is another ground upon
which the case may be decided.4 Finding that the indictment was not bad
for duplicity, the Court reversed.
Estoppel
Convent of the Sisters of Saint Joseph v. Winston-Salem,5 involving
the doctrine that a party who has accepted benefits under a statute may
be estopped to assert its unconstitutionality, is discussed elsewhere.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS TO PERSONS
Right To Counsel
Defendant was indicated for first degree murder; the solicitor in open
court announced that the State would ask for no greater verdict than
second degree murder. The defendant was a poorly-educated colored
woman, unfamiliar with court and jury trial procedure and financially
unable to employ counsel. Although, following the verdict, counsel was
appointed to perfect the appeal, the defendant was not represented by
counsel during the trial. In State v. Simpson7 the Court held this
failure to appoint counsel violative of G. S. § 15-4.18 which provides
that counsel shall be appointed when the accused is unable to employ
counsel and is bound over to the Superior Court to answer a charge, the
punishment for which may be death. It was held immaterial that the
State elected to seek a lesser verdict than the first degree charged in the
indictment or that the defendant did not request the appointment of
counsel.9
Self-Incrimination
Upon an application for an order to examine certain officers of de-
fendant corporation and to inspect certain books and records, the Court
pointed out that if the individuals sought to be examined should refuse
to testify on the ground that their evidence would tend to incriminate
them, a constitutional question would be presented but that the indi-
viduals, and not the court, must raise the question. 10
3b re Parker, 209 N. C. 693, 184 S. E. 532 (1936).
'For a discussion of the application of this rule in the United States Supreme
Court, see 27 N. C. L. REv. 221 (1949).
5 243 N. C. 316, 90 S. E. 2d 879 (1956).
' See MuNiciPAL CORPORATIONS, p. 240 infra.
'243 N. C. 436, 90 S. E. 2d 708 (1956).
:This statute implements N. C. CONST. art. I, § 11.
'See 32 N. C. L. Rxv. 331 (1954).
"0 Cates v. Finance Co., 244 N. C. 277, 93 S. E. 2d 145 (1956).
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EMINENT DOMAIN
In Sale v. Highway Commission, the State Highway and Public
Works Commission acquired an easement over plaintiff's land by pur-
chase pursuant to G. S. § 136-19 and agreed to pay plaintiffs a specified
sum and to remove plaintiff's warehouse from the right of way and re-
construct it on other property belonging to the plaintiffs. While the
property was under the custody and control of the Commission, the
warehouse was destroyed by fire. Plaintiff sought compensation for the
taking of land. The Commission contended that the proceeding should
be nonsuited, because the Commission did not acquire the easement by a
taking; that the authority of the property owner to bring an action under
G. S. § 136-19 and G. S. § 40-11 is predicated upon the inability of the
owner and the Commission to agree upon the purchase price of real
estate; and that there is no authority to give any court jurisdiction over
an action for the failure of the Commission to comply with the terms of
a contract made by it. The Court allowed a nonsuit for variance since
the petition alleged the taking of land while the evidence supported a
recovery for failure to pay the money compensation and to perform the
other obligations according to a contract between the parties.
On the second appeal of Sale v. Highway Commission,12 the Court
held that the constitutional prohibition against taking or damaging
private property for public use without just compensation13 is self-execut-
ing, is not susceptible of impairment by legislation, and, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory remedy in a particular factual situation, may
be enforced by an action at common law, as an exception to the principle
that the soverign cannot be sued without its consent. The plaintiffs are
not remitted to an action against the state under the provisions of Article
IV, section 9 of the Constitution of North Carolina, nor, since the con-
sideration was agreed upon, is a special proceeding under G. S. § 136-19
and G. S. § 40-12 et seq., apposite.
The plaintiff, in Eller v. Board of Education of Buncombe County,14
sued the defendant Board of Education for damages for obstructing the
flow of outlet for a spring, causing water and mud to accumulate on
plaintiff's property, and for maintaining a septic tank constructed so
that sewage flowed into the branch, ruining plaintiff's spring, and emit-
ting noxious odors which rendered his home uninhabitable. The Court
held that the creation and maintenance of a government project so as to
constitute a nuisance substantially impairing the value of private property
"238 N. C. 599, 78 S. E. 2d 724 (1953).
242 N. C. 612, 89 S. E. 2d 290 (1955).
" "While the principle is not stated in express terms in the North Carolina
Constitution, it is regarded as an integral part of the 'law of the land' within the
meaning of Art. I, sec. 17." Eller v. Board of Education, 242 N. C. 584, 586, 89
S. E. 2d 144, 146 (1955).14242 N. C. 584, 89 S. E. 2d 144 (1955).
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is, in the constitutional sense, a taking within the principle of eminent
domain. 15 In rejecting defendant's contention that plaintiff's sole remedy
was a petition before the clerk under G. S.- § 40-12, the Court held that
G. S. § 40-12 applied only to instances where the condemnor acquires
title and right to specific land.1 6
JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES
In Better Home Furniture Co. v. Baron,'7 defendant challenged the
validity of a statute providing a procedure for small claims ($1,000.00 or
less) in the Superior Court of Forsyth County.' 8 The statute eliminates
jury trial unless demanded by a party in his first pleading. A plaintiff
making no such demand pays advance costs of half the usual costs and
gives no prosecution bond. Any other party demanding jury trial must
pay the remaining half of the costs and give prosecution bond of $25.00.
In the principal case plaintiff demanded no jury trial and defendant's
answer demanded none. Subsequently, new counsel for defendant at-
tempted to demand jury trial and also moved that plaintiff be required
to give the regular $200.00 prosecution bond under G. S. § 1-109. He
also moved for dismissal for the reason that the special statute was in-
valid. The Superior Court ruled that defendant had waived jury trial,
denied his motions, tried the case without a jury and gave judgment for
plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court found no conflict with the constitutional prohibition against
local legislation,'9 or any other constitutional provision, and pointed out
that the constitution expressly authorizes the General Assembly to
regulate procedure in courts below the Supreme Court.20 It also found
that there was no disregard of any constitutional guarantee of jury trial,
pointing out that the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States does not apply to the states and that while section 19
of Article IV of the North Carolina Constitution provides for jury trial,
section 13 of the Article expressly permits waiver of jury trial. The
Court recognized that the legislature may not attach unreasonable con-
ditions to the right to jury trial, but found that the instant statute's pro-
visions regarding costs and prosecution bond were not unreasonable.
The decision has state-wide significance because, as pointed out by
' N. C. CONsT. art. I, § 17: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges; or outlawed or exiled, or in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land."
" See 28 N. C. L. Rxv. 403 (1950).
11243 N. C. 502, 91 S. E. 2d 236 (1956).
's 1951 Sess. Laws, c. 1057.
19 N. C. CoNsT. art. II, § 29: "The General Assembly shall not pass any local,
private or special act or resolution relating to the establishment of courts inferior
to the Superior Court. ... Y2 N. C. CoNsr. art. IV, § 12.
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the Court, the 1955 Assembly enacted a general statute with provisions
similar to those of the Forsyth statute.2 1
Ingle v. McCurry2 2 was an action on a note. The plaintiff's evidence
made out a prima facie case but did not establish the defendant's affirma-
tive defense that the action was to recover a deficiency judgment which
is precluded by statute.23 The trial court dismissed the action prior to
the introduction of evidence by the defendant, upon its findings of facts
in accordance with the allegations of defendant's affirmative defense.
The Court held this to be reversible error as depriving the plaintiff of his
constitutional right of trial by jury,24 since there was no agreement of the
parties waiving jury trial or consenting that the court should find the
facts. 25
UNION SHOP UNDER RAILWAY LABOR ACT: STATE "RIGHT TO WORK"
STATUTE
In Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad26 the Court held that since
the Railway Labor Act27 as amended expressly authorizes union shop
contracts, 28 such contracts between a union and a railroad are valid and
that G. S. § 95-78 (North Carolina's "Right to Work" statute) does not
control since Congress has pre-empted 29 the field. 80
EDUCATION- SCHOOL BONDS
In Constantian v. Anson County,31 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
defendant County from issuing and selling the $750,000 remainder of an
authorized $1,250,000 of capital outlay school bonds. He asserted that
the authorization was void because it discriminated against children of
the white race in violation of the Constitution of North Carolina,32 since
21 1955 Sess. Laws, C. 1337, now G. S. §§ 1-539.3 et seq. There are differences
in details. The 1955 law is applicable only in counties in which the commissioners
adopt it.
'243 N. C. 65, 89 S. E. 2d 745 (1955).
23 G. S. § 45-21.38 (1950).
N. C CoNsT. art. I, § 19: "In all controversies at law respecting property,
the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the
people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable ... ."; and art. IV, § 1: ... the
facts at issue tried by order of court before a jury."2
'N. C. CoNsT. art. IV, § 13.
-242 N. C. 650, 89 S. E. 2d 441 (1955).2'764 STAT. 1238, 45 U. S. C., § 152 (eleventh) (1951).
28 The amended Act permits a union shop agreement requiring, as a condition
of continued employment, that all employees shall become members of the labor
organization representing their craft or class, within 60 days following the begin-
ning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is later.
29 See 33 N. C. L. REv. 626 (1955).
SRy. Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225 (1956).
11244 N. C. 221, 93 S. E. 2d 163 (1956).
-N. C. CON T. art. IX, § 2: "The General Assembly... shall provide ... for
a general and uniform system of public schools. . . . And the children of the
white race and the children of the colored race shall be taught in separate schools
but there shall be no discrimination in favor of, or to the prejudice of, either race."(The last sentence was added in 1875.) Art. IX was amended in 1956 by adding
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some of the facilities identified in two of the projects were described as
facilities suitable for colored children. The Superior Court refused to
grant the injunction and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Plaintiff first contended that, even assuming the validity of the bonds
when authorized, recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, made subsequent to such authorization, rendered impossible the
realization of the purpose for which the bonds were authorized.
The Court said that the constitution contained a mandate that the
General Assembly provide for a state public school system33 and that
the county boards of commissioners provide the funds for the buildings
and equipment necessary for the maintenance and operation of these
schools.3 4 The Court stated that the Commissioners were responsible
only for providing the school plant facilities as opposed to the operation
of the schools, and, when they provided the funds, their responsibility
was discharged.
Plaintiff next contended that when the bonds were authorized, the
Constitution of North Carolina contained the mandatory requirement
that children of the white race and children of the colored race be taught
in separate schools 35 and that since the Supreme Court of the United
States in Brown v. Board of Education36 has declared that the enforced
separation of Negroes and whites in public schools, solely on the basis of
race, denies to Negroes the equal protection of the laws, both the bond
order and the election were invalidated. The Court said that no provision
of the Constitution of the United States requires that the state maintain
a system of public schools; this is exclusively a matter of state policy,
and nothing in the Brown case requires that children of different races
be taught in the same school. The Court held that the doctrine declared
in the Brown case is that no child, whatever his race, may be excluded
from attending the school of his choice solely on the basis of race and,
if so excluded by a state or a state agency, he may assert his constitutional
rights under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, as interpreted in the Brown case.37
Continuing, the Court said that only that portion of the 1875
a new § 12 authorizing education expense grants for private education and authoriz-
ing suspension of local schools. See Wettach, North Carolina School Legislation
-1956, 35 N. C. L. REv. 1 (1956).
3 Ibid.
' IN. C. CONsT. art. IX, § 3: "Each county of the State shall be divided into
a convenient number of districts, in which one or more public schools shall be
maintained at least six months in every year; and if the commissioners of any
county shall fail to comply with the aforesaid requirements of this section, they shall
be liable to indictment." See note 32 supra for reference to the 1956 school law
amendments.
'5 Note 32 supra.
O347 U. S. 483 (1954).
'
T The Court noted that this interpretation was substantially the same as that
given the Brown case in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (1955).
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Amendment which purported to make mandatory the enforced separation
of the races in the public schools is violative of the equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment and thus void; otherwise, the mandates of the
Constitution of North Carolina 8 remain in full force and effect. These
provisions were held to be complete in themselves and capable of en-
forcement.
The Court concluded by saying that, although they believed that the
interpretation now placed on the 14th Amendment by the Brown case
could not be reconciled with the intent of the framers and ratifiers of
the 14th Amendment, the actions of the Congress of the United States
and of state legislatures, or the long and consistent judicial interpretations
placed on it, the Constitution of the United States takes precedence over
the Constitution of North Carolina. "In the interpretation of the Con-
stitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United Sates
is the final arbiter. Its decision in the Brown case is the law of the land
and will remain so unless reversed or altered by Constitutional means."30
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF CONTRACT
The matter of impossibility of performance of a contract was pre-
sented in Sale v. Highway Commission,' where petitioners sought dam-
ages for respondent's failure to perform work it had contracted to do as
part of the consideration for a right-of-way agreement,2 the work being
removal of petitioners' warehouse and woodshed from the right-of-way
and reconstruction of them on near-by property belonging to petitioners.
The petition alleged that while the property was in the custody and con-
trol of respondent, the warehouse and woodshed were destroyed by fire
through negligence of respondent; damages were sought for the money
value of the buildings located as agreed in the contract. After disposing
of matters of defense involving constitutional law concerning eminent
domain,3 the Court dealt with the contract feature of impossibility of per-
formance, stating: ". . they [petitioners] can recover such damages, un-
less the respondent, the burden being upon it, can show that the build-
ings were destroyed by fire, or otherwise, and it, or its agents, were in
the exercise of due care. After proof of the execution of the contract
38 N. C. CONST. art. IX §§ 2, 3.
" Constantian v. Anson County, 244 N. C. 221, 229, 93 S. E. 2d 163, 168 (1956).
1242 N. C. 612, 89 S. E. 2d 290 (1955).
2 The case was a special proceeding pursuant to G. S. §§ 136-19 and 40-12
et seq, which provide for recovery of compensation for right-of-way grants to the
Commission.3 See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 202 supra.
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and breach by the promisor, the burden is on the promisor to show an
excuse for the breach.' 4
In Radio Electronics Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,5 plaintiff alleged
an oral contract whereby it was granted exclusive distributorship of de-
fendant's products in North Carolina, followed by defendant's cancella-
tion of the contract and grant of the distributorship to another. Pointing
out that a contract whereby a person limits his right to do business in
the State is, by G. S. § 75-4, made unenforceable unless in writing and
signed by the party so contracting, the Court held that the statute applied
to "a contract whereby a-person, firm, or corporation is made exclusive
distributor for the State . . . precluding the manufacturer from doing
business in North Carolina otherwise than through [a] single chan-
nel. . .. "a
ILLEGAL CONTRACTS AND QUANTUM MERUIT
The interesting fact situation of Tillman v. Talbert7 produced an
illegal contract question in connection with G. S. § 83-12, which makes it
a misdemeanor for any person other than a licensed architect to sell or
furnish plans for the construction of a building of a value exceeding
$20,000.00.8 Defendants had contracted with plaintiff, who was not a
licensed architect, to furnish them plans for construction of a residence
to cost approximately $18,000.00. Plaintiff worked on the plans but
never finished those calling for an $18,000.00 residence, because, from
time to time, they were changed to comply with requests of defendants.
Final plans called for a house exceeding $20,000.00 in cost. Plantiff
sued for the unpaid balance of the original contract price, which was four
per cent of actual cost of construction. Defendants answered that the
contract was illegal, and that, therefore, plaintiff could recover nothing;
whereupon, plaintiff amended his complaint to ask for recovery quantum
meruit for work done upon the plans for construction of a residence
to cost about $18,000.00 up to the time the changes in the plans made the
contract illegal.
In holding for the plaintiff, the Court said: "A subsequent illegal
agreement by the parties cannot affect a previous fair and lawful con-
4242 N. C. 612, 621, 89 S. E. 2d 290, 298 (1955).
244 N. C. 114, 92 S. E. 2d 664 (1956).
"Id. at 117, 92 S. E. 2d at 666. G. S. § 75-1 states: "Every contract . . . in
restraint of trade or commerce in the State . . . is hereby declared illegal." The
Court did not regard the oral contract as alleged as coming within the purview of
this section. It said: "The question is not whether the oral contract as alleged
herein is void as an unreasonable restraint of trade, but whether it is void and
unenforceable by reason of the provisions of G. S. 75-4."
7244 N. C. 270, 93 S. E. 2d 101 (1956). For another case involving an illegal
contract see MuNiCiPAL CO1'PORAIONS, p. 239 infra.
' G. S. § 83-12 prohibits the practice of architecture without a license, but states:
... nothing in this chapter shall prevent any person from selling or furnishing
plans" for buildings of a value not exceeding $20,000.00.
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tract between them in relation to the same subject .... The plaintiff
made out his case for a recovery on quantum meruit without reliance on
any work done by him on plans for the construction of a building of the
value of more than $20,000.00, which subsequent work will not bar his
recovery on a quantum meruit for work done under the original valid
contract."9
LIABILITY EXEMPTION CLAUSES
Hall v. Sinclair Refining Co.,' 0 presented the Court occasion to indi-
cate, albeit by dictum, continued approval of its position to the effect that
unequal bargaining power between parties to a contract is closely related
to the public policy limitation upon the general rule that a person may
effectively bargain against liability for his ordinary negligence in the per-
formance of a contractual duty. In the instant case, the contract between
plaintiff, owner-operator of a service station, and defendant contained
stipulations to the effect that plaintiff would: (1) "indemnify and save
harmless" the defendant from any loss or damage caused by any "leak-
age" resulting from the installation or use of the equipment installed by
defendant, whether due to negligence or otherwise, and (2) maintain and
repair the equipment at his expense. Plaintiff sought damages for
leakage of gasoline from the underground tank and pumping equipment
installed by defendant.
In affirming judgment for defendant on the pleadings, the Court
stated that a factor in determining the validity of such "exemption
clauses" is "the comparable positions which the contracting parties oc-
cupy in regard to their bargaining strength, i. e., whether one of the
parties has unequal bargaining power so that he must either accept
what is offered or forego the advantages of the contractual relation in a
situation where it is necessary for him to enter into the contract to obtain
something of importance to him which for all practical purposes is not
obtainable elsewhere.""1 Then the Court pointed out that it had rec-
ognized this test of relative bargaining power in a recent decision,12 but
observed that plaintiff's allegations failed to "raise the question of unequal
bargaining power between the parties," adding: "He has failed to bring
himself within any of the recognized limitations upon the rule which
permits exemption from liability for negligence."'13
244 N. C. 270, 272, 93 S. E. 2d 101, 103 (1956).
1- 242 N. C. 707, 89 S. E. 2d 396 (1955).
1Id. at 710, 89 S. E. 2d at 398.
'Ins. Ass'n v. Parker, 234 N. C. 20, 65 S. E. 2d 341 (1951), where the disparity
in bargaining power was between plaintiff car owner looking for a parking place
in downtown Charlotte and defendant parking lot owner who displayed a prominent
sign reading, "Not responsible for loss by fire or theft." The Court took judicial
notice of the increasing perplexities of the parking problem and held defendant liable
for theft of plaintiff's car resulting from defendant's negligence.
2 242 N. C. 707, 711, 89 S. E. 2d 396, 398 (1955).
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PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
In Kennedy v. Parrott,14 the ultimate issue involved the law of torts, 5
but in the course of a rather lengthy opinion, the Court made some
pointed comments pertinent to the law of contracts which could conceiva-
bly becloud the issue of whether or not a contract exists between
physician and patient. Said the Court: "While the law of contracts is
applied as between a patient and his physician or surgeon, when a person
consults a physician or surgeon, seeking treatment for a physical ailment
... and the physician or surgeon agrees to accept him as a patient, it
does not create a contract in the sense that term is ordinarily used ...
The physician.., prescribes ... but the patient is under no legal obliga-
tion to follow the physician's instructions. Thus it is apt and perhaps
more exact to say it creates a status or relation rather than a contract." 6
(Emphasis added.) Although the foregoing observations were obiter,
and may prove to be of little consequence in subsequent cases, statements
by the Court in earlier decisions left no doubt as to the existence of a
contract between physician and patient.' 7
RESCISSION
In a somewhat enigmatic per curiam,'8 the Court affirmed judgment
granting rescission of a contract of purchase and sale of a house where
the vendor was "an experienced real estate dealer" and the vendee "a
blind, poorly educated woman who 'Brailled' the house" attempting to
ascertain its condition but failed to discover that "the house was not
- 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956).5 See TORTS, p. 252 infra. The instant case held that the surgeon had authority
to remove internal cysts discovered after incision for appendectomy.
'6243 N. C. 355, 360, 90 S. E. 2d 754, 757 (1956).
'TIn Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 127 S. E. 356 (1925), where the issue was
also one of tort (negligence), the Court stated: "The duty which a physician or
surgeon owes to his patient must be measured and determined primarily and in the
first instance by the contract of employment." The contract aspect of this case
was cited with approval in Childers v. Frye, 201 N. C. 42, 158 S. E. 744 (1931),
where the issue was also one of tort.
70 C. J. S., Physicians and Surgeons § 37 (1951) states: "The relationship of
physician or surgeon and patient is one arising out of a contract, express or implied
.... The duty owed to a patient is measured and determined primarily by the
contract of employment .... The physician or surgeon may by special agreement
or notice limit the extent and scope of his employment." Citing Nash v. Royster,
supra, and Childers v. Frye, supra.
70 C. 3. S., Physicians and Surgeons § 38 (1951) states: "An action ex
contractu. will lie for a breach of duty arising out of a contract between a physician'
and patient.'
Quaere whether the following interpretation of the Court's statements in theinstant case could fairly be made so as to reconcile them with the previous state-
ments by the Court: There is a contract between a physician or surgeon and his
patient, but it is one giving the physician or surgeon extraordinary discretion.
Even so, the statement in the instant case that, "the patient is under no legal
obligation to follow the physician's instructions," appears to be an insinuation, at
least, of absence of consideration moving to the physician in return for his services.
If such implication was intended, it completely overlooks the patient's legal obli-
gation to pay for the physician's services.
" Thompson v. Stadiem, 243 N. C. 291, 90 S. E. 2d 518 (1955).
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properly underpinned and had not passed city inspection as repre-
sented."'19 Presumably the Court meant, "as represented" by defendant;
otherwise it would be difficult to explain the basis for rescission.20 But
assuming defendant was guilty of at least an innocent misrepresentation,
the decision was supported by substantial authority.21
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
GUARANTORS
In Arcady Farmzs Milling Co. v. Wallace,' the wives of defendant
principal debtors were joined as defendants in a suit on trade acceptance
for goods sold, because the wives guaranteed payment on the goods.
The wives demurred to the complaint on the grounds that (1) there
had been a misjoinder of parties and causes, and (2) married women
cannot be guarantors for their husbands unless they comply with G. S.
§ 52-12,2 which concerns the validity of contracts made between spouses.
The judgment of the lower court overruling the demurrer was sustained
by the Court, which said that the causes of action "arise out of the same
transactions, or transactions connected with the same subject of action,
rest upon the same proof against all defendants, and may be joined for
a complete determination of the questions involved." a  The Court con-
ceded that in an earlier case4 it had held that a guarantor, unlike a
surety, could not be sued as an original promisor on the principal contract
with the debtor. However, that holding did not prohibit a cause of
action against the guarantor on his separate contract of guaranty. The
"
9 d. at 291, 90 S. E. 2d at 519.
204 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS § 926 (rev. ed. 1936) states that the doctrine of
caveat emptor is still in full force in the law of real estate: "Still more clearly
there can be no warranty of quality or condition implied in the sale of real estate
and ordinarily there cannot be in the lease of it."
"1 5 WiLmisTOrx, CONTRACTS § 1500 (rev. ed. 1936) states: "It is not necessary,
in order that a contract may be rescinded for fraud or misrepresentation, that the
party making the misrepresentation should have known it was false. Innocent
misrepresentation is sufficient, for though the representation may have been made
innocently, it would be unjust to allow one who has made false representations,
even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such representations."
Accord, RE:STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 470 (1) (1932) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION§ 28 (b) (1945).
And see Whitehurst v. Ins. Co., 149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067 (1908), where an
insurance agent's false statements to an illiterate blind man were held sufficient
for actionable fraud, though made without knowledge of their falsity.
1242 N. C. 686, 89 S. E. 2d 413 (1955).
2 The statute provides in part: "No contract between husband and wife made
during their coverture shall be valid to affect or change any part of the real estate
of the wife, or the accruing income thereof for a longer time than three years next
ensuing the making of such contract, or to impair or change the body or capital
of the personal estate of the wife, or the accruing income thereof, for a longer
time than three years next ensuing the making of such contract, unless [certain
formal requirements are met]."
3242 N. C. 686, 690, 89 S. E. 2d 413, 416 (1955).
4Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Clifton, 203 N. C. 483, 166 S. E. 334 (1932).
[Vol. 35
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
Court said that the causes were not independent. It should be noted that
the guaranty here was to pay if the principal debtor failed to pay upon
maturity. In this situation joinder should certainly be permitted. It
should, in fact, be permitted in any situation in which the obligation of
the guarantor matures prior to the bringing of the action.
On the second ground for demurrer, G. S. § 52-12 was held not ap-
plicable because the wives contracted with plaintiff creditors rather than
with their husbands.
CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY
In Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Angle, Inc.5 the plaintiff had paid an obli-
gation on which it was surety, and brought this action on a contract
indemnifying the surety. The defendant indemnitor demurred on two
grounds. The first was that the contract was not binding on the de-
fendant because it had not been executed by the plaintiff. The Court, in
accordance with the weight of authority,6 held that an indemnitee need
not sign the contract, since the object of the indemnitee's signature on
the contract is merely to show mutuality of agreement. Such mutuality
existed here because the plaintiff did become surety for the debtor in
accordance with the indemnity contract. The second ground was that
the extent of the plaintiff's loss as surety had not been determined when
the action was brought. The Court construed the indemnity contract to
determine whether it was one to indemnify against loss only or against
liability.7  Holding that the contract was broad enough to indemnify
against liability, the Court reversed the lower court, which had sustained
the demurrer.
DEEDS OF TRUST
Foreclosure
Where a lien is filed on real property prior to a federal tax lien, the
government has one year after foreclosure by the prior lienor in which
to redeem the property.8 A North Carolina statute9 allows the equitable
owner of mortgaged property to enjoin foreclosure upon a showing that
"the amount bid or the price offered" is insufficient and will cause ir-
reparable damage to the owner. In Roberson v. Boone10 a temporary
restraining order was granted on the ground that the federal govern-
ment's right of redemption would prevent the land's being sold on fore-
closure at its true value. The Court, in a per curiam decision, sustained
1243 N. C. 570, 91 S. E. 2d 575 (1956).
'See 17 C. J. S., Contracts § 62 (1939); 42 C. J. S., Indemnity § 4 (1944).7 See 27 Am. Jui., Indemnity § 20 (1940).
062 STAT. 972 (1948), as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 2410 (c) (1952).9 G. S. § 45-21.34 (1950).
20 242 N. C. 598, 89 S. E. 2d 158 (1955).
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the dissolution of the order because it could find no legal or equitable
ground for continuing the order."
In Roberson v. Pruden=2 a former debtor was able to compel his
former creditor to reconvey property foreclosed and bid in under a
deed of trust securing a promissory note. To require the reconveyance,
plaintiff sued on the theory of a parol trust. The Court did not discuss
the former debtor-creditor relationship, but devoted its opinion to the
application of the parol trust theory to the facts of the case. That aspect
of the case is discussed elsewhere in this Survey.'3
SUFFICIENT RECORD NOTICE FOR LIENS
Three cases involving liens on property turned on the sufficiency of
record notice. The first case, Dula v. Parsons,14 involved a judgment
lien. There the plaintiff judgment creditor made a motion to set aside a
homestead allotted to the son out of certain property that the judgment
debtor had conveyed to his son. The son contended that the debtor had
conveyed the property to the son before the docketing of the judgment,
though the docketing preceded registration of the deed. The deed had
been referred to in two deeds of trust registered prior to the judgment
lien. The Court held, in accordance with G. S. § 1-234, that a docketed
judgment is "a lien on the real property situated in the county where the
same is docketed ... ."'5 In the absence of actual registration, the deed
from the debtor to the son could not defeat the lien of the judgment.10
The reference in the recorded deeds of trust to the unrecorded deed was
no substitute for registration.
The second case17 was concerned with whether G. S. § 161-22,18
which prescribes the methods for the indexing of the recordation of liens,
deeds, and mortgages, had been complied with sufficiently to give notice
of a mortgage on certain tobacco. The names of the mortgagor and
mortgagee had been properly transcribed in the grantee and grantor in-
dexes, but the references to the book and page on which the mortgage
had been recorded were incorrect in the grantor index. The trial court
held as a matter of law that the chattel mortgage on the crop had not been
properly recorded. The Court reversed the trial court's decision on the
"Some states give mortgagors a redemption power, following foreclosure, of
a year or more. See 31 Am. Jtm., Judicial Sales §§ 222-33 (1940).12242 N. C. 632, 89 S. E. 2d 250 (1955).
"See TRUSTS, p. 264 infra.14243 N. C. 32, 89 S. E. 2d 797 (1955).
"G. S. § 1-234 (1953).
'
0 G. S. § 47-18 (1950) provides in part: "No conveyance of land . . . shall be
valid to pass any property, as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable con-
sideration, from the donor, bargainor or leasor, but from the registration thereof
within the county where the land lies ..
"Johnson Cotton Co. v. Hobgood, 243 N. C. 227, 90 S. E. 2d 541 (1955).
"8 The statute provides that no instrument shall be deemed properly registered
unless properly indexed and cross-indexed.
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ground that there had been sufficient notice "to attract attention or stimu-
late inquiry."'19 Therefore, the defendant was "affected with knowledge
of all the inquiry would have disclosed.
20
The Court in Saunders v. Woodhouse21 found that a laborer's and
materialman's lien complied with G. S. § 44-38.22 The material and
labor had been furnished prior to the registration of a deed of trust, but
the deed of trust was recorded two months before the lien was filed.
However, it was held that the lien took precedence under the familiar
rule that such a lien which has been properly filed relates back and
covers the materials furnished and the labor done within the preceding
six months. The fact that the lien had been filed in the same docket
with the old age assistance liens did not affect the validity of its registra-
tion because the docket book was labeled "Lien Docket 1" and complied
with the requirements of G. S. § 2-4223 as a lien docket.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW
Homicide
The Court was concerned in several cases with the rules governing
involuntary manslaughter as a result of culpable negligence. Possibly
the most controversial case decided by the Court during the past year is
State v. Kluckhohn.1 There was evidence that defendant was "dry-
firing" his pistol in his hotel room when it fired, killing a woman in the
street. Defendant contended that he was putting away his gun after
having cleaned and supposedly unloaded it when it went off accidentally.
It was error to charge the jury that a violation of G. S. § 14-342 prox-
imately resulting in death would constitute manslaughter, for "dry-
firing" does not imply the pointing of a gun at a person. An instruction
that for an accidental killing to be an excusable homicide the act must
have been lawful, done in a lawful and careful manner, and done without
1" 243 N. C. 227, 230, 90 S. E. 2d 541, 544 (1955).
20 Ibid.
"'243 N. C. 608, 91 S. E. 2d 701 (1956).
-"2 The statute provides that liens may be filed for materials furnished and labor
performed, but does not specify any special filing procedure for the clerk to follow.
2' This section lists a "lien docket" among the books a clerk is required to
keep. G. S. § 108-30.1 (1952 and Supp. 1956) specifically provides that the old
age assistance lien will be filed in the regular lien docket.
'243 N. C. 306, 90 S. E. 2d 768 (1956). There was a dissent by two justices
for the reason that defendant's own evidence made out a case against him of "a
culpably heedless use of a deadly weapon resulting in the death of deceased which
entitled the State to a peremptory instruction, so that any error in the charge was
harmless." Id. at 315, 90 S. E. 2d at 775.
2 G. S. § 14-34 (1953). "If any person shall point any gun or pistol at any-
person .. , whether such gun or pistol be loaded or not loaded, he shall be guilty
of an assault. . ." (Emphasis added.)
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any unlawful intent is erroneous because the jury would be free to con-
vict on a finding of ordinary negligence. The Court, citing State v.
Cope,8 said:
"A departure [from the conduct referred to in the charge] to be
criminal would have to consist of an intentional, willful, or wanton
violation of a statute or ordinance enacted for the protection of
human life or limb which resulted in injury or death. Such a
violation of a statute would constitute culpable negligence. ' 4
In State v. Phelps5 the evidence showed that defendant's car was
traveling at a speed of 75 to 80 miles per hour with its left wheels on or
over the center line and that defendant was not keeping a proper look-out.
Defendant's conviction of manslaughter was affirmed. The Court reas-
serted the proposition that the violation of a statute regulating auto-
mobiles is a violation of a statute designed to protect human life6 and
again quoted the Cope case 7 in saying that the "intentional, willful or
wanton" violation of such a statute, resulting in death, makes the wrong-
doer guilty of manslaughter. However, in State v. Mundy8 the Court
held that there can be manslaughter through the use of an automobile on
the highways without violation of a motor vehicle law. The defendant,
who had gone to sleep while driving, was charged with speeding, reckless
driving, and manslaughter; he had been acquitted of the speeding and
reckless driving charges but had been convicted of manslaughter.
Arson
In State v. Long9 defendant burned part of a house unfit for human
habitation. He was indicted for and convicted of willfully and feloniously
setting fire to and burning an unoccupied dwelling house. In an opinion
giving a general coverage of the law of arson in North Carolina it was
held that defendant could not be convicted of common law arson be-
cause the essential elements of malicious burning, and inhabitation of the
building were lacking from the indictment. The case was tried on the
theory that the indictment charged a violation of G. S. § 14-67,10 the
trial judge so stating in his charge and the judgment being imposed
'204 N. C. 28, 167 S. E. 456 (1933).
'243 N. C. 306, 313, 90 S. E. 2d 768, 773 (1956).
* 242 N. C. 540, 89 S. E. 2d 132 (1955).
' See State v. Swinney, 231 N. C. 506, 57 S. E. 2d 647 (1950).
7204 N. C. 28, 167 S. E. 456 (1933). This much-cited case was referred to again
in State v. Wall, 243 N. C. 238, 90 S. E. 2d 383 (1955), as containing applicable
principles of law in drawing the line between actionable negligence and culpable neg-
ligence.
8243 N. C. 149, 90 S. E. 2d 312 (1955). For a discussion of the auxiliary
problem in the case of the legal consequences of falling asleep while driving see
Note, 35 N. C. L. Rav. 123 (1956).
'243 N. C. 393, 90 S. E. 2d 739 (1956).
""If any person shall willfully attempt to burn any ... uninhabited house ...
the property of another, he shall be guilty of a felony." (Emphasis added.)
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thereunder. The Court held that defendant could not be convicted under
this statute, for it is concerned with attempts, not completed acts.
Furthermore, since the house was not fit for human habitation, defendant
could not be convicted under G. S. § 14-144,1 the Court holding that
"uninhabited house" implies one fit for habitation. The incongruity of
penalizing the attempt to do an act (G. S. § 14-67) more heavily than
the actual commission of the same act (G. S. § 14-144) was noted by the
Court to be a fit subject for legislation.
Intoxicating Liquor
In State v. Ritchie'2 defendant was charged in three separate courts
with unlawful possession, transportation, and possession for the purpose
of sale of tax-paid liquor. A nonsuit was allowed as to the unlawful
transportation count, but the jury returned a verdict of guilty of both
unlawful possession and unlawful possession for the purpose of sale.
Since possession of tax-paid liquor in the home when lawfully brought
there is not unlawful unless for the purpose of sale, the conviction on the
possession count was reversed. However, it was said in a dictum in
another case that there may be separate judgments on' counts of unlaw-
ful possession and unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor, al-
though the same act constituted both offenses.' 3
In State v. Tillery'4 the only evidence that the whiskey which de-
fendant transported and possessed was non-tax-paid was that it was
"bootleg" whiskey. The Court refused to take judicial notice that such
whiskey is non-tax-paid.' 5
Self-Defense
In State v. Tyson'0 defendant teased a girl accompanied by two male
companions at a "juke joint." This resulted in an exchange of blows
between defendant and the girl. Later, when defendant drew back his
hand as if to strike the girl, the deceased, one of her companions, knocked
defendant down with a piece of wood. Defendant then drew a pistol
and killed the deceased. The Court, in upholding a charge to the effect
" "If any person.., shall unlawfully and willfully burn... any... uninhabited
house ... every person so offending shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
This statute and G S. § 14-67 are in different articles and subchapters of Chapter
14 of the General Statutes.
12243 N. C. 182, 90 S. E. 2d 301 (1955).
'z State v. Stonestreet, 243 N. C. 28, 89 S. E. 2d 734 (1955). The Court relied
on State v. Chavis, 232 N. C. 83, 59 S. E. 2d 348 (1950), the basis of both decisions
being that unlawful possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor are neither
degrees of nor major and minor parts of the same offense and thus the penalty for
one is not merged into the penalty for the other on a conviction of both.
14243 N. C. 706, 92 S. E. 2d 64 (1956).
" See State v. Wolf, 230 N. C. 267, 52 S. E. 2d 920 (1949), where the Court
would not take judicial -notice that "white liquor" was non-tax-paid.
10242 N. C. 574, 89 S. E. 2d 138 (1955).
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that defendant could not take advantage of a plea of self-defense unless
he was without fault in the matter, said:
"Defendant knew, or ought to have known, that any insult directed
at, or any assault made upon, the woman would provoke the re-
sentment and the possible assault of her male companion. Hence,
there was sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding that
defendant was not without fault."'1
In this the doctrine that a person may not justify a homicide on the
grounds of self-defense when he has provoked the attack seems to be
extended beyond limits previously recognized in North Carolina and
other common law jurisdictions."'
Entrapment
The defendant's evidence was that the payee of a check assured de-
fendant drawer that the check would not be presented for payment until
defendant had sufficient funds to pay it. In a prosecution for issuing a
worthless check the defense was entrapment by the payee. The Court
states the rule that where a crime is such regardless of the consent of
the victim, the defense of entrapment consists of inducement by officers
or agents of the state only, and not private citizens. The Court held that
since the issuance of a worthless check is a crime regardless of the con-
sent of anyone, entrapment was not present.19
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Search and Seizure
In two cases the Court granted new trials because of admission of
evidence obtained through the use of search warrants not shown to be
valid. In State v. McMilliam20 defendant, before pleading to the in-
dictment, moved to suppress the State's evidence on the ground that it
was obtained either by no search warrant or by an invalid one. The
trial judge reserved ruling on the motion until the State had presented
the challenged evidence and rested its case. The Court held that on a
motion to suppress the State's evidence a ruling must be made before the
evidence in introduced and that when the validity of a search warrant is
at issue, the State must produce the search warrant or prove it is lost
'1 Id. at 577, 89 S. E. 2d at 140.8 See 26 Am. Jun., Homicide §§ 130, 131 (1940); Annot., 45 L. R. A. 687
(1899). In North Carolina the following cases represent the kinds of provocation
heretofore recognized as depriving defendant of the defense of self-defense: State v.
Brittain, 89 N. C. 481 (1883) (defendant attacked deceased) ; State v. Hardee, 192
N. C. 533, 135 S. E. 345 (1926) (defendant attacked the wife of deceased) ; State
v. Kennedy, 169 N. C. 326, 85 S. E. 42 (1915) (defendant used words calculated to
bring on a combat).
19 State v. Jackson, 243 N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1955). For a discussion of
entrapment in North Carolina, see Note, 34 N. C. L. REv. 536 (1956).20 243 N. C. 771, 92 S. E. 2d 202 (1956).
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and introduce evidence as to its contents and regularity. In State v.
White21 a police officer failed to sign under oath the affidavit supporting
the issuance of the search warrant although he testified under oath to the
information necessary for the validity of the warrant. The Court cited
G. S. § 15-27 in holding that the evidence was improperly admitted.
In State v. McPeak22 it was held that a guest or passenger in a car has
no legal right to object to a search of the car, because the constitutional
guarantee of freedom from unlawful search and seizure is a personal one
and can be asserted only by the one whose rights are invaded, in this
case the owner of the car.
Sufficiency of Warrant and Indictment
In several cases the Court struck down warrants or indictments on
the ground that they did not sufficiently charge a criminal offense, in that:
the defendant would not be informed of the exact crime so as to be able
to prepare a defense, a conviction or acquittal would not be a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense, or the trial court would
not be able on conviction to pronounce sentence according to law.23
Warrants or indictments were held to be insufficient which: failed to
state the duty the officer was undertaking, in an indictment for resisting
arrest ;24 insufficiently described the article stolen, in an indictment for
larceny ;25 did not state where a car was parked, other than on a public
street in Greensboro, in a warrant for failing to put money in a parking
meter ;26 failed to set out the false statements defendant supposedly pro-
cured and failed to state that defendant knew them to be false or that he
did not know whether they were true, in an indictment for subornation of
perjury ;27 did not state in what respect defendant aided and abetted in
prostitution, in a warrant for that crime. 28
These last two cases also involved the problem of charging the viola-
tion of a statute in the words of the statute. In State v. Lucas29 the
Court held that "since 'the commission of the crime of perjury is the
basic element in the crime of subornation of perjury' ",o the part of the
- 244 N. C. 73, 92 S. E. 2d 404 (1956).
-2243 N. C. 243, 90 S. E. 2d 501 (1955).
" See Case Surveys, 32 N. C. L. Rxv. 379, 436 (1954), 34 N. C. L. REv. 1, 43(1956).
-"' State v. Stonestreet, 243 N. C. 28, 89 S. E. 2d 734 (1955).
"' State v. Strickland, 243 N. C. 100, 89 S. E. 2d 781 (1955). The indictment
was for larceny and receiving a "quantity of meat of the value of $1500, of the
goods, chattels and moneys of one R & S Packing Company." The kind of meat
should have been stated.
'State v. Burton, 243 N. C. 277, 90 S. E. 2d 390 (1955).
27 State v. Lucas, 244 N. C. 53, 92 S. E. 2d 401 (1956).
.' State v. Cox, 244 N. C. 57, 92 S. E. 2d 413 (1956), State v. Powell, 244 N. C.
121, 92 S. E. 2d 681 (1956).
-9 244 N. C. 53, 92 S. E. 2d 401 (1956).
3
0 Id. at 56, 92 S. E. 2d at 403 (1956).
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perjury statute31 setting out the form to be used for indictments in such
cases should be read into the subornation of perjury statute.82 The fact
that a warrant or indictment is drawn in statutory language does not
necessarily mean, however, that it is sufficient. Although under the
general rule it is sufficient, State v. CoX3 3 held that when "the statute
characterizes the offense in mere general or generic terms, or does not suf-
ficiently define the crime or set forth all its essential elements,"3 4 using
the statutory language is not enough.3 5
In Harrell v. ScheidO6 the question was whether it was necessary
to charge and prove a defendant guilty of a second offense of drunken
driving in order for the Commissioner to take his license away for three
years.3 7 The Court held that in order to impose the heavier punishment
for a second offense as set out in G. S. § 20-179, the prior conviction must
be alleged in the indictment or warrant. But, since the revocation of
licenses by the Commissioner is not part of the punishment for the crime,
a license may be taken away for three years under G. S. § 20-19 (d)
without the prior conviction having been alleged.
Two cases involved quashing of indictments or warrants because of
disjunctive or alternative allegations of the charges against defendants.
The general rule is that where the statute gives more than one way in
which a crime may be committed it is bad pleading to charge commission
in the alternative or disjunctive, because it leaves defendant uncertain as
to the crime charged. In State v. Jones,38 involving a county health
ordinance concerning the installation of septic tanks, it was held that
there was no prejudice to defendant in charging that he did "build or
install" a septic tank, for the quoted words are used synonymously. To
the same effect is State v. Jackson,89 involving a warrant charging that
defendant issued a check knowing that neither defendant, nor defendant
trading under a trade name, nor the designated firm had sufficient funds
to pay the check.40 This cqse implies, and a dictum in the Jones case
states, that the general rule as given above applies only when the statute
31 G. S. § 15-145 (1953).
G. S. § 15-146 (1953).
S244 N. C. 57, 92 S. E. 2d 413 (1956).
I4d. at 60, 92 S. E. 2d at 415 (1956).
Possibly the aspect of this case more important for our purposes lies not in
the reiteration of this settled proposition, but rather in the fact that it overruled
Sate v. Johnson, 220 N. C. 773, 18 S. E. 2d 358 (1942), on the very question of
whether an allegation in the language of G. S. § 14-204 (1953), on repression of
prostitution, is sufficient.
For a discussion of the general question of sufficiency of alleging in the statutory
language see Note, 35 N. C. L. REv. 118 (1956).
243 N. C. 735, 92 S. E. 2d 182 (1956).
"Applicable sections of the General Statutes are: § 20-138 (offense of drunken
driving), § 20-179 (punishment), § 20-17 (revocation of license on conviction),§ 20-19 (d) (revocation for 3 years on a second conviction).8 242 N. C. 563, 89 S. E. 2d 129 (1955).
a9243 N. C. 216, 90 S. E. 2d 507 (1955).
40 G. S. § 14-107 (1953).
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prohibits conduct. When the statute commands, the allegations may be
in the disjunctive.
Nolo Contendere
In State v. Barbour4 l defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to
a charge of assault. The trial court accepted the plea and rendered
judgment on the verdict. The case was reversed, the Court saying that
a plea of nolo contendere is equivalent to a plea of guilty for the purpose
of entering judgment on the particular case, and nothing remains but
the imposition by the court of a judgment, and that it is incorrect for the
court to say that defendant was guilty or not guilty of any part of the
indictment or to render judgment "on the verdict" for there is none,
the purpose of any inquiry by the judge being only to determine the
extent of punishment to impose.42
Former Jeopardy
Defendant was tried in a domestic relations court on a warrant origin-
ally charging failure to provide expenses incidental to the pregnancy of
the mother of his illegitimate child and amended after it was issued to
charge failure to provide support for the child. On his appeal to the
Superior Court nonsuit was allowed. When defendant was later tried
anew on a new warrant for non-support, a plea of former jeopardy was
allowed by the domestic relations court. Appeal was taken by the State,
and defendant was convicted in the Superior Court.43 The Court held
that G. S. § 15-179 does not allow the state to appeal from a judgment
allowing a plea of former jeopardy.44 Thus all proceedings after the
allowance of the plea of former jeopardy by the domestic relations court
were void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court noted, however, that it is
not necessary that prosecution of defendant end, for there had been no
negative adjudication of paternity, and the offense of non-support is a
continuing one under G. S. § 49-2.
Trial
In State v. Clonch45 the defendant gave evidence which tended to
show that he was guilty of the crime charged. The trial court instructed
the jury that if they believed the evidence of the defendant they would
return a verdict of guilty. The Court granted a new trial, calling this
instruction "too unequivocal" saying that ordinarily the judge may
charge that if the jury finds the facts as the evidence tends to show be-
" 243 N. C. 265, 90 S. E. 2d 388 (1955).42 See Lane-Reticker, Nolo Contendere in North Carolina, 34 N. C. L. REv. 280(1956).9 Sate v. Ferguson, 243 N. C. 766, 92 S. E. 2d 197 (1956).
"See State v. Wilson, 234 N. C. 562, 67 S. E. 2d 748 (1951).
1- 242 N. C. 760, 89 S. E. 2d 469 (1955).
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yond a reasonable doubt to return a verdict of guilty, but otherwise not
guilty.
Two cases involved the necessity for instructions as to the weight to
be given testimony of accomplices. Many jurisdictions have statutes
prohibiting conviction solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an ac-
complice.4" The rest of the states, including North Carolina, while per-
mitting conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of an ac-
complice, have rules regarding instructions to the jury on the weight
to be given such testimony.4 State v. Stevens 48 reiterates the well-
established principle of North Carolina law that the trial judge is not
required to give such instructions in the absence of a special request.49
Thus it is incumbent upon the defendant to ask for instructions on specific
factors in the weighing of evidence. The usual instruction requested is
to the effect that a conviction may be based on the unsuppported testi-
mony of accomplices but that it is dangerous or unsafe to do so and that
the jury should scrutinize such testimony with caution and be sure of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before bringing in a verdict of guilty.
In State v. Hooker,50 where the only evidence the state offered was the
testimony of persons who admitted their complicity, the Court held it
error not to give the requested instructions: 1) that the witnesses were
accomplices according to their own testimony and 2) that there was no
other evidence pointing to defendant's guilt.
In two murder cases 51 the trial judge instructed the jury that a verdict
of guilty of murder in the first degree with a recommendation of life
imprisonment might be returned. In neither case was such recommenda-
'tion made. New trials were granted in both cases because there was no
instruction that upon the recommendation of life imprisonment the im-
position of a life sentence is mandatory, as required by G. S. § 14-17.
The Court felt that in the absence of the required instruction it was pos-
sible that the jury might have taken too lightly their power of life or
death.
Sentencing Problems
In the case of In re Swink 5 2 petitioner had been sentenced by one
court in two cases, #203 and #204, tried at the same time and recorded on
40 20 Am. JUR., Evidence, § 1235 (1939).
17 53 Am. JUR., Trial, § 740 (1945) ; Annot., 15 ANN. CAs. 698, 702 (1910).
,s244 N. C. 40, 92 S. E. 2d 409 (1956).
4' This seems to place North Carolina in the minority of those states not having
a prohibitory statute, the majority requiring instructions regardless of request.
See Annot., 15 ANN. CAs. 698, 702 (1910).
A m 243 N. C. 29, 90 S. E. 2d 690 (1956).
11 State v. Carter, 243 N. C. 106, 89 S. E. 2d 789 (1955), followved in State v.
Adams, 243 N. C. 290, 90 S. E. 2d 383 (1955).
2243 N. C. 86, 89 S. E. 2d 792 (1955). The case actually involved conviction
and sentence in addition to those mentioned in the text, but those seem to state the
problem.
[Vol. 35
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
the minutes of the court in immediate succession. The judgment of the
court in case #204 was that he be imprisoned in the county jail for
two years to begin at expiration of sentence in #203. Petitioner had also
been sentenced by two other courts, the first sentence being to confine-
ment in the county jail, "Sentence to begin at expiration of existing
sentences.15 3 In the second case the sentence, also to the county jail, was
"to begin at expiration of existing sentence." 54
On certiorari to review an order entered after a habeas corpus hear-
ing, the Court held that the designation by reference to case #203 in the
first sentence satisfied the requirement that in order for a sentence to run
consecutively the judgment in the later case must designate with certainty
when the second sentence is to begin. But the Court stated that the
second and third sentences failed to designate with certainty when they
were to commence, since their provisions in regard to existing sentences
imposed in other courts have no meaning apart from what may be dis-
closed by investigations and evidence dehors the record and are, there-
fore, void for uncertainty. 55 However, the Court noted that the general
rule that sentences run concurrently as a matter of law unless the judg-
ment sufficiently specifies a contrary intent is applicable only to sentences
imposed to the same place of confinement. 56 Where, as here, the sen-
tences are to different places of confinement, they must by their very
nature be served consecutively. 57 The Court said, "It appears that the
rule ... has been changed by Ch. 57, Session Laws of 1955." s Since its
subsequent enactment caused the statute to have no bearing on the
judgments, nothing further was said concerning it. It is unfortunate
that the Court did not see fit to interpret this statute, for it is not clear
whether all it does is give the trial judge authority to make sentences to
different places run concurrently or whether it makes these sentences
run concurrently as a matter of law unless affirmatively stated to the
contrary.5 9
Two problems of importance concerning activation of suspended
sentences were considered."" There must be hearing de novo in the
Id. at 88, 89 S. E. 2d at 794.
16rd. at 89, 89 S. E. 2d at 794. The commitments executed by the clerks changed
the language to refer to the end of specific prior sentences, one of which was in
another county. The Court disregarded the commitments as not in conformity with
the judgments.
See In re Parker, 225 N. C. 369, 35 S. E. 2d 169 (1945).
State v. Stonestreet, 243 N. C. 28, 89 S. E. 2d 734 (1955).
57 In re Smith, 235 N. C. 169, 69 S. E. 2d 174 (1952).
" G. S. § 15-6.2 (Supp. 1955). 'When by a judgment of a court or by op-
eration of law a prison sentence runs concurrently with any other sentence a pris-
oner shall not be required to serve any additional time in prison because the con-
current sentences are for different grades of offenses or that it is required that they
be served in different places of confinement."
' For a discussion of this statute, see Note, 35 N. C. L. REV. 112 (1956).
'o See Note, 31 N. C. L. REv. 195 (1953) for an excellent discussion of suspended
sentences in North Carolina.
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Superior Court when defendant appeals from the activation of a sentence
imposed by a lower court.01 A finding by the Superior Court on appeal
that there was evidence to support the findings and order of activation
of the inferior court is not a hearing de novo. 62 In State v. Davis,'3 after
holding that when there is more than one condition to a suspended
sentence the lower court must specify which one was violated when
activating the sentence (this to enable the defendant to test the validity of
a condition he believes to be illegal or void), the Court intimated that
for a prohibitory condition to be valid it must proscribe unlawful con-
duct. 4 While it is true that when a sentence is suspended on the good
behavior of defendant, the term "good behavior" means conduct not
punishable by law, 5 no North Carolina case has been discovered as
authority for the proposition that the acts in breach of the condition must
"raise an inference that ... defendant ... was ... violating the law in
some respect."6 6 In the light of the reformative value of the suspended
sentence it is hoped that the Court will not harden this dictum into a
firm holding but will invalidate only those conditions which are exces-
sive in duration,67 or are illegal or unreasonable. 8
DAMAGES
EASEMENTS
Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Clark' was a special proceeding to
obtain an easement, limited to the construction, operation and main-
tenance of the petitioner's power transmission line, with the right to
enter upon the land for inspection, repairs and alterations and to keep
- G. S. § 15-200.1 (1953).2 State v. Thompson, 244 N. C. 282, 93 S. E. 2d 158 (1956).
243 N. C. 754, 92 S. E. 2d 177 (1956).
o, "In the absence of some unusual or peculiar circumstance, it is not unlawful or
unreasonable to allow people to congregate or remain in one's home after the hours
of darkness. Therefore, in our opinion, a finding that the defendant had violated
the second condition in the judgment suspending the sentence, would not be suf-
ficient to justify putting the prison sentence into effect unless it was shown by the
evidence or found as a fact that the defendant allowed people to congregate or
remain in her home with such frequency and in such numbers as to raise an in-
ference that she was engaged in fortune telling or aiding in prostitution, or violating
the law in some other respect." State v. Davis, 243 N. C. 754, 756, 92 S. E. 2d 177,
178 (1956).
" State v. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922).
" State v. Davis, 243 N. C. 754, 756, 92 S. E. 2d 177, 178 (1956). Contrast this
language with that used by the Court in State v. Smith, 233 N. C. 68, 62 S. E. 2d
495 (1950), where the condition of suspension of a larceny sentence was that
defendant not drive a car on the highways, and in State v. Shepherd, 187 N. C.
609, 122 S. E. 467 (1924), where the condition of suspension of a sentence for
violation of the prohibition law was that defendant totally abstain from the use
of intoxicants. See also G. S. § 15-199 (1953).
G. S. § 15-200 (1953).
"See Note, 31 N. C. L. Rtv. 195, 199 (1953).
1243 N. C. 577, 91 S. E. 2d 569 (1956).
[Vol. 35
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
the right of way clear of all structures, except ordinary fences, trees, etc.
The easement sought by the petitioner expressly stated "that the de-
fendants shall have the full power and right to use the lands over which
said right of way and easement shall be condemned for all purposes not
inconsistent with the rights to be acquired therein and the use thereof
by the petitioner."' 2 The defendants offered testimony to show that their
land was adapted for a dam site, that such a dam had been planned and
equipment for its construction secured, and that the easement would
destroy its availability for a dam site, thus decreasing the present value
of the land. The trial court excluded testimony to show the high cost
of constructing such a dam, offered by the petitioner to combat the
evidence of the defendants tending to establish the availability of the
property for a dam site.
In holding the exclusion of this evidence to be error, the Court said:
"In fixing values on property in condemnation proceedings for any and
all uses or purposes to which the property is reasonably adapted and
might, with reasonable probability, be applied, but has never been ap-
plied, its availability for future uses must be such as enters into and affects
its market value, and regard must be had to the existing business or wants
of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the im-
mediate future to affect present market value. The test is what is the
fair value of the property in the market. The uses to be considered must
be so reasonably probable as to have an effect on the present market
value. Purely imaginative or speculative value should not be con-
sidered." 3
The petitioner also contended that the trial court had erred in its
charge as to the measure of damages in that court had instructed the
jury that they might award the full market value of the land covered by
the easement although there was reserved to the defendants the full
power and right to use the lands for all purposes not inconsistent with the
easement rights. In sustaining this objection, the Court held that the
trial court had ignored, the nature and extent of the easement to be
acquired by the petitioner according to its express stipulations and had
charged the law as if the petitioner were endeavoring to acquire the fee
to the premises in question to the exclusion of the individual defendants.4
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In Hinson v. Dawson5 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant driver
suddenly and without warning made a left turn in the path of the car in
which plaintiff's intestate was riding. He also alleged, upon information
'Id. at 582, 91 S. E. 2d at 572. 'Id. at 580, 91 S. E. 2d at 570.
'McCoRmICiK, DAMAGES, 131 (1935). See also Carolina Central Gas Co. v.
Hyder, 241 N. C. 639, 86 S. E. 2d 458 (1955).
'244 N. C. 23, 92 S. E. 2d 393 (1956).
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and belief, that (1) the defendant's driver had defective vision and was
incapable of seeing and apprehending the dangers of the operation of a
motor vehicle, (2) the defendant knew the driver had such defective
vision and (3) the defendant's conduct in allowing his driver to drive
constituted wanton conduct. Plaintiff also alleged that "in view of the
financial worth of the defendants . . . punitive damages should be in
some very substantial amount," and sought such damages in the amount
of $10,000.
The Court held that in the absence of allegations that the conduct
is malicious or willful, there is no basis for the submission of an issue
of punitive damages unless the facts alleged justify the allegation (by way
of coficlusion) that the conduct is wanton. It noted that references to
"gross" negligence as a basis for the recovery of punitive damages may
be found in North Carolina decisions,6 but concluded that those decisions
used that term in the sense of wanton conduct. It then defined conduct
as wanton ". . . when in conscious and intentional disregard of and
indifference to the rights and saftey of others,"7 and concluded that in
this case the plaintiff had the right, in relation to the facts alleged, to
assert that the defendant's conduct was wanton and thereon base a claim
for punitive damages.
An earlier North Carolina case, Taylor v. Bakery,8 held that allega-
tions of the financial worth of the defendant were admissible. The
Court expressly overruled the Taylor case as authority for that proposi-
tion and concluded that, although evidence of the financial worth of a
defendant is competent for the jury when an issue as to punitive damages
is warranted and submitted, allegations of the financial worth of a de-
fendant "should be stricken as an allegation of evidence rather than of
a substantive, ultimate fact."9 Such an allegation is patently prejudicial
if the plaintiff's evidence proves insufficient to warrant punitive damages
and should not be brought to the attention of the jury until the trial
judge determines that the evidence warrants the submission of such an
issue.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ADOPTIONS
In re Adoption of Hoosel was a case in which the parents, because of
the mother's illness, had consented to the adoption of their child by the
'E.g., Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N. C. 567, 5 S. E. 2d 828 (1939).
244 N. C. 23, 28, 92 S. E. 2d 393, 397 (1956).8234 N. C. 660, 68 S. E. 2d 313 (1951).
244 N. C. 23, 29, 92 S E 2d 393 397 (1956) The existence of a strong argu-
ment to this effect was recognized in Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on
Pleading Damages in North Carolina, 31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 250 (1953).
:1243 N. C. 589, 91 S. E. 2d 535 (1956).
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petitioners. Two months later, after the petitioners had begun adoption
proceedings, the parents intervened and withdrew their consent. In
cases of direct placements, G. S. § 48-11 provides for revocation by the
consenting parents within six months after consent is given. Consent
being an essential element to an order of adoption unless the child has
been abandoned, 2 the Court had to determine whether the original con-
sent given by the parents constituted constructive abandonment under
G. S. § 48-5.
Quoting G. S. § 48-2 (3), which defines an abandoned child as "any
child under the age of eighteen years who has been wilfully abandoned
at least six consecutive months, immediately preceding institution of an
action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child," the
Court held that the record conclusively refuted any claim that this child
had been so abandoned.
Wilfullness was said to be as much an element of abandonment with-
in the meaning of the adoption statutes as it is in our criminal statutes. 3
CUSTODY
Dellinger v. Bollinger4 presented a question of first impression in this
state. The putative father of a illegitimate child brought a special pro-
ceeding under G. S. § 50-13 to have the child removed from an environ-
ment detrimental to his welfare, and to have custody awarded to peti-
tioner. The defendant demurred, contending that a putative father was
not a parent within the meaning of the statute and, therefore, not en-
titled to institute this proceeding.5 The Court determined that the
putative father, required by our bastardy laws to support his illegitimate
child, had a sufficient interest to request that the court award him custody
of the child.
Holmes v. Holmes6 was a case involving a contest for the custody of
a child between one of the parents and the grandparents. The lower
court found that it was in the best interest of the child that he remain in
the custody of the grandparents, entering an order to that effect. This
order was approved on appeal, even though there was no finding that
the parent was an unfit custodian. In approving this order the Court
seems to be slipping further away7 from the position taken in the case
of In re Cranford8 that in the absence of a showing of unfitness, the
natural right of a parent to the custody of his child is paramount.
- See G. S. §§ 48-6 through -11 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
'G. S. §§ 14-322 and -326 (1953).
'242 N. C. 696, 89 S. E. 2d 592 (1955).
If the putative father were held not to have the interest of a parent, he would
apparently have to bring the action before a juvenile court. See G. S. § 110-21 (3)
(1952).(243 N. C. 171, 90 S. E. 2d 382 (1955).7 See Case Survey, 33 N. C. L. REv. 157, 194 (1955).
'231 N. C. 91, 56 S. E. 2d 35 (1949).
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Two cases presenting conflict of laws have been previously discussed
in this law review.9  Weddington v. Weddingtoni' involved an award
of custody by a court of this state at a time when the child was not within
the state; Richer v. Harmon" involved a decree of another state award-
ing custody of a child then present in that state but subsequently re-
moved to this state. In the former case the Court held that the decree
was not enforceable, and in the latter case the Court held that our courts
could take jurisdiction to determine if facts transpiring since the entry
of the foreign decree justified a different award of custody.
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
In Jones v. Lewis12 the husband and wife separated and entered into
a formal deed of separation whereby the wife conveyed certain lands to
the husband. The deed was in all respects regular and in conformity
with the laws of this state. Thereafter, the parties spent a night to-
gether. The wife contended that this subsequent cohabitation constituted
a reconciliation which abrogated the separation agreement, entitling her
to a reconveyance of the lands. The Court held that the reconciliation
did terminate the separation agreement insofar as it remained executory,
but that it did not revoke or invalidate a duly executed deed of con-
veyance. This holding appears to be consistent with the rule generally
followed in other states.' 3
ALIMONY AND DIVORCE
In Rayfield v. Rayfield'4 a wife who had been awarded alimony in
a suit for divorce from bed and board, and who had subsequently
obtained an absolute divorce on the grounds of two years' separation,
made a motion in the cause asking for an increase in the alimony pay-
ments. The Court held that the prior alimony award survived the
absolute divorce and that an increase was proper under the circumstances
of this case. An award of alimony may be modified at any time, it was
stated, upon a showing of changed conditions, with the proper procedure
being a motion in the cause. It should be noted, however, that the result
will be different for wives whose absolute divorce decrees are rendered
after January 1, 1956. G. S. § 50-11 was amended in 1955 to provide
that an award of alimony will not survive an absolute divorce later ob-
tained by the wife on the ground of two years' separation.
9 Note, 35 N. C. L. REv. 83 (1956).10243 N. C. 702, 92 S. E. 2d 71 (1956).
1243 N. C. 373, 90 S. E. 2d 744 (1956).
12243 N, C, 259, 90 S. E. 2d 547 (1955).
1"Simpson v. Weatherman, 216 Ark. 684, 227 S. W. 2d 148 (1950) ; Miller V.
West Palm Beach Atlantic Nat. Bank, 142 Fla. 22, 194 So. 230 (1940) ; Haggarty
v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 258 Mich. 133, 242 N. W. 211 (1932) ; it re Estate
of Shafer, 77 Ohio App. 105, 65 N. E. 2d 902 (1944).
-1242 N. C. 691, 89 S. E. 2d 399 (1955).
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In another case' 5 concerning alimony, the lower court held a husband
in contempt of court for failure to make payments under an order for
alimony pendente lite. The facts disclosed that the wife had initiated an
action for alimony without divorce in 1949, and had been awarded
alimony pendente lite. The husband never filed an answer in that action
and there had never been a final determination of that case. In 1951,
the husband obtained an absolute divorce in another court. He continued
making the alimony pendente lite payments for a time following his abso-
lute divroce, but was $966.50 in arrears at the time of the hearing on the
contempt citation. The husband contended on appeal that his absolute
divorce had terminated his obligation to make the payments, but the
Court rejected this argument on the authority of G. S. § 50-11 and its
interpretation in Howell v. Howell.'6 It held that the husband's divorce
did not of itself terminate the prior order, and that he was liable for
accrued alimony to date. However, the Court did point out that the
husband could terminate the order by bringing the wife's suit for alimony
without divorce to a final determination. This would apparently be
accomplished by final judgment following the filing of an answer setting
up the defense of absolute divorce.
Although it upheld the lower court's finding of liability on the alimony
order, the Court reversed because the record did not support the finding
that the failure to pay was deliberate and wilful. It was thus not
necessary for the Court to discuss the terms of the contempt order,
which were that the husband be confined in jail until the alimony be paid
or until he might be lawfully released. This sentence of confinement for
an unlimited period is appropriate only when an offense is a civil con-
tempt, the punishment being "as for contempt" under our statute.' 7
The unlimited sentence was consistent with what is thought to be the
better view on this point,' 8 but inconsistent with the most recent case
which held such a contempt to be criminal in nature.'9 Imprisonment
for criminal contempt cannot exceed thirty days. 20
Mabry v. Mabry2l was a case of first impression in this state. The
wife filed a divorce petition under G. S. § 50-5 (6) grounded on five
years' separation by reason of the incurable insanity of the husband. The
only question involved was whether the husband had been confined in
a mental institution for five consecutive years as required by the statute.
The evidence disclosed that he had been released on probation on two
occasions, once for a period of ten days and again for a period of six
" Yow v. Yow, 243 N. C. 79, 89 S. E. 2d 867 (1955).1 0206 N. C. 672, 174 S. E. 921 (1934).
17 G. S. § 5-8 (1953).
" See Note, 34 N. C. L. REv. 221 (1956).
" Basnight v. Basnight, 242 N. C. 645, 89 S. E. 2d 259 (1955).2
'G. S. §§ 5-1 and 5-4 (1953).
"1243 N. C. 126, 90 S. E. 2d 221 (1955).
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months. The Court held that the two periods of probation did not
constitute an interruption of the confinement inasmuch as the husband
remained in constructive custody of the institution during those periods.22
EQUITY
There were four equity cases of significance, two of injunction and
two relating to specific performance.
The Court in Causby v. High Penn Oil Co." permitted an interlocu-
tory injunction against an anticipated industrial nuisance. Unlike
Wilcher v. Sharpe,2 where similar relief was denied against the erection
and operation of a new feed mill on the ground that the nuisance was
merely apprehended, the nuisance in Causby was found to be seriously
threatened and the balance of hardship to be in plaintiff's favor. The
defendant was rebuilding a plant for the refining of used motor oil.
Before its destruction by fire, the original plant had been found to be a
nuisance and its operation as such had been enjoined.3  Now, in Causby,
the court found that the new plant would probably be operated in the
same manner as the old. This case should be compared with Pake v.
Morris4 where injunction on the ground of nuisance was denied against
a fish-scrap factory, then being rebuilt after a fire. In that case, however,
there had been no litigation over the original plant, and the jury at final
hearing found that it had not been operated as a nuisance.
In Blowing Rock v. Gregorie,5 on a point of first impression in
North Carolina, the Court affirmed a judgment granting the municipality,
after final hearing, a mandatory injunction to compel the removal of an
obstruction in a street. Heretofore, such relief had been granted only to
individual citizens affected.6 The Maryland case7 principally relied upon
is an excellent application of the public nuisance concept to street ob-
struction, and of the traditional power of equity, at the suit of the govern-
ment, to enjoin the public nuisance, even though the offensive use of land
also constitutes a crime; and this without any statute authorizing in-
junction. That goes beyond Elizabeth City v. Aydlett,8 where the court
"For another domestic relations case, involving collateral attack on a divorce
decree, see TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE, p. 263 infra; to be commented on in a
later issue of the LAW REVIEW.
1244 N. C. 235, 93 S. E. 2d 79 (1956).
2236 N. C. 308, 72 S. E. 2d 662 (1952).
'Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N. C. 185, 77 S. E. 2d 682 (1953).
'230 N. C. 424, 53 S. E. 2d 300 (1949).
'243 N. C. 364, 90 S. E. 2d 898 (1956).
'Scott v. Shackelford, 241 N. C. 738, 86 S. E. 2d 453 (1955) ; Brooks v. Muir-
head, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S. E. 2d 889 (1943).
*Adams v. Town of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A. 2d 830 (1954).
8 198 N. C. 585, 152 S. E. 681 (1930) ; cf. Elizabeth City v. Aydlett, 200 N. C.
58, 156 S. E. 163 (1930).
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overlooked the public nuisance concept and denied the city an injunction
agaifist a filling station that violated a zoning ordinance, the violation
being a criminal offense, because no statute authorized injunction. In
Blowing Rock, however, it did not appear that the street obstruction was
a criminal offense. The decision, in its use of the public nuisance con-
cept, is in line with earlier cases of government injunctions against a
drainage obstruction9 and an offensive mill pond.' 0
In Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co.," in the course of denying enforce-
ment of building restrictions in a deed (because of the covenantee's
acquiescence in other violations and because of changes in the character
of the neighborhood), the Court dealt with another point of first impres-
sion in North Carolina. It held that a zoning ordinance, although it
could not supersede or nullify the building restrictions, may "be con-
sidered with other competent evidence in determining whether or not
there has been a fundamental change in the restricted subdivision ... or
in the neighborhood . -.12 The restrictive covenants originally limited
the use to residential purposes. The ordinance rezoned the area for
business purposes. The decision is in accord with the few cases that
have appeared elsewhere.' 3
In Reynolds v. Early4 the trial court decreed specific performance
of a contract to convey land, incorporating a direction that the decree
was to operate as a transfer of title under G. S. § 1-22715 in the event
defendants failed to execute a deed as theretofore required in the decree.
This direction was enough to render unnecessary a consideration of the
conflict in the cases 16 as to whether a decree must so provide. The
decree specifically provided for payment as a condition of the order to
defendants to execute the deed, but it did not mention payment in the
paragraph providing for the decree to operate as a transfer of title and
to be registered as such. The Supreme Court modified this paragraph
by specifically requiring deposit of the price with the Clerk, for the bene-
fit of defendants, within a specified time.
'Town of Roper v. Leary, 171 N. C. 35, 87 S. E. 945 (1916).11 Attorney General v. Hunter, 16 N. C. 12 (1826).
"243 N. C. 636, 91 S. E. 2d 903 (1956).
1 Id. at 648, 91 S. E. 2d at 912.
1" Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S. W. 2d 1024(1939) ; Hayslett v. Shell Oil Corp., 39 Ohio App. 164, 175 N. E. 888 (1930);
see Needle v. Clifton Realty Corp., 195 Md. 553, 73 A. 2d 895 (1950).
"243 N. C. 623, 91 S. E. 2d 598 (1956).
18 This statute provides that when a court orders legal title of property to be
conveyed by one party in a suit to another, it may also, in its discretion, declare in
the decree that the effect of the decree itself shall be the same as a conveyance of
the legal title.
" Morris v. *White, 96 N. C. 91, 2 S. E. 254 (1887) (decree must expressly
provide that it "shall be regarded as a deed of conveyance") ; Evans v. Brendle,
173 N. C. 149, 152, 91 S. E. 723, 724 (1917) (dictum) ("doubtful" if decree
effective as transfer without such provision). Contra, Skinner v. Terry, 134 N. C.
305, 46 S. E. 517 (1904).
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EVIDENCE
OPINION TESTIMONY AND "INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY"
Although there are sound bases for admitting or excluding the opinion
testimony of laymen, our Court still explains its exclusion of such opinion
evidence on the ground that it "relates to the ultimate fact to be
determined by the jury" and "invades the prerogative of the jury."
Thus in Wood v. Ins. Co." the issue was whether the damage to certain
property had been caused by rain or wind. The trial court permitted
four laymen who had examined the premises after the damage was oc-
casioned to testify that in their opinion from the conditions they observed
the damage had been caused by wind. The Supreme Court held the ad-
mission of this opinion testimony was reversible error because it related
to the ultimate fact to be determined by the jury and invaded the jury's
prerogative.
The Court referred to Section 124 of Stansbury on Evidence but un-
fortunately did not proceed further to Section 126 where Professor
Stansbury vigorously attacks the above manner of reasoning and shows
that not only does a witness frequently give testimony on the ultimate
fact to be determined by the jury but also that he can never invade the
jury's province or usurp its functions for no jury is bound by the opinion
of the witness. As a matter of fact our Court has repeatedly admitted
the opinion testimony of laymen on the ultimate issue. The true test is
set out in State v. Kincaid.2 Briefly stated, the opinion testimony of a
layman is not to be admitted if he can so fully describe the situation that
the jury is placed in as good a position as the witness to draw a con-
clusion, and, conversely, "opinion evidence is always admissible when
the facts on which the opinion or conclusion is based cannot be so de-
scribed that the jury will understand them sufficiently to be able to draw
their own inferences."'
Another case in which our Court has correctly reasoned on the ad-
mission of opinion testimony as to the cause of damage to plaintiff's land,
even though that was the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury, is
Teseneer v. Henrietta Mills Co.4 where the plaintiff was permitted to
testify that the dam of the defendant caused the injury to plaintiff's land.
Such testimony, said the Court, "did not invade the province of the
jury.
1243 N. C. 158, 90 S. E. 2d 310 (1955).
- 183 N. C. 709, 110 S. E. 612 (1922) and see cases cited in STANSBURY,
EVIDENCE § 125 (1946).
3 STANBURY, EVIDENCE § 125 (1946).
-'209 N. C. 615, 184 S. E. 535 (1936).
,Id. at 622, 184 S. E. 2d at 539 (1936). The Court recognized the general
rule excluding opinions but stated there was a well recognized exception which ad-
mits the opinion evidence "of common observers testifying (to) the results of their
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IMPEACHMENT
In State v. RowellO the defendant was charged with involuntary man-
slaughter in connection with the death of one Ivey from injuries sustained
in a collision between a pick-up truck operated by the defendant, in whicfi
Ivey was a passenger, and a truck operated by Wiley Goings. Goings
testified for the prosecution and, while under cross-examination, was
asked if he was now being sued by the estate of Ivey for wrongful death.
The trial court sustained the objection by the State to thi; question. The
witness, in the absence of the jury, was permitted to answer that he was.
On appeal the Court held this evidence admissible, following the general
rule that cross-examination of an opposing witness for the purpose of
showing bias or interest is a substantial legal right, which the trial court
cannot abrogate or abridge. The Attorney General argued that State v.
Hart,7 cited and followed by the Court, was not applicable because in
that case the witness was suing for the recovery of damages whereas in
this case the witness was being sued for damages. The Court held this
to be a "difference without a distinction in principle."
In In re Gamble9 a nephew brought proceedings to have his aged
uncle declared incompetent and to have a trustee appointed for him. The
uncle bad recently executed deeds giving away all his real property, sub-
ject to a life estate reserved to himself. On cross-examination the nephew
testified that he was only trying to protect his uncle's interest and that he
had no intention in bringing the action to protect his own interest as a
possible legatee or devisee under his uncle's will. The nephew also de-
clared that he did not know the contents of the will which his uncle had
deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court.
The attorney for the uncle attempted to offer in evidence the contents
of the will to show bias and interest on the part of the nephew. The
trial court refused to allow counsel to examine the contents of the will
left in a sealed envelope with the Clerk. The uncle did not remember
the will or its contents.
The Court reaffirmed the general rule that, ordinarily, the answer
of a witness on cross-examination concerning collateral matters for the
purpose of impeachment is conclusive, and may not be contradicted by
other evidence, but recognized that the witness' answers to question
which tend to impeach his impartiality by showing bias, interest, etc.
are not conclusive and may be contradicted by other evidence.Y0
observations made at the time in regard to common appearances, facts, and con-
ditions which cannot be reproduced and made palpable to the jury."
'244 N. C. 280, 93 S. E. 2d 201 (1956).
1239 N. C. 709, 80 S. E. 2d 901 (1954).
8244 N. C. 280, 282, 93 S. E. 2d 201, 202 (1956).
244 N. C. 149, 93 S. E. 2d 66 (1956).102 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 948 (1940).
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The general rule that exclusion of evidence is not reviewable on ap-
peal unless the record discloses what the excluded evidence would have
been" was held inapplicable here because of the impossibility of intro-
ducing such evidence. The trial court had denied access to the sealed
envelope and counsel could not show the contents orally by the uncle.
The Court noted that if the contents of the will had been made known
to the jury, petitioner's evidence might well have been discounted if it
had appeared that he was a sole or principal heir under the will. "It is
the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-
examiner, even though he cannot state to the court what facts a
reasonable cross-examination might develop."' 21 Judgment for petitioner
was set aside and a new trial was ordered.
REPUTATION
Nance v. Pike13 was an action for damages based on alleged assault
and battery. A witness for the defendants was allowed to testify on di-
rect examination that the general reputation of the defendants for peace-
fulness and quietness was good and that the general reputation of the
plaintiff for "high-temperedness, turbulence and violence" was bad. On
redirect examination the witness disclosed that he had based this general
reputation on hearsay statements concerning particular incidents. Other
witnesses offered similar testimony. The Court held that since each
party had testified, it was competent to show either party's general
reputation as bearing on his credibility as a witness but only testimony
as to general reputation for such traits was admissible and hearsay evi-
dence as to particular incidents was incompetent. Since the case of
State v. Turpin,'14 where there is a homicide and evidence to show that
it was in self defense, the defendant may offer evidence tending to show
the bad general reputation of the deceased as a violent and dangerous
fighting man and the defendant's knowledge thereof. Once such evidence
is offered, the State may offer evidence in rebuttal tending to show the
general reputation of the deceased as a man of peace and quiet. This
rule has often been applied to homicide cases, but, since State v. Kim-
brell,'5 it has been held inapplicable to assault cases. In the Nance
case our Court saw no sufficient reason for the distinction between homi-
cide and assault cases and said that State v. Kimbrell "may be considered
withdrawn as authority for the proposition stated."'16 Thus the same
rule will apply in cases of civil and criminal assault, thereby creating an
exception to the general rule that testimony as to the general reputation of
" See 33 N. C. L. REv. 476 (1955).12244 N. C. 149, 155, 93 S. E. 2d 66, 70 (1956).
244 N. C. 368, 93 S. E. 2d 443 (1956).
1- 77 N. C. 473 (1877).
15151 N. C. 702, 66 S. E. 614 (1909).1 244 N. C. 368, 373, 93 S. E. 2d 443, 446 (1956).
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a party is not admissible in a civil action as substantive evidence.- 7 It
should be noted that the Court restricted the admission of evidence of
the assailant's general reputation to his reputation as a "violent and
dangerous fighting man," saying that the use of such words as "quarrel-
some," "troublemaking," "high-temperedness," "disorder," and "dis-
turbances" tend to divert rather than aid the jury in determining the
issue.
RELEVANCE OF PRIOR INSANITY
At the same term of court in which the defendant was arraigned for
murder he was adjudged insane and ordered committed to an institution.
Following his release, the case was reopened and at the trial defendant
offered in evidence the adjudication of insanity. The trial court sus-
tained the State's objection to its admission. The State offered no evi-
dence that the defendant had recovered or had been restored to sanity.
The Court held' s that in criminal cases, when insanity is relied on as a
defense, an adjudication of insanity made prior to the alleged offense or
subsequent thereto is admissible in evidence for the consideration of the
jury on the issue as to whether the defendant was insane when the of-
fense was committed, provided the time of the adjudication bears such
relation to the person's condition of mind at the time of the crime as to
be worthy of consideration. However, an adjudication of insanity is not
conclusive but is merely evidence tending to show the mental condition of
the defendant at the precise time of the act in issue. North Carolina has
previously recognized this rule in civil cases' 9 and, by this decision,
makes the same rule applicable in criminal cases, thereby aligning us
with the majority rule.20
CUSTOMARY SAFETY DEVICES
In Southern Ry. v. Akers Motor Lines21 the plaintiff sought to re-
cover damages sustained in a train-truck collision at a rural railroad
crossing near the City of Henderson. The plaintiff was permitted to
introduce evidence of protective devices maintained at other crossings
in Henderson. Since the collision occurred at a rural crossing,
the Court held the admission of this evidence error. The Court
said "where evidence of conditions is offered to prove a habit or custom
under such conditions, the circumstances of the conditions must not be
so dissimilar that the evidence is without probative value,"122 and that
.. 'it is obvious that there must be such a similarity or unity of
"See STANSBURY, EVIDENCE, § 103-104 (1946).
" State v. Duncan, 244 N. C. 375, 93 S. E. 2d 421 (1956).
" 222 N. C. 274, 22 S. E. 2d 553 (1942).
205 WIGmORE, EviDENcE § 1671 (1940).
"242 N. C. 676, 89 S. E. 2d 392 (1955).
"Id. at 680, 89 S. E. 2d at 395, citing STANSBURY, EVIDENCE § 89 (1946).
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conditions that what is done by one or more persons or sets of persons
may be taken as indicating the probable general habit of the class of per-
sons under similar circumstances.' "23 Other conditions or events may
be used to show the requisite standard of care but there must be a more
substantial similarity of conditions and circumstances than existed in
this case. The Court noted that the offered evidence related to inter-
sections within the City of Henderson where the noise is more intense,
traffic more congested and trains move more frequently, whereas the ac-
cident occurred in a rural portion of the county at an intersection where
only one train passes daily.
CONFESSIONS
In State v. Isom24 the defendant was intoxicated at the time he made
a confession tending to incriminate him. The Court applied the general
rule that intoxication of an accused person does not render inadmissible
his confession; however, the extent of the intoxication is relevant and the
weight to be accorded a confession made under such circumstances is
exclusively for the determination by the jury.
DEAD MAN'S STATUTE (G. S. § 8-51) AND WAIVER
The plaintiffs, claiming under a deceased person, examined the at-
torney for the deceased in respect to the execution and delivery of deeds
to the land in controversy and the consideration given therefor. They
also adversely examined the defendant Ricard for the purpose of obtain-
ing evidence for use in the trial as provided in G. S. §§ 1-568.1 to
1-568.16, and, at a former trial, called the defendant as an adverse witness
and examined her in detail about her relations with the deceased. In Hayes
v. Ricard25 the Court held that an examination of the attorney by the
plaintiffs constituted (1) a waiver of the rule that communications be-
tween an attorney and his client are privileged and (2) a waiver of
G. S. § 8-51 (North Carolina's Dead Man's Statute) in respect to com-
munications or transactions with the decedent. In addition, following
such an examination, the other party is entitled to a cross-examination of
the attorney as to matters on which he has testified.26
A pre-trial examination of the defendant for the purpose of obtaining
evidence for use in the trial is also a waiver of the protection afforded by
G. S. § 8-51 to the extent that either party may use it upon the trial.
Since the plaintiffs at a former trial examined the defendant in detail
about her relations with the deceased, this also constituted a waiver of
G. S. § 8-51 and opened the door for the defendant to testify in another
" 242 N. C. 676, 681, 89 S. E. 2d 392, 395 (1955) quoting 2 WGmoRE, EvimNcs§ 379 (1940) (emphasis supplied by the Court).
24243 N. C. 164, 90 S. E. 2d 237 (1955).
2' 244 N. C. 313, 93 S. E. 2d 540 (1956).
26 8 WiGomRE, EvimENCE § 2327 (1940).
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trial in respect to the matters about which the plaintiffs had previously
examined her.
2 7
FUTURE INTERESTS
CLASS GIFTS
In Edwards v. Butler,' J conveyed land to his wife, L, for life, and
then to his children. L died leaving husband, J, and four children sur-
viving. One of these four children was born after the execution of the
deed. J later remarried and had several more children. All children
of both marriages claimed an interest in the property. The lower court
held that only the children living at the time of the execution of the deed
took an interest. Reversing, the Supreme Court held that all the children
born of the first wife took, because the critical date for closing the class
was the death of the life tenant,2 and not the execution of the deed. None
of the children of J by his second wife took any interest because they were
not in being when the class closed and the roll was called.
EXECUTORY DEVISE
In Stanley v. Foster,3 testator devised lands to his son, T, with a
provision that if T died leaving no children, the land should go to tes-
tator's three named grandchildren, and if a grandchild died without leav-
ing children, her part should go to "them that is living." T died leaving
no children. All grandchildren were still living and were over seventy
years old. Two of the grandchildren had no children, but the third
grandchild had five children, who were the plaintiffs in this action. The
plaintiffs claimed that the three grandchildren had only a life estate and
that, because they were over seventy years old and the possibility of
their having issue was extinct, the living great grandchildren had the
fee. The court held that in contemplation of law the possibility of having
issue is commensurate with life.4 Each of the grandchildren had a fee
in the land defeasible by dying without leaving issue. The great grand-
children could not assert any interest in the property during the lives of
the grandchildren.
RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
The Court decided two cases in the past year involving the Rule in
Shelley's Case.5 In Hammer v. Brantley,6 the will read "to be hers
-I See, e.g., Norris v. Stewart, 105 N. C. 455, 10 S. E. 912 (1890).
1244 N. C. 205, 92 S. E. 2d 922 (1956).
.See Mackie v. Mackie, 230 N. C. 152, 52 S. E. 2d 352 (1949).
3244 N. C. 201, 92 S. E. 2d 925 (1956).
See McPherson v. First & Citizens National Bank, 240 N. C. 1, 81 S. E. 2d
386 (1954).
See SIdnES AND SmiTH, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 1541 (2d ed. 1956).6244 N. C. 71, 92 S. E. 2d 424 (1956).
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[the plaintiff's] for her life time and at her death to her bodily heirs in
fee simple forever." The Court held that the plaintiff had a fee simple
estate. When a devise is to a person for life with remainder over after
his death to "his heirs" or "his bodily heirs" or the "heirs of his body,"
the Rule in Shelley's Case requires such words to be construed as words
of limitation and not words of purchase. 7 Therefore, the devisee (or the
grantee) takes a fee simple or a fee tail estate depending upon the words
used. In the instant case, the words "bodily heirs" created a fee tail
estate and G. S. § 41-1 converted it into a fee simple estate.8 Apparently
the super-added words "in fee simple forever" did not change the con-
struction of "bodily heirs" from words of limitation to words of purchase.
This is in line with previous North Carolina holdings.9 But see
Whitson v. Barnett,'° where the deed read "to Roy and bodily heirs, and
their heirs and assigns" and on the facts the Court held that "bodily
heirs" meant children and the Rule in Shelley's Case did not apply.
When the limitation is to one for life and after his death to his
children or issue, the Rule in Shelley's Case does not apply, unless it
appears that such words are used in the sense of heirs generally." In
Griffin v. Springer, 2 defendant claimed that the plaintiffs could not
convey a fee simple title to the land in question. The granting clause of
the deed to the plaintiffs read: To B "a life estate, at his death to be
divided to the parties of the third part [M and N, plaintiffs] equally,
and to the children of the said... [M and N] ... respectively, at their
death." (B died in 1939.) The Supreme Court held that "children"
was not used in the sense of heirs generally, and that the Rule in
Shelley's Case did not apply; therefore, M and N had life estates. The
four children of M had a vested remainder in M's undivided interest
subject to open and let in any after born children of M. Since N had
no children, the remainder to her children was contingent, but would
vest upon N having a child. Since M and N only had life estates, they
could not convey a fee simple interest. The words "respectively at their
death" helped decide the case. The Court interpreted them to mean that
the future interest of the children of M must vest during M's life and
that of the children of N must vest during N's life. "Respectively at
their death," therefore, did not mean that the children of M and N must
survive their parents. It merely denoted the falling in of possession and
did not fix the time of vesting, which occurred for the children of
7 See Whitson v. Barnett, 237 N. C. 483, 75 S. E. 2d 391 (1953).
See Jones v. Whichard, 163 N. C. 241, 79 S. E. 503 (1913).
9 See Block, The Rule in Shelley's Case, 20 N. C. L. Rv. 49, 72 (1941).
10237 N. C. 483, 75 S. E. 2d 391 (1953).
Faison v. Odom, 144 N. C. 107, 56 S. E. 793 (1907).
12244 N. C. 95, 92 S. E. 2d 682 (1956).
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M when they were born and would occur for the children of N when they
were born.'5
VESTED REMAINDERS
In Blanchard v. Ward,'4 the conveyance read to A for life and then
to his children if any, but if there is no issue, then over. A's only son
died in childhood, and A was seeking to sell the land. The Court held
that the remainder in the children of A was contigent until A's son was
born. Then it became vested subject to open.' 5 When the son died his
vested remainder descended to his heirs, who were his father and
mother, A and R, as tenants in common. 6 Therefore, since A then had
a life estate and an undivided interest as tenant in common in the vested
remainder inherited from his son, there was a merger pro tanto, and his
life estate terminated by the merger into the fee. But the interest of
A's wife, R, was still subject to the life estate in A, and this life estate
was sufficient to support the contingent remainder of -any child that might
thereafter be born to A and R. Thus, in an action. for specific perform-
ance, it was held that A and R could not convey a fee simple indefeasible
title to the defendant. The Court deemed if unnecessary to determine
if A's interest which had merged would also open up for contingent
remaindermen, if children were later born.
Does this case mean that if the wife had had no interest, the contingent
remainder of unborn children would be destroyed by the merger of A's
life estate and his vested remainder? If so, it would seem to mean that
North Carolina still recognizes the doctrine of destructibility of con-
tingent remainders by merger. Compare Winslow v. Speight,17 where
the Court refused to let a contingent remainder be destroyed by merger.' 8
REMAINDERS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
In Ridge v. Bright,'9 the executor of an estate brought a declaratory
judgment proceeding to determine whether certain stock was an asset
of the estate or belonged to a defendant under the terms of a revocable
trust agreement. In the course of the opinion finding a valid inter vivos
trust, the Court mentioned that under G. S. § 39-6.2, a remainder in
personal property after a life estate may now be created by deed. Prior
to this statute, a remainder in personalty could only be created by will.20
" See Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Haywood, 186 N. C. 313, 119 S. E.500 (1923) for a discussion of vested and contingent remainders.
'244 N. C. 142, 92 S. E. 2d 776 (1956).
' See Mason v. White, 53 N. C. 421 (1852).10G. S. § 29-1 (6) (1950).17187 N. C. 248, 121 S. E. 529 (1924).
" See McCall, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in North Carolina,
16 N. C. L. REv. 87, 108 (1938).
"244 N. C. 345, 93 S. E. 2d 607 (1956).
.0 See A Survey of Statutory Changes, 31 N. C. L. REv. 375, 408 (1953) for
discussion.
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INSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE THEFT POLICIES
Plaintiff sought to recover on an automobile accident and theft
policy. The stipulated facts showed that an employee of plaintiff who
used the auto in performing his work around town went, "without the
knowledge or consent" of plaintiff, to Texas, where the auto was found
some nine days later; and that plaintiff suffered $1,000.00 damages. The
Court stated1 succintly that the taking of the auto did not come within
the term "accident" as it is ordinarily used, and that the facts agreed did
not bring the case within the meaning of the "theft" clause. The Court
cited two earlier decisions,2 one of which held taking with felonious
intent must be shown.
EFFECT OF TENANCY BY ENTIRETY
In a case of first impression,3 the Court held that the insurable
interest of a husband runs to the whole of the property held by him and
his wife as tenants by the entirety, and that when the property is de-
stroyed by fire, followed by divorce of husband and wife, the wife is
entitled to half the insurance proceeds, although the husband alone was
in possession, took out the policy and paid the premium.4
STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY
Where a policy insures against death by "external, violent and ac-
cidental means which, except in case of drowning or death from internal
1 Sparrow v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 243 N. C. 60, 89 S. E. 2d 800
(1955).
'5Funeral Home v. Ins. Co., 216 N. C. 562, 5 S. E. 2d 520 (1939) and Auto
Co. v. Ins. Co., 239 N. C. 416, 80 S. E. 2d 35 (1954). In the former, plaintiff's auto
had been taken by his nephew "to keep an engagement with a girl friend." The
fatal flaw in plaintiff's case was failure of the evidence to show "any unlawful and
felonious intent on the part of" the taker, the Court saying that theft is a popular
term for larceny, and that requisites for larceny are: (1) a taking without consent
of the owner, (2) with felonious intent to deprive the owner of the property.
In the latter case, an employee of plaintiff, instructed to take the auto to a
garage for repair, upon arriving at the garage found that "the job could not be
done at that time," and desiring breakfast, drove the car home. Stipulated facts
showed a conviction of the employee under G. S. § 20-105, violation of which
requires (1) a taking without the consent of the owner, (2) with intent temporari-
ly to deprive the owner of possession. The Court conceded, without deciding, that
the insurance policy included statutory taking of a vehicle as defined by G. S. §
20-105, but stated that the stipulation of conviction under the statute was ". . .an
erroneous admission of law, rather than . . . of fact, [and] may be disregarded."
In affirming judgment for defendant, the Court noted that the stipulated facts no-
where stated a taking "without consent of the owner," with intent to "temporarily
deprive!'
Thus, it appears that in the instant case plaintiff needed at most to show that
his employee took the car "with felonious intent." And had the Court been
squarely presented with the issue, and had decided to hold, that a "theft" policy
insures against a statutory taking of an auto as defined by G. S. § 20-105, showing
a taking ith mere "intent to temporarily deprive" the owner of his possession of
the vehicle would have sufficed.
3 Carter v. Continental Ins. Co., 242 N. C. 578, 89 S. E. 2d 122 (1955).
'For full treatment of this case, see Note, 35 N. C. L. Rav. 134 (1956).
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injuries revealed by autopsy, leave a visible contusion or wound upon the
exterior of the body," proof of death by heatstroke does not come within
the coverage regardless of whether such death be deemed through ex-
ternal, violent, or accidental means, since there is no visible contusion or
wound upon the exterior of the body.5
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
In North Carolina ex rel. Tillett v. Mustian' the Court was called
upon to determine the validity of an election which resulted in the repeal
of the town charter. The charter was granted by a special act of the
General Assembly in 1953 and the town's first officers were appointed to
serve until the first election in 1955. G. S. § 160-353 provides that an
election to vote upon a proposed amendment to, or repeal of, the charter
of a municipal corporation may be initiated in either of two ways. One
is by ordinance of the governing body, predicated upon its finding that
the amendment or repeal is for the best interests of the municipality.
The other is by petition signed by not less than twenty-five per cent of
the qualified electors entitled to vote at the next preceding election in
the municipality. The election in question was called by petition and was
held on the same day as the first election of officers. The Court, con-
struing the statute strictly, held that as there had been no next preceding
election, the petition-and therefore the repeal vote-was invalid.
There is some question as to whether giving the voters the authority
to repeal or amend a municipal charter under this section is an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power. Deciding this case on the
narrow procedural ground, the Court left this question untouched.
Lexington Insulation Co. v. Davidson County2 appears to be the first
case in which our Court has denied at least a quantum meruit recovery
to a plaintiff who has performed under an invalid contract with a city.3
Here, the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners was a stock-
holder and officer of a private corporation. The county manager let
contracts to this corporation for the insulation of the county home and
court house and the Chairman of the Board executed the voucher in
payment, all without the knowledge of the other commissioners. When
the other commissioners learned of the contract they cancelled and de-
manded the return of the price paid. The corporation returned the
money and sued for a quantum meruit recovery for work done up to the
1 McDaniel v. Imperial Life Ins. Co., 243 N. C. 275, 90 S. E. 2d 546 (1955).
1243 N. C. 564, 91 S. E. 2d 696 (1956).
-243 N. C. 252, 90 S. E. 2d 496 (1955).
'G. S. § 14-234 (1953) prohibits an appointed or elected official from making a
contract for his own benefit under the authority of his office.
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time of cancellation. 4 The Court distinguished this case from others in
which, even though a contract with a municipality had been declared
void, a quasi-contractual recovery had been permitted, saying that in
those cases 5 no moral turpitude or breach of public policy had been in-
volved. However, the Court did not mention Moore v. Lamnbethu de-
cided under a statute comparable to that in Lexington case, in which
the reasonable value of the services rendered was deducted by the lower
court from the city's recovery of the contract price paid. Although not
directly in issue upon the appeal, the Court seemed to approve the al-
lowance of quantum meruit in that case even though there had been a
conspiracy to evade the law, defraud the city, and let the contract at an
excessive price.
Bryan v. City of Sanford7 is another in a line of cases dealing with
G. S. § 160-173. This statute, the constitutionality of which was up-
held in Marren v. Gamble,8 provides that when at any intersection two
or more corners are zoned in a given way, the owner of another corner
lot may have his lot zoned in the same way. In Robbins v. Charlotte,9
the Court had held that the statute did not apply to a "T" intersection
because there were not the necessary four corners. In the Bryan case
there was also a "T" intersection, but a proposed street extension, not
actually opened, could convert this to a regular intersection with four
corners. The proposed extension had been dedicated to the public by
a registered map, and the city had subsequently adopted this map as
official by incorporating it into the zoning ordinance. The Court held
that this amounted to an acceptance of the dedication and that the lot
should be given the same treatment.
Convent of the Sisters of Saint Joseph v. Winston-Salem seems to
be the first case in North Carolina concerning the validity of conditions
imposed by a board of adjustment in granting special zoning permits.
The zoning ordinance allowed public schools to be built in the area but
did not allow private schools except by special permit. The Catholic
Bishop of the diocese purchased a large residence and applied for a
special permit to operate a private school there. The permit was
granted subject to the condition that no changes could be made in the
exterior of the buildings. The property was subsequently transferred
'See BusINEss AssoCIATIoNs, p. 187 supra. Compare the prior cases, reaching
the same result, in which recovery was sought by individuals: Davidson v. Guilford
County, 152 N. C. 436, 67 S. E. 918 (1910) ; Snipes v. Winston-Salem, 126 N. C.
375, 35 S. E. 610 (1900).
' Charlotte Lumber and Mfg. Co. v. Charlotte, 242 N. C. 189, 87 S. E. 2d 204
(1955) ; Hawkins v. Dallas, 229 N. C. 561, 30 S. E. 2d 561 (1948).
207 N. C. 23, 175 S. E. 714 (1934).
7244 N. C. 30, 92 S. E. 2d 420 (1956).
8237 N. C. 680, 75 S. E. 2d 880 (1953).
241 N. C. 197, 84 S. E. 2d 814 (1954); see Case Survey, 34 N. C. L. REv.
1, 61-62 (1955).10 243 N. C. 316, 90 S. E. 2d 879 (1956).
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to the plaintiff Convent, which desired to expand the school and applied
for a permit to wall up the doors of the three-car garage so that it could
be used as classroom space. The permit was denied by the board, and the
plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the ordinance for making an
unfair discrimination between public and private schools. The Court
did not reach the larger constitutional issue and decided the case on the
ground that one who receives benefits under an ordinance or statute is
estopped to attack its validity. The power of a zoning board of ad-
justment to impose conditions which are reasonable has been upheld
elsewhere,"1 but it is not clear how far a board may go in a particular
case.
12
REAL PROPERTY
BOUNDARIES
The usual rule in the construction of the description in a deed is
that in case of conflict a call for a course and distance in the deed must
give way to a call for a natural boundary because the natural boundary
is more certain.' A case illustrating this point is Wachovia Bank and
Trust Co. v. Miller2 where the plaintiff was seeking title to the disputed
area under color of titles plus seven years adverse possession.4 The
Court found that the call in plaintiff's deed for 98 feet depth must give
way to the call in the deed for the rear line, "the Springs line," which
was well known and established by two independent walls to buildings
on adjacent land and as such was a natural boundary.5 Therefore the
description in plaintiff's color of title included the area in question.
G. S. § 39-2 provides that "No deed . . . shall be declared void for
vagueness in the description.., for the reason that the boundaries given
do not go entirely around the land described . . . provided, it can be
made to appear to the satisfaction of the jury that the grantor owned at
the time of the execution of such deed . . . no other land which at all
corresponded to the description contained in such deed or paper writing."
1' See Hopkins v. Bd. of Appeals, 179 Misc. 325, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 167, 175 (Sup.Ct. 1942).
12 See BAssETr, ZONING 128-29 (2d ed. 1940), which indicates that the condi-
tions which can be imposed are not necessarily limited to the scope of the police
power.
'Wilson Lumber and Milling Co. v. Hutton, 152 N. C. 537, 68 S. E. 2 (1910).2243 N. C. 1, 89 S. E. 2d 765 (1955).
Possession taken under color of title must be commensurate with the limits
of the tract which the instrument purports to convey. Wallace v. Rice, 232 N. C.
371, 61 S. E. 2d 82 (1950).
'G. S. § 1-38 (1953).
5 A call to the line of an adjacent tract, if well known and established, is a call
to a natural boundary. Wilson Lumber and Milling Co. v. Hutton, 152 N. C. 537,
68 S. E. 2 (1910).
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In Brown v. Hurley,6 the description in the deed was held sufficiently
certain to permit proof aliunde to be admitted to fit the description in
the deed, although the boundaries given did not entirely enclose the
land.7 There was evidence as to location of corners, marked trees and
other natural objects, and the testimony of a surveyor and others tended
to fit the description to the land, with one witness testifying that she
could walk the line at any time.
In Jones v. Turlington,8 the question was whether the defendant
owned the fee under a street bordering the Intra-Coastal Waterway,
and if he thereby had the title to any adjacent accretion.9 The Court
found that a conveyance of the lot according to a map showing the lateral
lines of the lot running across the full width of the street, carried the fee
in the land covered by the street, subject to an easement for the street.
The defendant thereby became a riparian owner with the title to accretion.
DEDICATION
It is a settled principle that if the owner of land, located within or
without a city or town, has it subdivided and platted into lots and streets,
and sells the lots with reference to the plat, he thereby dedicates the
streets to the use of the purchasers and the public. 10 The purchaser
acquires the right to have all the streets kept open and, when the land
is within a municipality, this is true whether or not the streets in fact
are accepted by the governing board.1 However, as to the general
public the dedication is not complete until acceptance. This acceptance
may be shown not only by formal action on the part of the authorities
having charge of the matter, but under certain circumstances by user as
of right on the part of the public.12 But in so far as a municipality is
concerned, the platting of land and the sale of lots pursuant thereto
amount to a mere offer of dedication. There is no complete dedication
until the municipality accepts, either by formal action of the governing
body'8 or by acts done under the authority of the governing body, such
as improving, repairing, or paving a street.'4 This is to allow the
municipality to limit its responsibility for street maintenance or other
8243 N. C. 138, 90 S. E. 2d 324 (1955).
G. S. § 8-39 (1953) provides that parol evidence may be introduced to fit the
description in the deed to the land.
8243 N. C. 681, 92 S. E. 2d 75 (1956).
' The owner of riparian lands acquires title to all accretions. 56 Am. Jua.,
Waters § 477 (1947).
'0 Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 7 S. E.
2d 13 (1940).
1Ibid.2 Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N. C. 364, 90 S. E. 2d 898 (1956).
"' Gault v. Town of Lake Waccamaw, 200 N. C. 593, 158 S. E. 104 (1931).
'426 C. J. S., Dedication § 40 (1956).
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liability."' In Blowing Rock v. Gregorie,16 the Town Commissioners
attempted to close a street. The town had accepted the dedication of
the street by making repairs on it. The Court said that G. S. § 160-200
(11) 17 must be construed with G. S. § 153-9 (17),18 and if a municipality
wishes to close a street it must give the notices required by G. S. § 153-9
(17). In the instant case such notice had not been given; hence the
resolution to close the street was void.
DEEDS
Parol evidence is admissible to fit the description to the land conveyed.
Such evidence cannot, however, be used to enlarge the scope of the
descriptive words. The deed itself must point to the source from which
evidence aliunde to make the description complete is sought.19 In
Baldwin v. Hinton,20 the description in the deed read: "Being a tract of
land in Selma Township, in the settlement called 'Coonsboro' about
three miles north of Selma, North Carolina, consisting of 10.65 acres,
more or less." The Court held that the deed was void for insufficiency
of description because the description could fit any tract of land "about
three miles north of Selma."
Plaintiff executed a deed giving the defendant the right to cut over
timber land only once during a five year period. The purpose of such
restriction was to protect the new timber growth. Defendant cut over
the land once for saw timber and again for pulp wood. The Court held
that the defendant had no right to cut for pulp wood.2 1 No classification
of timber had been fixed in the deed. Therefore, the defendant had the
right to cut only once for all the merchantable timber. There is a strong
dissent which takes the view that the deed did not require that all the
timber be cut in one continuous operation. Therefore, since there was
only a special cutting for saw timber and never a general cutting, the
defendant had the right to come back and cut the pulp wood.
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
G. S. § 45-21.38 precludes a deficiency judgment pursuant to fore-
closure of real property securing a purchase money note. In Fleishel v.
Jessup,22 the defendant executed purchase money notes secured by a
1 Home Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Carolina Beach, 216 N. C. 778, 7 S. E.
2d 13 (1940).
" 243 N. C. 364, 90 S. E. 2d 898 (1956).
"'This statute provides that all cities shall have the power to open, change,
widen, extend, and close any street.
" This statute provides that the governing body of any municipality shall have
the power to close any street. It further provides for certain notices to be given
when a street is to be dosed.0 9N. C. Self Help Corp. v. Brinkley, 215 N. C. 615, 2 S. E. 2d 889 (1939).
20243 N. C. 113, 90 S. E. 2d 316 (1955).
' Scarborough v. Calypso Veneer Co., 244 N. C. 1, 92 S. E. 2d 435 (1956).2242 N. C. 605, 89 S. E. 2d 160 (1955).
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deed of trust on certain machinery, equipment, and land. A fire de-
stroyed the machinery and equipment, and the plaintiff brought an action
on the notes and to foreclose the deed of trust. Deficiency judgment
was awarded the plaintiff. In remanding the case, the Supreme Court
held judgment for any deficiency was premature. There could be no
deficiency until the sale. After a sale was held, plaintiff recovered a
deficiency judgment in a second action. On appeal 23 the Court held
that the lower court erred in excluding evidence showing whether the
property was realty or personalty. The defendant was entitled to have
the jury decide what proportion of the value of the property was realty,
and as to that proportion deficiency judgment is barred by G. S. §, 45-
21.38. Quaere, if the holder of purchase money notes secured by
realty can sue first on the notes separately, or must he sell or foreclose
under his deed of trust and be barred from any later deficiency judg-
ment? If the holder can sue on his notes separately, it would seem to
be a device to evade this statute.24
EMINENT DOMAIN
Questions concerning eminent domain were before the Court in
Eller v. Bd. of Educ. of Buncombe County2 5 and Sale v. Highway
Comm'n.28 Both cases are treated in the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW section
of this Survey. It is significant to note that the Court in the Eller case
held G. S. § 40-12 et seq.27 applicable only where the condemnor ac-
quires title and right to possession of specific land.
Three appeals from special proceedings instituted under G. S. § 136-
19 were consolidated and handled by the Court this year.28 The Court
held that acceptance by landowners of voluntary payments of awards
fixed by the Commissioners settled the question of compensation. The
cases were controlled by the decision in Highway Comm'n v. Parding-
ton.29
Determination of amount of compensation was considered in Caro-
ina Power and Light Co. v. Clark.3 0 A treatment of this case may be
found in the DAMAGES section of this Survey.
LANDLORD-TENANT
A magistrate's jurisdiction in an ejectment action obtains only if
there is a landlord-tenant relation between the plaintiff and defendant.3'
-
3Fleishel v. Jessup, 244 N. C. 451, 94 S. E. 2d 308 (1956).2SThese problems will be considered in a forthcoming note in this Law Revicw.
2242 N. C. 584, 89 S. E. 2d 144 (1955).242 N. C. 612, 89 S. E. 2d 290 (1955).
- These statutes govern the condemnation of land under the power of eminent
domain.28Highway Comm'n v. Mullican, 243 N. C. 68, 89 S. E. 2d 738 (1955).29242 N. C. 482, 88 S. E. 2d 102 (1955), noted in Case Survey, 34 N. C. L. REv.
1, 67 (1955).
*°243 N. C. 577, 91 S. E. 2d 569 (1956).
-- G. S. § 42-26 (1950), Howell v. Branson, 226 N. C. 264, 37 S. E. 687 (1946).
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In Harwell v. Rohrabacher,32 defendant made a purchase contract for
a house and gave earnest money. Later the defendant withdrew his
money and agreed that his contract was null and void. Then the de-
fendant leased the house and paid rent. When the lease was terminated
and the defendant refused to vacate, the plaintiff brought summary eject-
ment before a Justice of the Peace. The Court, in upholding the magis-
trate's jurisdiction, said that since the defendant's purchase contract had
been cancelled, the defendant was a tenant and could not deny his
landlord's title.33
In Hedrick v. Akers,34 the plaintiff sued one of several lessees of a
building for injuries sustained in a fall over a drainpipe across the side-
walk. In the course of the opinion affirming a nonsuit for plaintiff's
contributory negligence, the Court stated that since the landlord in-
stalled the drainpipe and the tenant had no responsibility for either its
upkeep or removal, the tenant was not responsible.
35
QUIETING TITLE
Plaintiff sued the State Highway and Public Works Commission and
a municipal corporation to remove a cloud on title based on an al-
leged invalid claim of right of way.3 6 The Court stated that the High-
way Commission is only subject to suit in the manner authorized by
G. S. § 40-12 when it takes land under its eminent domain power under
G. S. § 136-19 and G. S. §§ 40-12 et seq. It is not subject to suit to
remove a cloud on title.37 However, the defendant municipal corpora-
tion has no such rule applicable to it and can be sued under G. S. § 160-2
and G. S. § 41-10.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
In Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co.,3 8 the plaintiff sought to enforce
certain restrictive covenants in a deed given by the plaintiff to the
grantors of the defendant. However, the plaintiff at a later time made
an agreement with the defendant's grantors and others, the terms of
which placed less stringent restrictions upon the property in controversy.
The plaintiff claimed the agreement was executed by him only to secure
restrictions on lots within the adjacent subdivision, as the agreement
=243 N. C. 255, 90 S. E. 2d 499 (1955).
33 It is recognized as a general rule that a tenant cannot deny the title of his
landlord. Lawrence v. Eller, 169 N. C. 211, 85 S. E. 291 (1915).
2,244 N. C. 274, 93 S. E. 2d 160 (1956).
"The landlord and not the tenant is responsible to persons on the sidewalk for
injuries resulting from a defective sidewalk in front of a building leased to different
tenants where the landlord exercises a general control of the building. 32 Am. JUm.,
Landlord & Tenant § 821 (1941) ; Childress v. Lawrence, 220 N. C. 195, 16 S. E.
2d 842 (1941) ; Knight v. Foster, 163 N. C. 329, 79 S. E. 614 (1913).
"Cannon v. Wilmington, 242 N. C. 711, 89 S. E. 2d 595 (1955).
"7 Compare, however, the cases discussed in Eminent Domain under CoNsTrru-
TIONAL LAW.
"243 N. C. 636, 91 S. E. 2d 903 (1956).
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itself stated, and not to change the restrictions in plaintiff's prior deed.
The Court held that the plaintiff could not deny knowledge of the pro-
visions of the agreement and that he was estopped to enforce the restric-
tions in his deed, because he had accepted benefits under the agreement,
which specifically liberalized the restrictions on the lot in question.
SALES
BREACH OF WARRANTY OF QUALITY
Measure of Damages
North Carolina is in accord with the weight of authority' and the
Uniform Sales Act2 as to the damages recoverable for breach of war-
ranty of quality of merchandise sold. In Grossman v. Johnson3 the de-
fendant counterclaimed for breach of warranty to the plaintiff's action to
recover a balance due for goods sold. The Court affirmed a nonsuit to
the counterclaim because there was no evidence of the difference be-
tween the value of the goods sold as warranted, and as delivered.
The Court, after giving the general statement of the measure of
damages, had added: "But, where there is no evidence as to the value of
the goods at the time and place of delivery, the purchase price will be
regarded as the actual value."'4 It should be noted that even though
the price and the value as delivered are the same, there would still be
damages if the goods as warranted would have had an even greater
value. But where, as in this case, the purchase price must be taken as
the true value and there is no showing that the goods as warranted
would have had a greater value, there are no damages proved.
Cause of Action for Personal Injury
Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for breach of warranty
because upon application of a hair rinse she developed weeping derma-
titis.5 Plaintiff's girl friend also had a reaction to the preparation. The
Court sustained a nonsuit to the action because the plaintiff failed to
show that the rinse contained any deleterious substance. Therefore, the
cause of her dermatitis remained a matter of conjecture.
The Court added that it might be that she and her friend were allergic
to the ingredients in the rinse, and that it is generally held there is no
liability on the part of the seller where the buyer was allergic or unusually
146 Am. JvR., Sales § 737 (1943).
2 UNIFORm SAiEs AcT § 69 (7) provides: "In the case of breach of warranty
of quality, such loss, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate
damage of a greater amount, is the difference between the value of the goods at
the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had
answered to the warranty."
=242 N. C. 571, 89 S. E. 2d 141 (1955).
'Id. at 573, 89 S. E. 2d at 143.5Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N. C. 268, 90 S. E. 2d 392 (1955).
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susceptible to injury from the product, which fact was unknown to the
seller and peculiar to the buyer. The Court, acknowledging that there
are some decisions to the contrary, indicated its belief that the majority
rule is the sounder view.
The opinion pointed out that the plaintiff produced no evidence that
the rinse was adulterated under G. S. § 106-136, or misbranded under
G. S. § 106-137, or falsely advertised under G. S. § 106-138.
TORTS
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
In more than one half of the tort cases covered by this Survey,
contributory negligence has been an issue. Accordingly, this division of
tort law merits considerable attention.
It has long been held in North Carolina that the driver who fails
to stop within the range of his headlights is negligent per se. This is
often referred to as "outrunning the headlights."' There was consider-
able opposition to this fixed formula and in 1953 the General Assembly
abolished it by amending G. S. § 20-141 (e).-2 In Burchette v. Davis
Distributing Co.,3 the new amendment was applied for the first time, the
Court stating: ". . the courts may no longer hold such failure to be
negligence per se, or contributory negligence per se, as the case may be.
* . . However, this provision does not apply if it is admitted, or if all
the evidence discloses that the motor vehicle was being operated in excess
of the maximum speed limit under the existing circumstances as pre-
scribed under G. S. § 20-141 (b)."4
In Hyder v. Asheville Storage Battery Co.,5 plaintiff entered an inter-
section on a green light. The evidence indicated that because of a mal-
function of the traffic control light, defendant also had a green light and
entered the intersection from plaintiff's right. Defendant moved for
nonsuit on the ground that contributory negligence affirmatively appeared
from plaintiff's evidence. The motion was overruled. In approving this
ruling, the Court stated that a motorist is not under a duty to anticipate
the negligence of others unless there is something to put him on notice
of it, but he nevertheless has a duty to expect and anticipate the presence
'Note, 34 N. C. L. REv. 137, 140 (1955).2The amendment added: "Provided that the failure or inability of a motor
vehicle operator who is operating such vehicle within the maximum speed limits
prescribed by G. S. 20-141 (b) to stop such vehicle within the radius of the lights
thereof or within the range of his vision shall not be considered negligence per se
or contributory negligence per se in any civil action, but the facts relating thereto
may be considered with other facts in determining the negligence or contributory
negligence of such operator."
S243 N. C. 120, 90 S. E. 2d 232 (1955).
lId. at 125, 90 S. E. 2d at 236.
242 N. C. 553, 89 S. E. 2d 124 (1955).
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of others. The green light is not a command to go, but a qualified per-
mission to enter the intersection with caution. The Court ruled that
failure of plaintiff to observe traffic before entering the intersection should
be submitted to the jury on the issue of contributory negligence but did
not warrant a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Southern R.R. v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc.,6 involved a collision
between a tractor-trailer and a train. Defendant's driver approached a
railroad crossing and when about thirty-five feet away, looked down the
track and saw the oncoming train. As it was too late to stop the tractor-
trailer, the driver accelerated in an attempt to clear the crossing before
the train arrived. A collision resulted and the railroad sued defendant
for damages to the train. The crossing was marked with a standard
crossing marker, but defendant contended that plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent for failure to mark the crossing with lights or gongs of
some type. The Court answered this contention by stating that the rail-
road was not necessarily negligent for failure to provide lights at the
crossing, since the State Highway and Public Works Commission under
authority of G. S. § 136-20 (f), has exclusive discretion as to where such
lights will be placed. The Court, in ruling on defendant's counterclaim,
said that the failure of defendant's driver to observe the track in time to
bring his vehicle to a halt constituted negligence as a matter of law. He
not only has a duty to look and listen but to do so in time to save himself
if it becomes necessary.
Dennis v. Albemarl came before the court on rehearing.8  In this
case, plaintiff was standing on the back of a truck as it passed under a
wire suspended over the road. Plaintiff turned his head involuntarily in
response to hearing his name called and was struck and seriously injured
by the wire. In its first opinion, the Court ruled that there was a
permissible inference that plaintiff's action under the circumstances did
not necessarily deviate from the conduct of a reasonable and prudent
man and, therefore, plaintiff could not be held to be contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. Defendant contended on rehearing that
this was tantamount to a ruling contrary to prior North Carolina case
law, that diverting circumstances are sufficient to negative contributory
negligence. In explaining and confirming its decision, the Court pointed
out that each case involving diverting circumstances is considered on its
own merits in the light of all the facts. Hence, the question was not
whether diverting circumstances could excuse a failure to keep a proper
lookout, but rather whether one keeping a proper lookout is charged with
- 242 N. C. 676, 89 S. E. 2d 392 (1955).
'243 N. C. 221, 90 S. E. 2d 532 (1955).
1 See Dennis v. Albemarle, 242 N. C. 263, 87 S. E. 2d 561 (1955), discussed in a
previous Case Survey, 34 N. C. L. REV. 1, 75 (1956).
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contributory negligence as a matter of law because he is momentarily
and involuntarily diverted.
It is the general rule in North Carolina that to grant a motion for
nonsuit based on plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law,
the evidence must establish contributory negligence so clearly that no
other conclusion may be reasonably inferred.9 Where plaintiff is forced
off a dominant road in order to avoid colliding with defendant who has
entered from a servient road without stopping, there is a permissible
inference that defendant was negligent in failing to stop before entering
the dominant road and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause
of the accident.'0 But there is also a permissible inference that plaintiff
failed to exercise proper care, or having been put on notice of defendant's
negligent conduct, failed to take such action as an ordinarily prudent
person would take, and that such lack of care contributed to the accident.
There being two reasonable inferences possible, it is a case for the con-
sideration of the jury and it was held error to declare plaintiff contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law."
VIOLATION OF A STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE
Generally, one who violates a safety statute is guilty of negligence
per se.12 In such case, the relative standard of care based on the con-
duct of a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances has
no application, for the standard is said to be an absolute one prescribed
by the statute. Consequently, proof of the violation proximately result-
ing in injury is proof of actionable negligence.'3
G. S. § 20-154 (a) imposes two duties upon a motorist before making
a left turn. He must (1) see that such movement can be made in safety,
and (2) give a signal of his intention to make such movement that is
plainly visible to the operators of other vehicles which his movement
might affect. In Bradhan v. McLean Trucking Co., 14 plaintiff failed in
both these duties. While the intersection was covered with a dense fog
Wright v. Pegram, 244 N. C. 45, 92 S. E. 2d 416 (1956).
" Caughron v. Walker, 243 N. C. 153, 90 S. E. 2d 305 (1955). Although failing
to stop when entering a dominant highway is prohibited by G. S. § 20-158 (a)
(1950), by the express terms of the statute the violation is not negligence per se.
"1 For a similar case in which the Court also refused to say plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law, see Freedman v. Sadler, 243 N. C. 186,
90 S. E. 2d 380 (1955). In Smith v. Buie, 243 N. C. 209, 90 S. E. 2d 514 (1955) the
Court applied virtually the same principles to a collision occurring at a street
intersection. The opinion also discusses the difference in proof required when a
stop sign, as distinguished from a traffic light, is involved. Two judges dissented.
12 See Case Survey, 33 N. C. L. REv. 157, 215 (1955).
'3However, violation of a safety statute is not always negligence per se.
In Landini v. Steelman, 243 N. C. 146, 90 S. E. 2d 377 (1955) plaintiff violated
G. S. § 20-174 (a) (1950) by failing to yield the right of way to traffic when
crossing the street within a city block, and was struck by defendant's car. The
violation of the statute was not held to be contributory negligence per se. But see
Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589 (1955).31243 N. C. 708, 91 S. E. 2d 891 (1956).
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which obscured visibility beyond a distance of ten feet, plaintiff attempted
a left turn and was struck by defendant's truck while moving across
defendant's traffic lane. On the basis of plaintiff's violation of the statute,
the Court ruled that he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Once negligence is established by way of violation of a statute, the
ordinary rules of negligence apply. Thus it is error to instruct the jury
that defendant would be liable for all the proximate results of the viola-
tion whether foreseeable or not.15 Proximate cause is an essential ele-
ment of every negligence action, and foreseeability is an essential element
of proximate cause. 16
Although defendant's negligence is based upon violation of a safety
statute, contributory negligence is a valid defense. 17 Barker v. Gilbert
Engineering Co.' 8 dearly illustrates this point.
AUTOMOBILES
The decisions involving motor vehicles since the last Case Survey
may be grouped into the following categories: seven concerned collisions
between vehicles at intersections;19 four involved train-motor vehicle
collisions ;20 six arose when vehicles struck pedestrians or children on
the road ;21 in four, the vehicles were moving in the same direction when
they collided,22 while two were concerned with vehicles moving in the
opposite direction;23 five involved vehicles striking a stopped or parked
vehicle ;24 two concerned vehicles overturning ;25 and one involved a car
15 McNair v. Richardson, 244 N. C. 65, 92 S. E. 2d 459 (1956).
'- Ibid.
'7REsTAThEmxT, TORTS § 286 (d) (1934).
I 243 N. C. 103, 89 S. E. 2d 804 (1955).9 Wright v. Pegram, 244 N. C. 45, 92 S. E. 2d 416 (1956); Bradham v. McLean
Trucking Co., 243 N. C. 708, 91 S. E. 2d 891 (1956) ; Smith v. Buie, 243 N. C. 209,
90 S. E. 2d 514 (1955); Freedman v. Sadler, 243 N. C. 186, 90 S. E. 2d 380
(1955).; Caughron v. Walker, 243 N. C. 153, 90 S. E. 2d 305 (1955) ; Barker v.
Gilbert Engineering Co., 243 N. C. 103, 89 S. E. 2d 804 (1955) ; Hyder v. Asheville
Storage Battery Co., 242 N. C. 553, 89 S. E. 2d 124 (1955).
" Gray v. Carolina & N. Ry., 243 N. C. 107, 89 S. E. 2d 807 (1955) ; Wrenn v.
Southern Ry., 243 N. C. 76, 89 S. E. 2d 761 (1955) ; Moser v. Southern Ry., 243
N. C. 74, 89 S. E. 2d 752 (1955) ; Southern Ry. v. Akers Motor Lines, 242 N. C.
676, 89 S. E. 2d 392 (1955).
2' Merrill v. Kindley, 244 N. C. 118, 92 S. E. 2d 671 (1956) ; Pope v. Patterson,
243 N. C. 425, 90 S. E. 2d 706 (1956) ; Landini v. Steelman, 243 N. C. 146, 90
S. E. 2d 377 (1955) ; Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 243 N. C.
55, 89 S E. 2d 788 (1955); Gentile v. Wilson, 242 N. C. 704, 89 S. E. 2d 403
(1955) ; Pavone v. Merion, 242 N. C. 594, 89 S. E. 2d 108 (1955).
". Royal v. McClure, 244 N. C. 186, 92 S. E. 2d 762 (1956) ; Lawrence v. Bethea,
243 N. C. 632, 91 S. E. 2d 594 (1956) ; Dosher v. Hunt, 243 N. C. 247, 90 S. E.
2d 374 (1955) ; Kimsey v. Reaves, 242 N. C. 721, 89 S E. 2d 386 (1955).
"
3McNair v. Richardson, 244 N. C. 65, 92 S. E. 2d 459 (1956); Riddle v.
Artis, 243 N. C. 668, 91 S. E. 2d 894 (1956).2 Lambert v. Bland, 244 N. C. 283, 93 S. E. 2d 89 (1956) ; Baxley v. Cavenaugh,
243 N. C. 677, 92 S. E. 2d 68 (1956) ; Garrenton v. Maryland, 243 N. C. 614 91
S. E. 2d 596 (1956); Weavil v. Myers, 243 N. C. 386, 90 S E. 2d 733 (195 6 );
Burchette v. Davis Distributing Co., 243 N. C. 120, 90 S. E. 2d 232 (1955).
-5 Ransdell v. Young, 243 N. C. 75, 89 S. E. 2d 773 (1955) ; Sears v. Boyce,
242 N. C. 606, 89 S. E. 2d 147 (1955).
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striking a building.26 Several points raised in these cases perhaps merit
special mention.
A motorist's duty to children was considered by the Court in Pavone
v. Merion.27 The minor plaintiff, suing by her next friend, had darted
into the street and been struck by defendant's automobile. The Court
reversed a lower court judgment of involuntary nonsuit, stating that a
motorist has a duty to avoid injuring children whom he sees and those
whom by the exercise of due care he should have seen. He must act in
accordance with the knowledge that children, unmindful of danger, may
enter the street without warning. In this situation, the motorist's duty
was defined as that of exercising care in proportion to the child's inca-
pacity to foresee and avoid danger. It would seem, however, that this
duty would not apply if the child suddenly darted from behind an ob-
struction, not giving the motorist an opportunity to anticipate his
presence.28
The fact that a car door flies open, causing the driver to fall out of the
car and lose control, does not compel the conclusion that the resulting
collision was an unavoidable accident.2 The unavoidable accident occurs
only when there is a lack of causal negligence.30 Evidence that the
driver failed to close the door properly or leaned on it while rounding a
curve, when considered with all other circumstances of the case, could be
evidence of causal negligence.
Dosher v. Hunt,31 involving interesting questions of imputed negli-
gence, is discussed under AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.
THE AUTOMOBILE RACE TRACK AND RACING
The ordinary rules of negligence and contributory negligence apply
to the automobile race track. In Blevins v. France,32 plaintiff's intestate
who was a participant in an automobile race, stalled his car on the
track while he and the other participants were following a lead car around
the track preliminary to the start of the race. Another car then had to
push intestate's car to start it. Upon starting, intestate continued around
the track, but his car stalled again. Before it could be removed from the
track, the race was started. One of the racing cars crashed into the rear
of the stalled car killing plaintiff's intestate. Plaintiff joined the pro-
20 Hensley v. Harris, 242 N. C. 599, 89 S. E. 2d 155 (1955).
-1242 N. C. 594, 89 S. E. 2d 108 (1955).
" See also Pope v. Patterson, 243 N. C. 425, 90 S. E. 2d 706 (1956).
" Baxley v. Cavenaugh, 243 N. C. 677, 92 S. E. 2d 68 (1956).
"0 Causal negligence is defined as negligence which is the proximate cause of the
injury. The proximate cause of an event is that which in natural sequence, un-
broken by any new cause, produces the event, and without which the event would
not have occurred. See Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N. C. 463, 468; 23 S. E. 2d
844, 848 (1943).
:1243 N. C. 247, 90 S. E. 2d 371 (1955).
2244 N. C. 334, 93 S. E. 2d 549 (1956).
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moters and directors of the race as defendants in her wrongful death
action.
In affirming a nonsuit, the Court ruled that intestate was contribu-
torily negligent for remaining on the track after he was aware that his
car was operating imperfectly, pointing out that he could have removed
the car from the track while it was being pushed and thus could have
avoided the accident. Although the language of the Court implied that
intestate might be guilty of contributory negligence by virtue of having
assumed the risk in voluntarily entering the race, the principal basis of
the decision seems to rest on his lack of due care while participating in
the race.
JOINT TORT-FEASORS
It is fundamental that there may be two or more proximate causes
of an accident. Two causes may operate independently of each other,
but if both concur to produce a single injury, the tort-feasors are jointly
and severally liable as joint tort-feasors.33
In Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,8 4 plaintiff's
intestate, an unemancipated child, ran onto the highway and was killed
by defendant's automobile. Defendant contended that the child's mother
was concurrently negligent in allowing the child to run into the street
and that she should be joined under the provisions of G. S. § 1-240.85
The Court pointed out that the personal representative of the deceased
has a right of action only if his intestate would have had a cause of action
had he lived.80 As an unemancipated child cannot sue his parent for
ordinary negligence, 7 the mother could not be joined, there being no
cause of action against her.38
In Riddle v. Artis,39 A's car skidded to its left in front of plaintiff's
car and the two vehicles collided. B's car, which apparently was fol-
lowing too close, then struck the rear of plaintiff's car. When plaintiff
sued both A and B, B demurred, contending that, under the allegations
of the complaint, the negligence of A was the sole proximate cause of the
injury. B's theory was that A's negligence had intervened to insulate
his negligence. In reversing judgment sustaining the demurrer, the
Court explained that the doctrine of intervening cause will operate to
relieve the original tort-feasor of liability only where a new cause inter-
venes between the initial negligent act and the resulting injury, effectively
breaking the chain of causation and becoming solely responsible for the
Shaw v. Barnard, 229 N. C. 713, 715, 51 S. E. 2d 295, 296 (1949) (dictum).
"243 N. C. 55, 89 S. E. 2d 788 (1955).
"This statute permits a defendant tort-feasor to bring in another for con-
tribution.
"G. S. § 28-173 (1950).
" Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 2d 12 (1923).
" See Note 35 N. C. L. REv. 141 (1956).
"9 243 N. C. 668, 91 S. E. 2d 894 (1956).
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injury. The cause must be of such a character that the injury produced
would not have followed had the cause not intervened. To operate as an
intervening cause, it must be reasonably unforeseeable. Otherwise, the
acting parties are joint tort-feasors. Here, the Court ruled that the
complaint alleged concurring negligence against both A and B.
RESCUE
Alford v. Washington" was before the Court on a second appeal.
There, defendant ran through a stop sign and collided with another car
at an intersection. One of the cars was thrown against a pole carrying
high tension electric wires and, as a result, a wire fell across the car.
Plaintiff's intestate arrived shortly afterwards and in an apparent at-
tempt to extricate people from the car, touched the car and was electro-
cuted. In affirming a verdict for plaintiff, the Court applied the rescue
doctrine, stating that when the life of a human being is subjected to
danger, a bystander is justified in attempting to save the life of the
endangered person; and, in doing so, his conduct is not subjected to the
same standard of care required in ordinary circumstances. In such a
case the rescuer is allowed to risk his own safety, and unless his conduct
can be said to be reckless or rash under the circumstances, he cannot be
adjudged contributorily negligent.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
As was noted in Hunt v. Bradshaw,41 an unauthorized surgical
operation is an "assault and battery." The action is predicated on the
patient's lack of consent. Thus, if the patient can show lack of consent,
he may recover for resulting injury even though the doctor possessed
sufficient skill and the operation conformed to good surgical practice.
42
The rule was relaxed to an appreciable extent in Kennedy v. Par-
rott.43 There, feme plaintiff consented to an appendectomy in which a
general anesthetic was used. After defendant doctor had made his in-
cision, he noticed a cyst on her ovary and punctured it. Plaintiff alleged
that this resulted in her extended illness. In ruling that the extended
operation was "permitted" and therefore could not be a technical battery
based on lack of consent, the Court said: ". . . where an internal opera-
tion is indicated, a surgeon may lawfully perform, and it is his duty to
perform, such operation as good surgery demands, even when it means
an extension of the operation further than was originally contemplated,
1-244 N. C. 132, 92 S. E. 2d 788 (1956). The case was previously considered
in 238 N. C. 694, 78 S. E. 2d 915 (1953). See Case Survey, 32 N. C. L. REv. 379,
496 (1954).
242 N. C. 517, 88 S. E. 2d 762 (1955).
"PROSSER, TORTS § 18 at p. 85 (2d ed. 1955).
,243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1956).
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and for so doing he is not to be held in damages as for an unauthorized
operation."
Thus the Court has adopted a broad interpretation of the patient's
consent. Considering that the doctor's diagnosis cannot be infallible,
and that the desirable extent of the operation cannot be determined until
after the incision when the patient is under anesthesia and unable to con-
sent, it is felt that such a construction is proper.45
DUTY OF A SUPPLIER OF CHATTELS
In Petty v. Cranston Print Works Co.,46 plaintiff was an employee
of an independent contractor doing repair work in a factory. After
falling off a scaffold during the course of the work, plaintiff sued the
factory owner for negligence. The evidence indicated that the scaffold,
equipped with rollers, belonged to defendant and had been placed in
defendant's plant for the general use of anyone who wanted to use it,
but that defendant was under no obligation, by contract or otherwise, to
provide it. While plaintiff was using the scaffold, a locking mechanism
on one of the rollers came loose, allowing the scaffold to roll and plaintiff
fell to his injury. The Court affirmed a judgment of involuntary nonsuit,
and pointed out that to establish a cause of action for actionable
negligence there must be a legal duty owed, a breach thereof, and result-
ing injury proximately caused by such breach. A person who contracts
to furnish equipment is under a duty to see that it is in safe working
order for the purpose intended; however, a person who permits his
equipment to be used, not being under an obligation to do so, is only
under a duty to disclose latent defects of which he has notice. The
Court found that defendant had no effective notice of the defect in the
locking mechanism, and that it was not a latent defect since the plaintiff
had been aware of it. Although the discussion of the Court implied that
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, the principal basis for upholding
the nonsuit seems to be that plaintiff simply failed to show a breach of
any duty owed by defendant to plaintiff.
STATE TORT CLAIMS ACT
Under the State Tort Claims Act of 1951,47 the Industrial Commis-
sion has authority to hear and decide tort claims against the state and
its agencies. Under the act it must appear that: (1) plaintiff was free
of contributory negligence; (2) an employee of the state or of a state
agency was negligent while acting within the scope of his employment;
and (3) such negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. The
'Id. at 363, 90 S. E. 2d at 759.
"For a contrary view, see Note, 34 N. C. L. REv. 581 (1956), where the
principal case is discussed.
46243 N. C. 292, 90 S. E. 2d 717 (1956).
"G. S. §§ 143-291 through -300 (1952 and Supp. 1955).
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Industrial Commission has authority to award damages up to $10,00048
but its decisions are subject to judicial review.
In Lowe v. Department of Motor Vehicles,49 defendant's employee,
a highway patrolman, pursued plaintiff for several miles at high speeds.
When plaintiff finally stopped his car, the patrolman got out of his car
with his pistol in hand pointed at plaintiff. The patrolman, running in
the darkness toward plaintiff's car, tripped. The pistol accidentally
discharged, wounding plaintiff. The Court, in sustaining the Commis-
sion's award for negligent injury, ruled that the patrolman, in unjustifia-
bly and intentionally pointing the pistol at plaintiff, had violated G. S. §
14-34,O and by virtue of the violation was guilty of an assault. Since the
statute was enacted for the protection of the public,51 the Court said that
the violation of it constituted negligence per se. Thus the Court appears
to have taken the position that an intentional act may be the basis of a
negligence action. Plaintiff could not have recovered for assault because,
under the Tort Claims Act, -5 2 the state is not liable for the intentional
torts of its employees.
TRESPASS, NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE
In two cases, the Court used the labels trespass and negligence to
refer to torts which also might have been properly called nuisance.
Where defendant's mining operation discharged clouds of dust so that
plaintiffs' residence was damaged and their family was constantly under
a threat of silicosis, the Court held that the dust falling on the plaintiffs'
property constituted a trespass.5 3 In the other case, 54 defendant caused
dust from a road construction project to fall on plaintiff's tobacco crop,
resulting in damage to the tobacco. It was held that a cause of action
was stated for negligence, the Court saying that defendant had violated
a duty it owed to plaintiff in failing to keep the dust down.
In Lovin v. Hamlet,55 the Court held that since a municipal park is
maintained for the amisement of children impliedly invited to visit there,
the attractive nuisance doctrine56 could have no application.57 It ap-
" G. S. § 143-291 (Supp. 1955).
" 244 N. C. 353, 93 S. E. 2d 448 (1956).
"0 This statute provides that pointing a gun at a person constitutes assault.
"1 See VIOLATION OF A STATUTE, p. 249 supra.
'2 G. S. § 143-291 (Supp. 1955). In a more recent case based on similar facts
the Court denied recovery, saying that an intentional act could not be the basis of
a negligence action. The fact that the patrolman might have been guilty of
negligence per se by having violated G. S. § 14-34 (1953) was not mentioned.
Jenkins v. North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N. C. 560, 94 S. E.
2d 577 (1956).
" Hall v. DeWeld Mica Corp., 244 N. C. 182, 93 S. E. 2d 56 (1956).
"Billings v. Taylor, 243 N. C. 57, 89 S. E. 2d 743 (1955).
"243 N. C. 399, 90 S. E. 2d 760 (1956).
"See Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 227 (1948).
The Court acknowledged the existence of a possible conflict in prior cases as
to whether maintenance of a municipal park is a governmental function. It did not
undertake to resolve the conflict.
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parently thought that the doctrine might be applicable to the maintenance
of a municipal lake adjacent to the park, but found that the complaint
provided, at best, a defective statement of a cause of action. Plaintiff's
minor intestate had drowned in the lake; but there were no allegations
as to how or when he fell into the lake; and no facts were stated sufficient
to put the defendant on notice, such as that children were accustomed
to playing in the lake or at the water's edge. The Court held that the
lower court should have sustained the defendant's demurrer.0 8
FRAUD
Early v. Eley59 involved alleged fraud in the sale of corporate stock.
Plaintiff alleged in effect and testified in detail that the individual de-
fendant, the president of the corporate defendant, asserted that the cor-
poration had made a twelve per cent profit during the preceding year,
and further stated concerning the stock: "It is gilt edged. You cannot
buy anything better." Plaintiff also alleged that the statements were
false to defendant's knowledge, that in reliance on them he invested in
the corporation and as a consequence suffered a loss. The Court ob-
served that the elements of fraud are: (1) that defendant made a false
representation or concealment of a material fact either knowingly or
recklessly in conscious ignorance of the truth; (2) that the statement was
reasonably calculated to deceive; (3) that defendant intended to deceive;
(4) that plaintiff was in fact deceived; and (5) that damage to plaintiff
resulted.
In ordering a nonsuit, the Court found the evidence indicated that
the corporation had in fact made a twelve per cent profit during the
preceding eight months. The Court went on to say that even if no such
profit had been made, there was no evidence to charge defendant with
knowledge of the falsity of the representation or with making it recklessly
in conscious ignorance of the truth. As to the statements made by de-
fendant regarding the "gilt-edged" quality of the stock, the Court ruled
that they were expressions of opinion and therefore could not support
a finding of fraud. 60
LIBEL AND SLANDER
The best that can be said of the common law of defamation is that it
was illogical and overly technical. As it developed, slander came to be
divided into slander per se and slander per quod. If the spoken words
were such that they (1) imputed the commission of a crime, (2) tended
r' In Jessup v. High P'oint, T. & D. R.R., 244 N. C. 242, 93 S. E. 2d 84 (1956)
the Court held that a child who was killed while playing on defendant's train was a
trespasser and defendant had only a duty to refrain from wantonly or wilfully
injuring him.
,9243 N. C. 695, 91 S. E. 2d 919 (1956).
60 Another recent fraud case is Thompson v. Stadiem, 243 N. C. 291, 90 S. E.
2d 518 (1955), discussed in Rescission under CONTRACTS.
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to prejudice one in his profession, trade or calling, or (3) imputed a
loathsome disease, it was said they were slanderous per se.6 1 If the
words fell into either of these classes, malice and damages were con-
clusively presumed, and this was true whether extrinsic evidence had to
be brought in to prove the defamatory nature or not. If the words did
not fall into one of the three classes, malice and special damages were
not presumed and had to be alleged and proved. This group was called
slander per quod.62
Originally, libel had no such classification. All written matter tending
to injure a person's reputation was actionable without proof of special
damages. Today however, the majority of American courts do make a
classification: if the words are defamatory on their face, they are said to
be libelous per se; but if extrinsic evidence is required to prove their
defamatory nature, they are libelous per quod and special damages must
be alleged and proved.63  Although the growth of the libel per quod
concept was undoubtedly the result of confusion with the slander labels
and the special damage requirement, the basis for making the distinction
in the respective torts was radically different. Slander's dividing line
was reached if the derogatory words did not fit into one of the arbitrary
categories; in libel the division was made between words defamatory on
their face and those not.
In Badame v. Lampke,64 one businessman orally accused his com-
petitor of pulling "shady deals." The words would seem to fall within
the common law definition of slander per se, and the Court apparently
so held. Yet while the result of the Badame case is not questioned,
certain language in the opinion casts doubt on North Carolina's present
position as to slander. The Court stated that "defamatory words" are
"actionable per se" when "the law treats their injurious character as a
fact of common acceptance." The Court then continued: "On the
other hand, if the injurious character of the spoken statement6 5 appears
... only in consequence of extrinsic, explanatory facts showing its in-
jurious effect, such utterance is said to be actionable only per quod, and
in such cases the injurious character of the words must be pleaded and
proved, and in order to recover there must be allegation and proof of
some special damage."8 6 In the opinion, there is no specific mention of
the three common law classes of slander per se nor is there a use of the
word "slander" itself. (The preliminary statement of facts uses
" PaOSSER, TORTS § 93, at 584 (2d ed. 1955). By Statute, North Carolina has
added a fourth class. G. S. § 99-4 (1953) (charges of incontinency against a
voman).
'2 PROSSER, TORTS § 93 at 585 (2d ed. 1955),
" Ibid.
" 242 N. C. 755, 89 S. E. 2d 466 (1955).
11 Emphasis added.
.'242 N. C. 755, 89 S. E. 2d 466, 467 (1955).
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"slander.") The contention might be made that the Court was never-
theless referring to the arbitrary slander per se classes when it dealt with
the words as injurious to plaintiff in his special occupation (the second
category of slander per se, as listed above). Pointing in the other
direction is the Court's clear invocation of the extrinsic fact test for
spoken words which are to be placed in the contrasting per quod category.
The Court certainly appears to have imported libel rules into a slander
case, but it is not possible to say categorically whether this was done de-
liberately or by inadvertance.67 If the Court intends a total abolition of
all distinction, it can properly be inferred that "defamatory words"
"actionable per se" are not, where oral, restricted to the three slander
per se classes. If this assumption is correct, the position of the Court is
a laudable one. There seems to be no defensible basis here for adhering
to irrational tort concepts created several centuries ago. However, if
the Court intends to effect such a change, it would be preferable that it
do so in clear and unmistakable language. As it stands, this case actual-
ly increases the uncertainty and confusion in the North Carolina law of
defamation.
TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE
PROCESS
The importance of complying in detail with all statutory requirements
where service by publication is attempted was pointed out in the partition
proceeding of Jones v. Jones.' The trial judge found that all interested
and necessary parties were before the court. However, the record
showed that the affidavit on which the order of publication was made was
defective in that it failed to give the name and residence of the persons
so to be served, or that if unknown, diligent search to discover such name
and residence was made. Neither did the affidavit show whether any
such person was a minor or incompetent. The Court further noted
that the notice of publication was defective in that it did not give the
absent defendants the time to answer allowed by G. S. § 1-100 and G. S.
§ 1-125. Since these defects all appeared on the record the Court de-
clared the judgment void ex mero motu.
In Dellinger v. Bollinger2 the plaintiff putative father filed a petition
in which he sought custody of an illegitimate child born to the defendant.
Defendant made what purported to be a special appearance and de-
"7 See Brandis and Trotter, Some Observations on Pleading Damages it North
Carolina, 31 N. C. L. REv. 249, 269 et seq., discussing prior North Carolina cases
and recognizing a possibility that the libel rule might be imported into slander.
1 243 N. C. 557, 91 S. E. 2d 562 (1956).
2 242 N. C. 696, 89 S. E. 2d 592 (1955).
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murred ore tenus to the petition contending that the putative father was
not entitled to maintain an action for custody under G. S. § 50-13. No
summons was issued. The trial judge heard the evidence in affidavit
form on the demurrer and motion to dismiss, overruled the demurrer
and awarded custody to the father. On appeal the Court held that
despite the purported special appearance, the demurrer ore tenus was a
waiver of the absence of summons and constituted a general appearance.
Further, the Court held the trial judge erred in making a final award of
custody at that point in the proceedings. He should have given the
defendant an opportunity to answer the petition before rendering final
judgment.
VENUE
In Noland Co. v. Laxton Construction Co.3 the plaintiff foreign cor-
poration maintained its principal office in North Carolina in Wake
County until not later than March 21, 1955, when it moved its office to
Durham County. On April 19, 1955, the plaintiff instituted this action
in Wake County against the defendant who was of Mecklenberg County.
On the same day it filed in the office of the Secretary of State a certificate
noting its change of principal office from Wake to Durham County. De-
fendant moved, as of right, to have the venue changed to Mecklenberg
County. The trial court held that until the certificate had been duly filed
with the Secretary of State the principal office of the plaintiff would be
deemed to be in Wake County. In reversing, the Supreme Court stated
that the plaintiff could not take advantage of its own delay in filing, that
it is the actual location of the principal office that controls and not the
date of filing notice of change with the Secretary of State. The Court
conceded that, for venue purposes domesticated foreign corporations are
treated as domestic corporations, but did not mention G. S. § 1-79, which
expressly makes the location of the principal office the residence of a
domestic corporation for venue purposes.
DISCOVERY
The matter of when discovery shall be allowed has been before the
North Carolina courts on many occasions. It is not easy to predict
whether discovery will or will not be allowed in a given case. The
Supreme Court has two manners of approach to this question: the one
used by the Court when considering G.S. § 8-89 in H. L. Coble Construc-
tion Co. v. Housing Authority4 that the statute is remedial and "should
be liberally construed to advance the remedy intended thereby to be
afforded to the party," and the other illustrated by Cates v. Griffith Fi-
S244 N. C. 50, 92 S. E. 2d 398 (1956).
S244 N. C. 261, 93 S. E. 2d 98 (1956).
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nance Co.5 that as viewed by the Court the application for discovery made
under G. S. § 1-568.10 is in its broad scope "a fishing expedition." Space
does not permit the detailing of the particular matters sought to be
elicited and the action of the Court in each instance. However, any
attorney having a discovery matter before him would be well advised to
study the above two cases from their factual standpoint.
NONSUIT MOTION
Kennedy v. Parrott6 was a suit for malpractice. Plaintiff had offered
no expert testimony. Defendant's experts testified that the plaintiff's
condition was not the result of the operative procedures used. The trial
court nonsuited. The Supreme Court in sustaining the nonsuit stated
that it would take judicial notice of what was said about the cause of
plaintiff's condition by recognized medical texts. It proceeded to name
some such texts considered by it. Then the Court delved into the testi-
mony of the defendant's experts. In doing so it recognized that on a
motion for nonsuit the court may not consider the testimony of the
defendant as it tends to contradict the evidence offered by the plaintiff.
However, the Court does now consider the defendant's experts' testimony
".. . for the purpose of ascertaining what are the known and generally
accepted facts about phlebitis, as it tends to corroborate the textbook
statements in respect thereto." (Emphasis added.) In fact, the Court
continues, ".... the trial judge had the right to call upon experts in the
science of medicine to inform him on the subject."
G. S. Section 1-180
As long as G. S. § 1-180 stands on the books we may expect to see
t rial judges reversed because the Supreme Court finds they violated this
statute. Thus in Hyder v. Asheville Storage Battery Co. 7 the trial
judge in a negligence action stated to counsel within the hearing of the
jury that he did not see any evidence of contributory negligence in the
,case but would nevertheless submit an issue on the subject to the jury.
On defendant's appeal from a verdict and judgment for plaintiff the
Court reversed on the ground that the trial court had expressed an
opinion within the presence of the jury which was prejudicial to the de-
fendant and in violation of G. S. § 1-180.
In State v. Kleckholn8 the trial judge charged the state's contentions
in great detail but treated the defendant's contentions in a very general
and summary manner. This was held to be a violation of G. S. § 1-180
to the effect that the trial judge must state the contentions of the parties
\with "equal stress."
1244 N. C. 277, 93 S. E. 2d 145 (1956).
'a 243 N. C. 355, 90 S. E. 2d 754 (1955).
.242 N. C. 553, 89 S. E. 2d 124 (1955).
s243 N. C. 306, 90 S. E. 2d 768 (1955).
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In State v. Robbins9 the trial court charged the contentions of the
state and then as to the defendant said, "I don't know what he contends
... to be frank I am at a loss to know what to tell you the contentions
of the defendant are." Held, that this was error in that the court failed
to comply with G. S. § 1-180.
In re Will of Holcomb' ° was a caveat proceeding. A witness was
asked if he knew the signature of his father, the alleged testator. He
said he did. The trial judge then proceeded to violate G. S. § 1-180 by
saying, "As far as I am concerned he knows his father's signature ...
objection overruled." Clearly the remarks endorsed the veracity of the
witness.
CONDUCT OF JURORS
In State v. Barnes"' the defendant was found guilty on a verdict.of
the jury. It appeared that a juror when returning to the courtroom
stated that the jury stood 10 to 2 for conviction. This remark seems to
have been spontaneously made and not in reply to a question by the court
as to the verdict. Held, that such a statement was innocuous and no
ground for reversal.
In State v. Scott12 after the court had adjourned for the day the
defendant talked to a juror, not realizing he was a juror. It does not
appear what the conversation was but the following day while the jury
was deliberating its verdict defense counsel informed the court of the
conversation. The jury then returned a verdict against the defendant.
On motion for a new trial the court failed to find that the conversation
had been the cause of any prejudice against the defendant and refused to
award a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed. Mere evidence of the
conversation was not enough; prejudice must be shown.
MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT
Williams v. Stumpf' 3 presented a most unusual situation which the
Supreme Court, while expressing regret, did not feel required a re-
versal. There had been a verdict for the defendant and motion made by
plaintiff to set it aside. The court called witnesses on his own account,
took their testimony and refused to permit the defendant to cross
examine. The witnesses do not appear to qualify as witnesses giving
newly discovered evidence. Being satisfied that there should be a new
trial on the evidence thus taken the verdict was set aside and a new trial
ordered. The Supreme Court commented ... it is questionable whether
p243 N. C. 161, 90 S. E. 2d 322 (1955).
10244 N. C. 391, 93 S. E. 2d 454 (1956).
1243 N. C. 174, 90 S. E. 2d 321 (1955).
12242 N. C. 595, 89 S. E. 2d 193 (1955).
12243 N. C. 434, 90 S. E. 2d 688 (1955) ; noted at length in 34 N. C. L. REv.
585 (1956).
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the court should take additional testimony or base its decision only on
that which the jury considered." Obviously the verdict was set aside on
the basis of evidence not heard by the jury. One may well wonder how
secure any jury verdict is if it may be set aside upon the judge consider-
ing on his own motion testimony of witnesses not heard by the jury and
not subject to cross examination.
BROADSIDE EXCEPTIONS
In several cases the Court found the assignment of errors were broad-
side.14 In Harris v. Carolina Power & Light Co. 5 a motion had been
made to strike out portions of the defendant's answer. The motion was
granted in part and denied in part. Both parties appealed, alleging as
error either the striking or nonstriking of portions of the answer "as
shown by the order appealed from." Held, that the assignments of
errors of both parties were broadside since no specific matter was set out
and the Court was invited to make a "voyage of discovery" through the
record.
APPEALS
By Rule 4 (a) adopted by the Supreme Court, October 19, 1955, the
right to appeal from certain demurrers and orders denying motions to
strike allegations contained in pleadings is drastically limited. The rule
which went into effect at the Spring Term, 1956 provides as follows:
"From and after the first day of the Spring Term of 1956, this
Court will not entertain an appeal:
(1) From an order overruling a demurrer except when the de-
murrer is interposed as a matter of right for misjoinder of parties
and causes of action. The movant may enter an exception to the
order overruling the demurrer and present the question thus
raised to this Court on the final appeal; provided that when the
demurrant conceives that the order overruling his demurrer will
prejudicially affect a substantial right to which he is entitled
unless the ruling of the court is reviewed on appeal prior to the
trial of the cause on its merits, he may petition this Court for a
writ of certiorari within thirty days from the date of the entry of
the order overruling the demurrer.
(2) From an order striking or denying a motion to strike allega-
tions contained in pleadings. When a party conceives that such
order will be prejudicial to him on the final hearing of said cause,
he may petition this Court for a writ of certiorari within thirty
days from the date of the entry of the order."
1 Tillman v. Talbert, 244 N. C. 270, 93 S. E. 2d 101 (1956) ; Highway Commis-
sioner v. Brann, 243 N. C. 758, 92 S. E. 2d 146 (1956) ; Merrell v. Jenkins, 242
N. C. 636, 89 S. E. 2d 242 (1955)'.1- 243 N. C. 438, 90 S. E. 2d 694 (1955).
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It would appear that the writ of certiorari will be more frequently
used as a result of the foregoing rule.
Without the aid of the new rule the Court in Hamilton v. Hamilton'6
affirmed its previous rulings that no appeal lies from an order over-
ruling a demurrer ore tenus.
MOTION IN CAUSE OF THIRD PARTY
In Carpenter v. Carpenter17 the second husband brought an action
to have his marriage annulled on the ground that the divorce obtained
by his wife from her former husband, Shaver, was obtained on the basis
of false swearing by both parties. He contended that the Shavers had
not been separated for the requisite statutory period contrary to what ap-
peared on the face of the record. The Court stated the case -was one of
first impression but came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was a
stranger to the divorce suit and accordingly could not collaterally attack
the divorce decree. Neither could the Shavers attack it if they were both
parties to the false swearing. Justice Parker dissented on the theory
that if what the plaintiff alleged was true there was no jurisdiction to
grant the divorce and it was a nullity.
Carpenter then appeared in the Shaver v Shaver'8 cause and moved
that the judgment be vacated for the reasons above stated. The two
Shavers moved to dismiss the motion and from an order denying their
motion an appeal was taken. Held, that Carpenter was a stranger to the
Shaver cause and had no standing to move to vacate the judgment.
Notwithstanding the latter appeal the court below took proof and found
the divorce judgment was based on fraud and declared the divorce void
ab initio. On appeal from this order the Supreme Court held the prior
appeal had removed the case from the trial court's domain and his judg-
ment purporting to vacate the decree was a nullity.' 9
EXECUTION AND TRUST PROPERTY
In Cornelius v. Albertson20 the judgment creditor had the clerk issue
an execution directing the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out of property
held by a third person in trust for the debtor. Defendant made a motion
to restrain the plaintiff and sheriff from levying on the trust property.
The court granted the injunction finding the trust in question was an
active trust. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the levy was authorized
by G. S. § 1-315 (4). The Court referred to its previous decisions that
G. S. § 1-315 (4) and G. S. § 1-316 do not apply to active trusts. How-
ever, the Court found that the procedure engaged in by the defendant was
16242 N. C. 715, 89 S. E. 2d 417 (1955).
11244 N. C. 286, 93 S. E. 2d 617 (1956).
18244 N. C. 309, 93 S. E. 2d 614 (1956).
21 Shaver v. Shaver, 244 N. C. 311, 93 S. E. 2d 615 (1956).
20 244 N. C. 265, 93 S. E. 2d 147 (1956).
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wrong. Instead of making a motion in the cause to enjoin the plaintiff
from levying on and selling trust property the defendant should have
made a motion in the cause before the Clerk of the Superior Court to
recall or withdraw the execution which commanded a levy on trust
property held by a stranger. Any finding by the Court below that the
trust was active or passive should not have been made and was not then
up for review. Accordingly, the proceeding was remanded to the lower
court with a direction that it strike out of its order all its findings of fact
as to the trust created for the defendant and that it vacate the injunction.
and enter an order denying defendant's motion for the same. The de-
fendant could then move before the clerk to recall or withdraw the
execution, which should be allowed. The plaintiff could then have an
execution issued to satisfy her judgment uot of the property of the
debtor and after such execution was issued could by supplementary pro-
ceedings pursuant to G. S. § 1-360 bring in the trustee and subject him
to the court's jurisdiction. Plaintiff could then present to the court or
judge the question as to whether or not the trust estate should be ap-
plied to the satisfaction of the judgment. The Court pointed out that
the statutory provisions relating to supplementary proceedings, G. S. §
1-352 et seq., were intended to supply the place of a proceeding in equity
where relief was given after a creditor had determined his debt by a
judgment at law and was unable to obtain satisfaction by process of law.
Whether the Court means to imply that the equitable remedy is no
longer availabe and that recourse must be had under the supplementary
proceeding statute is not made clear.
TRUSTS
The opinion in Roberson v. Pruden' repeats the familiar doctrine
that one who buys a debtor's land at a foreclosure sale, having previously
agreed orally to hold it for him until reimbursed, cannot resist the en-
forcement of the parol trust, after repayment is tendered, by pleading the
Statute of Frauds. Even in jurisdictions which have the trust section of
the Statute, the debtor's reliance upon the purchaser's promise renders
unconscionable the latter's attempt to keep what he has acquired. Re-
liance on the oral agreement keeps the debtor from seeking another pur-
chaser or competing bidders at the sale and the land is usually bought at
a price below its value. A court will not let the buyer profit under the
agreement while attacking its validity.2 The same rule is applied in
' 242 N. C. 632, 89 S. E. 2d 250 (1955) ; see CaREr TRaASAcrons, p. 212 supra.
2 Nichols v. Martin, 277 Mich. 305, 269 N. W. 183 (1936); Moore v. De
Bernardi, 47 Nev. 33, 213 Pac. 1041, rehearing denied, 220 Pac. 544 (1923) ; Ryan
v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307, 90 Am. Dec. 696 (1866); accord: Enbler v. Enbler, 224
N. C. 811, 32 S. E. 2d 619 (1945) ; Rush v. McPherson, 176 N. C. 562, 97 S. E.
613 (1918).
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North Carolina, which does not have the trust section of the Statute of
Frauds; an oral agreement by the grantee to hold the land in trust for a
person other than the grantor is enforceable even against a plea of the
contract section of the Statute.3 The oral trust in the principal case is
distinguishable from that in which A deeds land to B on an oral trust for
A himself, which is condemned as being too susceptible to fraud.
In Ridge v. Bright4 the Court extends the frontiers of the North
Carolina law on the validity of inter vivos trusts. Heretofore, our de-
cisions have not gone beyond indicating that a reserved power to revoke
did not invalidate the trust.5 Now it is held that a settlor may safely
reserve the income, the power to amend the trust and to change the bene-
ficiary as well as to revoke, and the power to withdraw the principal in
whole or in part. These reservations will not render the trust void as an
attempted testamentary disposition not meeting the formal requirements
for wills; nor does reservation of these powers give so much control over
the trustee as to constitute an agency, which would be terminable upon
death. This rationale, applied to the facts of Ridge v. Bright, is in ac-
cord with recent decisions elsewhere6 and with the 1947 revision of sec-
tion 57 of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts. However, the transac-
tion before the court did not go so far as that in National Shawmut Bank
v. Joy,7 the high water mark of this development. There, the Massa-
chusetts court sustained a trust, A to B for A and C, in which full con-
trol over the trustee's investments was reserved by the settlor in addi-
tion to the other powers listed above. Ridge v. Bright was the case of
the settlor declaring herself trustee for a niece of shares in an investment
company, the instrument providing: "During my lifetime I reserve the
right, as trustee, to vote, sell, redeem, exchange or otherwise deal in or
with the stock subject hereto. . ... s Moreover, it provided that upon
any sale or redemption, the trust should terminate as to the stock sold or
redeemed, with the settlor entitled to retain the proceeds for her personal
account and use.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
ENFORCEMENT OF ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AFTER DEATH OF A SPOUSE
G. S. § 52-13 provides that "Any persons of full age about to be
married... may release and quitclaim dower, tenancy by curtesy ... in
IEnbler v. Embler, supra note 2; Avery v. Stewart, 136 N. C. 426, 48 S. E.
775 (1904).
'244 N. C. 345, 93 S. E. 2d 607 (1956).
Springs v. Hopkins, 171 N. C. 486, 88 S. E. 774 (1916); Witherington v:
Herring, 140 N. C. 495, 53 S. E. 303 (1906).
6 See 1 Scott, Trusts §§ 57, 57.1, and 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
7 315 Mass. 457, 53 N. E. 2d 113 (1944).
- 244 N. C. 345, 346, 93 S. E. 2d 607, 609 (1956). (Emphasis supplied.)
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the property of each other; and such releases may be pleaded in bar of
any action or proceeding for the recovery of the rights and estates so
released." In Turner v. Turner,' husband and wife mutually released
rights in each other's property by an antenuptial agreement. Later they
executed a separation agreement by which they also released rights in
each other's property. The separation agreement was annulled by
subsquent conjugal cohabitation. The North Carolina Supreme Court
found that since the separation agreement was not inconsistent with the
antenuptial agreement, the intent of the parties was for the separation
agreement to be supplementary to the antenuptial agreement. Therefore
the antenuptial agreement had not been rescinded, and it defeated the
wife's dower.
In Stewart v. Stewart,2 the Court held that where the will provided
that testator's estate should remain unsettled during his wife's lifetime
for the purpose of carrying out an antenuptial agreement providing an
annuity for the wife, the executor could not force the wife to accept a
lump sum payment based upon her life expectancy, but that the wife
could enforce the agreement. The result is to prevent the ultimate settle-
ment of the testator's estate until the wife dies.
DOWER
G. S. § 30-4 and § 52-19 provide that when a married woman shall
be convicted of the felonious slaying of her husband, or of being an ac-
cessory before the fact to such slaying, she shall lose all rights to dower.
In McMichael v. Proctor,3 the wife had been acquitted of the murder
of her husband. The North Carolina Court held that the acquittal was
a complete defense to the claim that she forfeited her dower because
G. S. § 30-4 and § 52-19 specifically require a conviction in order to work
a forfeiture. This decision is in accord with the rule that such statutes
will be construed narrowly.4 The question may arise, if the widow is
an accessory after the fact, would she still get the property ?5 The Court
might raise a constructive trust in such a situation, as was done in
Bryant v. Bryant,6 where the husband and wife held an estate by the
entirety and the husband murdered the wife. Also, in Garner v.
Phillips,7 where the son murdered his parents, the Court impressed a
constructive trust on the property.
'242 N. C. 533, 89 S. E. 2d 245 (1955).
2243 N. C. 284, 90 S. E. 2d 387 (1955).
3243 N. C. 479, 91 S. E. 2d 231 (1956).
'See 1 PAGE, WILLS § 231, 232 (3d Lifetime ed. 1941).
' See 26 N. C. L. REv. 232 (1948) for a discussion of the problem of accelerating
inheritance by murder.
8193 N. C. 373, 137 S. E. 188 (1927), commented on in 5 N. C. L. REv. 373
(1927).
'229 N. C. 161, 47 S. E. 2d 845 (1948).
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
The will directed the executor to take an inventory of the testator's
chattel property and real estate and bequeathed the home tract to "my
wife Lizzie Gomer during her natural life after her death to be sold
& divided (as all of my other property) equally between all of my
children."3 When the wife dissented and terminated her life estate and
thereby accelerated the vesting of the children's right to immediate en-
joyment of the home tract, the question of whether the executor had the
power to sell the realty arose. The Court said he had the power to sell
subject to the wife's dower right. In doing so, the Court followed
previous North Carolina holdings that where land is devised to be sold
for division among the heirs or designated beneficiaries, nothing else
appearing, the executor has no implied power to make the sale; but
where realty and personalty are mixed and are to be sold for division,
there is an implied power in the executor to sell both the realty and
personalty.9
In In re Estate of Boyles,'0 the executor refused to pay a beneficiary
her share of the personalty, and commingled funds of the estate with
money of the beneficiary. The Court found the clerk was justified in
revoking the executor's letters of administration under G. S. § 28-32,
which states that the clerk can revoke letters where the personal repre-
sentative has been guilty of default or misconduct in due execution of
his office.
In Poindexter v. First Nat'l Bank," the beneficiaries were suing the
personal representative for losses allegedly caused by mismanagement
in carrying on the intestate's manufacturing business, without adequate
authority to do so, for twenty-one months after intestate's death. The
Court stated that the usual rule is that the administrator is not an insurer
of the assets of the estate, but is required only to act in good faith, and
with such care as an ordinary, sensible, and prudent man would act with
his own property under like circumstances. The Court said: "'Accord-
ingly, it may in general be said that unless expressly authorized by statute,
by an order of court, by the will of the decedent, or by the terms of a
partnership agreement, neither an executor nor an administrator has any
authority or power to continue the estate of his decedent in trade or busi-
ness . . . except for the purpose of disposing of his stock in trade in
order to settle the estate or by disposing of the business of a going con-
cern.' 1.2 The personal representative cannot without specific authority
8 Gomer v. Askew, 242 N. C. 547, 548, 89 S. E. 2d 117, 119 (1955).
' Council v. Averett, 95 N. C. 131 (1886); Vaughan v. Farmer, 90 N. C. 607
(1882).10243 N. C. 279, 90 S. E. 2d 399 (1955).
11244 N. C. 191, 92 S. E. 2d 773 (1956).12Id. at 194, 92 S. E. 2d at 776, quoting 21 Am. JuR., Executors and Ad-
ministrators § 255 (1939).
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undertake generally to carry on the business. The Court reversed the
judgment of involuntary nonsuit entered by the trial judge.
EQUITABLE ELECTION
The doctrine of equitable election is based upon the principle that a
devisee cannot take benefits under a will and reject its adverse pro-
visions.' 3 The intent to put a beneficiary to an election must appear
plainly from the terms of the will itself.14 The doctrine applies when
the devisor purports to devise property which belongs to the beneficiary,
giving it to another, and also devises property of his own to the bene-
ficiary. The beneficiary is put to his election in such a case. 15 In two
recent cases,16 the Supreme Court held the doctrine of equitable election
inapplicable where the testator attempted to devise lands held by himself
and his wife by the entirety under the mistaken belief that he owned it
all individually. In neither case could there have been an intent to put
the wife to an election, since the husband thought he owned it all.
PATENT AND LATENT AMBIGUITY
Testatrix bequeathed to her sister "my furniture, household effects
and personal property. The balance of my estate I leave to the National
Red Cross Society of America.""' After payment of specific bequests,
and excluding the furniture and household effects, there was left some
$21,000.00 in cash and bonds. The problem then was whether the words
"personal property" in the bequest to the sister included the $21,000.00.
The Red Cross contended that personal property here meant household
effects and that it would not include the $21,000.00. In the course of
the opinion the Court discussed patent and latent ambiguities,' 8 and
" Lamb v. Lamb, 226 N. C. 662, 40 S. E. 2d 29 (1946).
21 Ibid.
" Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N. C. 703, 83 S. E. 2d 806 (1954).
"Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N. C. 734, 89 S. E. 2d 598 (1955).
The husband purchased land in the name of the husband and wife, thereby creating
a tenancy by entirety. Then the husband and wife made a deed to a trustee, void
because the provisions of G. S. § 52-12 were not followed. The trustee conveyed
back to the husband, who sold part of the land to third parties. The husband left
a will leaving the homeplace (not involved in the above-mentioned transaction)
and $50,000.00 to the wife. The Court held there was no election and the wife
took under the will and she also got the unsold portion of the tenancy by entirety,
plus one-half of the proceeds of the entirety land previously sold by the husband.
Taylor v. Taylor, 243 N. C. 726, 92 S. E. 2d 136 (1956). The testator devised
a life estate in three tracts to his wife, and the remainder to his sons. The testator
owned one tract individually, and was tenant by the entirety in the other two
tracts. The Court held that there was no election, and the wife took the personalty
and a life estate in the husband's tract under the will, and she also got the fee
in the entirety land by survivorship.
" Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Wolfe, 243 N. C. 469, 471, 91 S. E. 2d 246,
248 (1956).
1 "If there be a patent ambiguity in an instrument, the instrument must speak
for itself and evidence dehors cannot be resorted to ...it is a question of con-
struction ... and the only purpose of construction is to find out what the instru-
ment means, and that must depend upon what the instrument says. In cases of
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held that when a will contains a patent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is
not admissible to explain the meaning of the words used; but if the
patent ambiguity relates to intent as expressed in the will, evidence as
to facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of the
execution of the will19 is competent to aid the Court in ascertaining that
intent.20 Judgment for the Red Cross, entered by the court below, was
vacated because such evidence was excluded.
RELEASE OF EXPECTANCY
Intestate died survived by four sons and four daughters. Prior to
his death each daughter had released her expectancy to the intestate for
a consideration. 2' The previous North Carolina rule, as stated in Cannon
v. Nowell,22 was that an expectancy could not be released. The North
Carolina Supreme Court referred to this decision and said that it was
the minority view in America and had never since been followed in
North Carolina. The Court referred to various North Carolina equity
cases allowing transfers of expectancies, 23 and then adopted the majority
American rule24 holding the release of an expectancy binding if the con-
sideration is not grossly inadequate and the release is not procured by
fraud or undue influence.
latent ambiguity, evidence dehors is necessary. It is a question of identity, a
fitting of the description of the person, or thing, which can only be done by
evidence outside the instrument." Institute v. Norwood, 45 N. C. 64, 68 (1853).
" The facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of the
execution of the instrument are called "circumstances attendant."
" See recent note on this case in 35 N. C. L. REv. 167 (1956).
"Price v. Davis, 244 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 2d 93 (1956), commented on in 35
N. C. L. REV. 127 (1956).
2- 51 N. C. 436 (1859). Heirs take by positive law and the course of descent
cannot be altered by any agreement of the parties.
"McDonald v. McDonald, 58 N. C. 211 (1860) ; Mastin v. Mastin, 65 N. C.
696 (1871); Wright v. Brown, 116 N. C. 26, 22 S. E. 313 (1895); Kornegay v.
Miller, 137 N. C. 659, 50 S. E. 315 (1905).
"The majority rule is that a release by an heir or distributee, made to the
ancestor before the latter's death, where supported by an advancement or other
consideration, and freely and fairly made, is binding on the heir or distributee.
16 Am. JuR., Descent and Distribution § 152 (1938).
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